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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Rasmussen, Louse J. Ph.D., Human Factors and Industrial/Organizational Ph.D. Program, 
Department of Psychology, Wright State University, 2007. The Effects of 
Representational Format and Discourse Principles on the Comprehension and Production 
of Temporal Order. 
 
 
In the present study I examined the role physical representations play in supporting 
distributed planning and scheduling.  Specifically, I investigated the implications of 
different representational formats for the production of discourse as well as the later 
comprehension of text relating to temporal order.  In the first part of the study, pairs of 
participants created schedules for constructing a house with the aid of either a numeric, 
list format, or a graphical, Gantt chart format.  Participants completed the task in a non-
collocated fashion, without shared visual access.  In the second part of the study, after 
completing their schedule, the same participants answered a series of true/false 
statements about the order of events in a house construction schedule.  These sentences 
were presented randomly across the independent variables preposition, syntactic 
arrangement, semantic constraint, and temporal order (chronological and discourse).  
This experimental set-up allowed me to examine the effects of prior discourse on both the 
production of language in a conversational context and the effects of prior discourse on 
the comprehension of text.  My comprehension results demonstrated that features 
established in the previous literature which impose persistent influences on the cognitive 
complexity associated with language, such as syntax and iconicity, are sensitive to a 
pragmatic context.  Further, my production results pointed to the discourse situation itself 
as a source of temporal information, which can provide a context for resolving local 
ambiguity in propositions relating temporal order.  There were no persisting effects of the 
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representational formats on later comprehension; however, results suggested differences 
in the relationship between linguistic behavior and performance in the context of the two 
representations.  The present research thereby demonstrated the value of using verbal 
data to assess team performance.  The results of this study have implications for basic 
cognitive science by pointing to contextual influences of discourse and representational 
format on comprehension generally studied in more isolated contexts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
HOUSTON:  Endeavor, Houston, before you do that, would you please 
confirm that GPC 4 is in norm? 
ENDEAVOR: Affirmative, uh…GPC 4 is in norm.  And the Alpha…Alpha 
output feedback is good. 
 
This exchange between a controller NASA’s Mission Control and an Endeavor 
astronaut probably makes little sense. In addition to the specialized knowledge 
concerning the objects and procedures referred to, you, the reader, have no knowledge of 
the information that came before CAPCOM’s request, the referent for the relative 
pronoun ‘that’.  Additionally, research in cognitive psychology suggests that 
comprehension depends on the order in which the events are mentioned.  In chronological 
time, the ‘doing that’ will take place after the ‘confirming’, but the request introduces 
them in the opposite order.  This linguistic order reversal relative to chronological order 
increases the cognitive complexity associated with comprehending the sentence (Clark & 
Clark, 1968; French & Brown, 1977; Kavanaugh, 1979; Mandler, 1986; Trosborg, 1982).  
However, CAPCOM still described the events in this way, and the astronaut was able to 
respond to his request.  The present research examines language order effects in a 
situation where order is determined both chronologically and with respect to a distributed 
discourse context, such as is the case in the example above.  Additionally, I investigate 
the potential influences of physical representations on the production of discourse about 
order, and the later comprehension of order-related information.  The present research 
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will therefore examine the ability of language to function as an external representation 
and thereby to act as a foundation for collaborative activity.  
When considered separately, the existing literature on language comprehension 
provides predictions for most of the independent variables in the proposed study.  A 
fundamental claim of the proposed research is that the observed effects will vary from the 
predicted effects when the variables are investigated together, and in context.  The 
following sections will address the existing research which has examined the relationship 
between language and cognition, specifically focusing on the ability of language to 
communicate information about order.  Overall, this literature review will serve to 
highlight the focus in the existing literature on the comprehension of static linguistic 
features.  Further, this introduction will address the potential influences of contextual 
factors which exist in dynamic situations where language is both produced and 
comprehended. 
1.1 Individual versus Distributed Cognition 
Temporal order is not an unfamiliar topic in psychological research.  
Psychologists have long noted that humans are able to think about the world, particularly 
for thinking about the world not just as it is, but also as it could be.  This kind of 
reasoning is an example of our ability to reverse, and thereby abstract our thought from 
reality, an ability that Allen Newell referred to as ‘the great move’ (Newell, 1990). 
Since the cognitive revolution of the 1960s, great emphasis has been placed upon 
analyzing both language and cognition, such as the phenomena mentioned above, as 
thoroughly mental and largely private processes.  This resulted in the recognition of 
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intensional1 aspects of language, such as individual words (prepositions), syntax, as well 
as a limited number of extensional aspects, like order of mention and semantic constraints 
on the comprehension of written language.  
This literature, however, often omits the relationship between language behavior 
and the environment in which it takes place, a relationship that has long been recognized 
within other scientific disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, and linguistics.  In 
particular, researchers in anthropology, a field inherently interested in the role artifacts 
(technology and interfaces) and language play in shaping human interaction, have 
adopted a perspective on language that should be of conceptual and methodological 
interest to Human Factors psychology.  Similar to Human Factors, anthropology is also 
concerned with the role of artifacts (technology and interfaces) in shaping or guiding 
behavior.  An anthropological perspective on language regards the organization of 
language as extending beyond the mental attributes of an isolated speaker (Goodwin, 
2002) to the context in which the language is used. 
The working focus underlying a large proportion of the empirical work in 
psychology on the relationship between language and cognition seems to be that language 
is something humans consume, rather than something humans employ to attain a goal.  
This likely originates in an aspiration to get a firm grasp of basic phenomena before 
looking towards more complex ones.  An important, and largely unresolved question 
concerns whether the influences on cognitive complexity that have been identified within 
the literature on comprehension support predictions about the language people will use  
                                                 
1 Intensional is specification with respect to internal aspects of a system. Extensional is specification of 
aspects of one system with respect to those of another.  
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to accomplish a real task, i.e., when the language is used as a tool for coordinating 
activities between two people who are embedded in a common context and history.  For 
example, can we predict that people in such a context will tend to use language that 
describes events in chronological order because describing them in non-chronological 
order should be more complex to produce, and it should be more complex for the 
recipient to decode? A preliminary language analysis that I carried out on several voice 
transcripts of Mission Control communication revealed that the NASA controllers were 
more likely to produce sentence constructions with the main clause first, This means they 
were more likely to produce sentences like ‘x before y’, presenting events in 
chronological order, and ‘y after x’, presenting events in non-chronological order than 
they are to produce sentence with the main clause last.  The comprehension literature (H. 
Clark, & Chase, 1971; E. Clark, 1971) suggests that after is slightly easier to comprehend 
when the main clause is presented last, preserving chronological order, e.g. ‘after you do 
that, please confirm that GPC 4 is in norm’.  However, the analysis of Mission Control 
natural language suggests that controllers produce the main clause first construction when 
using the preposition after 47% more often than when they use the main clause last 
construction.  This suggests that the findings in the comprehension literature do not 
extend in a straightforward fashion to language in context.  Further, this preliminary 
evidence supports the notion that an account of the cognitive complexity associated with 
language should take pragmatic influences into account. 
The present study will investigate the psychological consequences of language 
organization in the context of a larger set of extensional influences, such as different 
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communicative purposes and representational support, and I will therefore discuss each in 
more detail in the following sections.   
1.2 Pragmatics and Comprehension 
A primary difference between cognition as it has been studied in traditional 
comprehension paradigms and cognition as it unfolds in applied contexts concerns the 
breadth and the nature of the reasoning content.  By breadth, I am referring to the types of 
considerations that speakers and recipients make when they produce and decode 
language.  For example, speakers are likely to choose language that satisfies multiple 
goals, ease of comprehension only being one of those goals.  I will address one way to 
conceptualize discourse goals in the following section on rules for cooperation.  By the 
nature of the reasoning content, I am referring to how speakers and recipients 
conceptualize the content of language.  The upcoming section on rules for cooperation 
will address this issue. 
1.2.1 Rules for Cooperation 
Two related theoretical approaches to addressing the implicit rules speakers use to 
ensure cooperation in discourse are Gricean maxims and the Given-New principle.  
1.2.1.1 Gricean maxims. 
The philosophy of language, a field that to a large extent has developed into the 
study of pragmatics, has identified a number of implicit maxims, or rules, that speakers 
appear to follow in order to facilitate cooperation in discourse.  Gricean maxims are an 
example of such rules.  Grice’s (1975) maxims assume that speakers design their 
utterances to facilitate listener comprehension.  Conversational maxims organized along 
four dimensions (Grice, 1975) dictate that one should:  
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Quantity:    
1) Make one’s contribution to the conversation as informative as necessary. 
2) Not make one’s contribution to the conversation more informative than 
necessary. 
Quality:  
1) Not say what one believes to be false. 
2) Not say that for which one lacks adequate evidence. 
Relevance:  
1) Be relevant (i.e., say things related to the current topic of the conversation). 
Manner:  
1. Avoid obscurity of expression.  
2. Avoid ambiguity.  
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary wordiness).  
4. Be orderly.  
 
These maxims introduce the possibility that speakers might formulate speech that 
manipulates order of mention relative to order of occurrence on purpose, in order to 
facilitate comprehension.  However, a potential pragmatic purpose for reversing order of 
mention could be related to implicit conventions concerning when certain information 
should be introduced.  That is, it is possible that speakers mention events out of 
chronological order to enhance quantity, e.g., to alert listeners to important information.  
Grice (1981) indeed has explored this possibility and has identified the linguistic 
phenomenon of implicature. An implicature is anything meant, implied, or suggested 
distinct from what is explicitly said.  Implicatures can be part of sentence meaning or 
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dependent on conversational context.  For example, if you ask me how my day was, and I 
reply ‘how about those Reds?’ by changing the topic, I am implying that I would rather 
not discuss how my day was.  It is possible that speakers use order of presentation in a 
similar way, to imply or suggest meaning.  Importantly, within this view, implicature 
cannot be determined simply by looking at an isolated sentence or utterance—rather it 
emerges from the context.  Further, it suggests that there may be pragmatic constraints on 
the order in which we talk about objects and events.  
1.2.1.2 The Given-New principle. 
The Given-New principle is another example of an implicit convention which 
suggests the presence of influences of order of presentation relative to a communicative, 
or discourse context.  Chafe’s (1972) maxim of antecedents, or the Given-New principle, 
states that one communicates New information, relative to the conversational context, on 
the basis of Given, or already established information.   
If information has been discussed recently, speakers generally consider that 
information as Given.  For example, you ask me whether or not I have turned up the heat, 
and I reply ‘I turned up the heat after I closed the door’—communicating that not only 
have I turned up the heat, but I have closed the door to attain the same goal, raising the 
temperature.  The order in which I mention these actions, however, is not based on the 
chronological order in which they occurred, rather, based on what has been established in 
prior discourse.  Turning up the heat is Given and therefore mentioned first.  Closing the 
door is New and therefore mentioned last.   
It is worth noting that mentioning the topic of your conversation partner’s request 
first is simply the polite thing to do.  Brown and Levinson (1987) have pointed out that 
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another important goal in conversation, in addition to cooperation, is the preservation of 
face.  Brown et al. propose that one of the strategies speakers use to ‘get what they want’ 
is to avoid embarrassing the listener by being polite.  One of the ways this politeness 
strategy may manifest itself, is in acknowledging a listener’s query through the order in 
which a speaker mentions objects or events.  
This means that, in addition to chronological order of occurrence, order can also 
be conceptualized as relative to the communicative context.  The idea that an individual 
sentence or entire paragraph is easier to comprehend when it respects a Given-New 
convention than when it challenges such a strategy was examined in a series of 
comprehension studies that all measured reading time of target sentences that were 
presented after context sentences provided the grounding for Given information.   
Clark and Haviland (1974) presented subjects with two sentences, a context 
sentence which either provided a direct or an indirect context for the second sentence.  
For example, in the sentences ‘We got some beer out of the trunk.  The beer was warm’ 
the first sentence provides a direct context.  In the sentences ‘We checked the picnic 
supplies.  The beer was warm’ the first sentence provides an indirect context.  Clark and 
Haviland found that the presence of a direct antecedent (i.e., overlapping words), such as 
in the first sentence pair, facilitated comprehension.  
Van de Kopple (1982) increased the scope of relevant context by examining the 
effects of contradicting the Given-New convention within paragraphs rather than 
sentences.  He used readability preference as a dependent measure instead of the 
traditional reading time or response time measures.  Van de Kopple found that 
participants preferred the topically-linked paragraphs that observed the Given-New 
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principle, and that they remembered more information from these paragraphs as indicated 
by performance on a short answer memory test.   
Clark and Haviland (1974) provided a process account of the Given-New effect, 
and concluded that presenting Given information first provides the reader with a mental 
scaffold onto which New information can be attached.  If New information is presented 
first, the readers must keep New information in memory while they wait for the 
antecedent for this information.  This account is consistent with Bransford and Johnson 
(1973), who found that a paragraph is more difficult to remember in the absence of a 
topic.  Similarly, Kintsch and Van Dijk’s (1978) corroborated these findings with their 
claim that in text processing, coherence can be established when arguments are shared 
across sentences.  Kintsch and Van Dijk suggested that argument overlap is one of the 
primary means through which readers connect sentences to form a coherent mental 
representation of them. 
The above sections suggest at least two reasons to mention Given information 
first: 1) to facilitate comprehension, and 2) to be polite.  It is possible that the increased 
level of difficulty in comprehension for chronological order mismatch seen in previous 
studies, which examined sentences divorced from a discourse or narrative context, 
reflects the absence of a communicative purpose for the order reversals. 
Conversational maxims, and to a certain extent the given-new principle, point to 
the existence of a certain complementarity between production and comprehension.  If 
comprehension and production are indeed complementary, this suggests that findings 
from comprehension ought to generalize to production.  If they do not generalize, as the 
mission control analysis above suggests, either: 1) Grice and Chafe are mistaken in their 
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basic assumption—speakers do not try to facilitate listener comprehension, or 2) 
documented psycholinguistic phenomena regarding comprehension are inadequate 
predictors of production because the phenomena were measured without taking context 
into account. 
To elaborate on the second and more likely alternative, the existence of pragmatic 
conventions could potentially mean one of several alternatives regarding the predictive 
value of the linguistic sources of cognitive complexity established in prior research.  It is 
possible those low-level influences on cognitive complexity are valid, and that speakers 
intentionally increase cognitive complexity to ensure that listeners pay attention.  
Alternatively, it is possible that the pragmatic context in and of itself serves to 
disambiguate language and thereby reduces the cognitive complexity associated with it.   
In sum, the mere existence of pragmatic influences on how people use language 
point to broader contextual influences on production, and thereby features which can 
influence comprehension.  The present study systematically examined a few of the 
potential pragmatic influences on language production and comprehension, and thereby 
also investigates the degree to which the two can be thought of as complementary.  This 
study focuses on discourse itself as a context, in addition to the representational support 
used to complete a cooperative task.  In order to examine the influence of these contexts 
on production and comprehension, the following sections address existing literature on 
the cognitive complexity associated with language.  
1.3 Syntax and Comprehension 
The following section explores the existing research on language comprehension, 
specifically comprehension of language that describes the relationships between temporal 
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events.  I introduce the variables that have been found to affect comprehension of 
temporal information separately, but as we shall see, several of these variables have been 
found  also to interact.  These variables include: words, syntax, and order of presentation, 
also referred to as iconicity.  
It is important to note that the literature presented here all specifically addresses 
comprehension rather than production.  The primary reason for this is that psychology 
traditionally has tended to focus on comprehension, presumably assuming 
complementarity between the two.  Additionally, even though the present study does not 
assume complementarity, I have chosen to focus on production as a context for 
comprehension.  That is, unlike the vast majority of language comprehension research, I 
will investigate the implications of a production, or discourse context on subsequent 
comprehension.  
First, I will discuss some of the early work on language comprehension, which 
presupposes a model of comprehension in which people encode language into a mental 
representation in the form of propositions.  Then, I will address more recent research on 
language comprehension in which comprehension is conceptualized as the online 
construction of a spatial, or experience-based mental representation, sometimes referred 
to as a situation model (see Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998 for review).  
1.3.1 Syntax and Language as Propositions 
Decades of cognitive psychology research have addressed the relationship 
between the perception of spatial and temporal relationships and the comprehension of 
relational linguistic descriptions, usually expressed with prepositions.  The 
methodological reason for this is that that nonlinear nature of space provides an 
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interesting counterpart to the linear nature of language (Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998).  
This discrepancy provides ideal conditions for studying the reasoning processes involved 
in resolving ambiguity and in constructing mental representations.  
The very structure of language, or syntax, provides us with a high level ordinal 
representation that imposes very significant constraints on how information is extracted 
from a sentence.  Syntax provides a framework for communicating intended order in 
ways that transcend actual temporal order of events so that the narrative is consistent with 
a greater framework of narrative.  Narrative content can manipulate temporal order—talk 
about the future first, then the present, and then the past.  Yet narratives are linear: like 
controlled attention, they address topics in sequence (Tversky, 2004).  Whether read or 
heard, the experience of the narrative must take place in a predetermined order.  A 
sentence requires processing from beginning to end in order to decode its message—we 
cannot start in the middle or at the end and then work our way backwards.  Therefore, 
processing the serial sentence ‘I picked up the kids from school after I ran errands’ is out 
of order2 relative to the order in which events actually occurred.  
Early developmental evidence, relying on the assumption that children acquire 
and use simpler syntactic and semantic distinctions before more complex ones, suggests 
that syntactic arrangements that preserve the temporal order of events are easier to 
comprehend.  Clark and Clark (1968) found better memory for sentences that preserved 
chronological order.  Similarly, Trosborg (1982) found that children had an easier time 
comprehending, i.e., judging the correctness of a sentence that was read out loud as well 
as acting out, sentences that presented information in chronological order, that is ‘x is 
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before y’ and ‘after x, y’. ‘X is before y’ was always the easiest of the two, meaning 
children made fewer errors on those than on ‘after x, y’.  This is consistent with E. 
Clark’s (1971) finding that children acquire the meaning of before earlier than they 
acquire the meaning of after.  
These studies attributed the differential cognitive complexity associated with 
these relational sentences to the differential ease with which marked and unmarked 
distinctions are encoded into and rate at which they can be lost from memory.  Sentences 
that reversed the order of mention of the events relative to temporal occurrence were 
considered marked:  
Unmarked: He tooted the horn before he swiped the cabbages. 
 
  After he tooted the horn he swiped the cabbages. 
 
Marked: He swiped the cabbages after he tooted the horn. 
 
  Before he swiped the cabbages he tooted the horn. 
 
According to Clark and Clark (1968) and Clark and Card (1969), memory for 
relational information depends on a primary relation as well as a marker.  For example, to 
remember a before relation, we encode a proposition containing the unmarked relation, 
and a marker tag that is set to zero, as it is unmarked, i.e., before0.  To remember an after 
relation, we encode the unmarked relation and a marker tag set to one, i.e., before1.  
Unmarked relations are easier because they are less complex, i.e., it is easier to remember 
the absence of a marker, than the presence of one.  Or, it is easier to misremember the 
presence of a marker, than the absence of one.  These results supported this account by 
___________________________________________________________ 
2 Reversing order, although it requires syntactic and lexical adjustments, does not result in a false 
proposition, it is still produces a truthful description of the world. 
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showing that when participants remembered order of mention instead of temporal order 
they most often misremembered using the unmarked form.  Clark and Chase (1972) 
further examined the marking construct in a sentence picture comparison task, and 
concluded that this process could also be accounted for using the marking notion.  
Verification response times suggested that pictures were encoded using the unmarked 
proposition. Within this framework, it is possible to think of order of mention as an 
unmarked or marked relation.  Sentences mentioning events out of order are encoded as a 
proposition mentioning events in order, plus a tag for marking. 
Clark and Clark (1968) proposed that the position of the main clause3 is the most 
important cognitive feature of a sentence.  That is, in computational terms, the position of 
the main clause is the feature of the sentence that is evaluated first.  If the main clause is 
positioned first, the sentence is considered unmarked for clause position; if it positioned 
last, it is considered marked.  Clark and Clark indeed demonstrated this in a study of 
recall of information presented in sentences varying marked and unmarked lexical items 
(before/after), clause position (and therefore chronological order).  They found that, in 
expressing what they remembered, subjects made fewer mistakes recalling sentences with 
the main clause first, but also in recalling sentences presenting events in chronological 
order.  So, ‘x before y’ resulted in fewer mistakes than ‘y after x’, but both of those 
resulted in fewer mistakes than ‘after x, y’ and ‘before y, x’.  
 
                                                 
3 A subordinate clause (sometimes called a dependent clause) is a clause that cannot stand alone as a 
complete sentence, e.g. “before he swiped the cabbages”.  Like the main clause, the subordinate clause 
contains a subject and a predicate; however, unlike the main clause, the subordinate clause begins with a 
subordinating conjunction, such as although, because, if, since, while, before, after, when, whereas, etc.   
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In expressing the information they recalled (production), however, it became 
evident that subjects often were only remembering the underlying sense of the sentence; 
not the topological order of the sentence.  That is, they remembered the correct 
chronological order, but would express this information in a different way than it was 
presented to them.  They might see the sentence ‘y after x’ but recall the sentence as ‘x 
before y’.  Examining these results as findings concerning production suggests that 
subjects preferred ‘x before y’ sentences over ‘y after x’ sentences’ in producing their 
answers—i.e., main clause first, before sentences were produced more often.  Clark and 
his colleagues saw such results as evidence that clause position is a cognitively more 
important feature of language than iconicity, i.e., it is more basic to cognitive 
organization. 
It appears, however, that this conceptualization of syntax and order of mention as 
static influences on comprehension may be influenced by other factors.  In fact, the only 
consensus in this literature as to the relative difficulties of syntactic constructions that 
reverse or do not reverse chronological order concerns the extremes, i.e., which sentence 
construction is the easiest, and which is the most difficult.  Sentences using before 
placing the main clause first are always easiest—they present events in chronological 
order (chronomc1st, see Appendix A for naming key).  Sentences using before placing 
the main clause last are almost uniformly the most difficult—it presents events in non-
chronological order (nchronomc2nd).  There is a lack of consensus as to the relative 
difficulty of sentences using the preposition after.  Children find it just as easy to act out 
before main clause first as after main clause last sentences (French, & Brown, 1977).  
Importantly, these sentences both present events in chronological order.  In the other 
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studies the relative difficulties of aftermc1st and aftermc2nd appears to depend on the age 
of the participants (Adults: Clark, & Clark, 1968; Mandler, 1986, Children: E. Clark, 
1971; French, & Brown, 1979; Kavanaugh, 1979; Trosborg, 1982) and the nature of the 
task (Recall/errors: Clark, & Clark, 1968, Acting out/errors: French, & Brown, 1979, 
Reading/reading time: Mandler (1986). 
In large part, the literature mentioned in this section, except for Mandler (1986), 
presupposes a model of comprehension in which people encode language into 
propositions.  This process of translating a sentence into a nominal proposition can either 
be facilitated, if the language is unmarked, or hindered, if the language is marked.  More 
recently, language comprehension has been conceptualized as the online construction of a 
mental representation with spatial attributes.  
1.3.2 Syntax and Language as Experience 
Rather than conceptualizing syntactic aspects of language as features which can 
facilitate translation into a mental format, it is possible to think of syntax as a feature that 
can assist in conveying, or recreating a physical experience.  The literature on situation 
models has established that comprehension is facilitated when descriptions present events 
in an order that is consistent with the experience people might have if they were 
physically acting out, or taking part in the situation described by a sentence.  Ehrlich and 
Johnson-Laird (1982), for example, found that when spatial relations between physical 
objects are described in an order consistent with moving around the objects in space the 
sentence was read faster and was therefore easier to comprehend.  For example, ‘the knife 
is in front of the pot.  The pot is on the left of the glass.  The glass is behind the dish’ was 
easier to comprehend than ‘the knife is in front of the pot.  The glass is behind the dish.  
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The pot is on the left of the glass’.  It is not clear, however, that reading time, which has 
been employed extensively in the context of comprehension studies, and in this study in 
particular, necessarily involves a comprehension component and therefore does not lend 
itself to straightforward interpretation (Foss & Bower, 1986). 
Much of the early literature described earlier assumed that the words we use to 
describe spatial and temporal relationships must be complementary in their usage.  
Mandler (1986) noted that perhaps the connectives before and after are not exact 
converses because they highlight different parts of the sentence, but she does not 
elaborate the entailments.  In the realm of logic, it makes perfect sense, that if one can say 
that the Star symbol is above the Plus symbol, it should be just as legitimate to say that 
the Plus is under the Star (Clark, & Chase, 1972).  However, when the statements refer to 
real objects, and not to meaningless symbols, our understanding of these objects and their 
relationships may not be entirely logical, and descriptions may not be complementary.  
For example, I would be unlikely to tell you ‘the table is under the stapler’.  This 
suggests that our understanding of the on/under relationship is sensitive to the kinds of 
objects the relationship concerns.  Perhaps this is due to the relative size difference 
between the stapler and the table, or perhaps it is not that simple.  If the table happened to 
be located under a pile of staplers, we might have a difficult time discerning the table, 
and it would then make sense to point out the location of the table as under the staplers.  
The new questions here become: what determines which aspects (objects or events) in the 
environment we tend to point out, in what situations, and how do we ‘point’ with 
language? 
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The present research is particularly focused on these questions as they relate to 
events in a scheduling task.  The following section on discourse order will address the 
question of ‘how we point with language’, which is particularly applicable in distributed 
work settings where participants cannot see each other, and language therefore is the only 
method for pointing.  The next section will discuss physical representations as external 
constraints on how we choose which objects, events, and relationships need to be 
addressed explicitly.  The section concerning semantic constraints will address potential 
characteristics of the events, and relations between them that influence the likelihood that 
we will discuss them explicitly. 
When we talk about objects, like the example above, ‘the stapler is on the table’, 
there is no correct order of mention, that is, there is no such thing as iconic order.  This 
means that there is not the potential for the order of language to reflect or misreflect the 
state of the world, as can be the case when we talk about events.  Therefore discourse 
relating the order of events must reflect other considerations.  In a speeded decision task, 
Zwaan and Yaxley (2003a) presented participants with word pairs that were semantically 
related—the relationship was either an iconic relation (the word ‘attic’ presented above 
the word ‘basement’) or in a reverse-iconic relation (the word ‘basement’ presented 
above the word “attic’).  The participants had a more difficult time judging the semantic 
relatedness of the reverse-iconic word pairs.  A follow-up experiment presenting the 
words horizontally did not replicate this effect, demonstrating that the iconicity effect is 
not due to the order in which the words are read. Zwaan and Yaxley (2003b) propose that 
a perceptual theory of lexical representation can account for these results (Barsalou, 
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1999; Langacker, and Pulvermüller, 1999). According to this theory, words activate a 
perceptual representation of their referents. 
In both the previous examples, ‘the stapler is on the table’ and ‘the table is under 
the staplers’ the objects that are mentioned first are those that have presumably been 
mentioned earlier.  Likely, ‘the table is under the staplers’ may be the answer to the 
question ‘where is the table?’.  That is why it is mentioned first in the answer.  By 
mentioning the object from the question first the answer ‘points’, in a figurative sense, 
from the object that is known to the one that is not.  From this example it appears that an 
alternative criterion for selecting order of mention resides beyond the semantic ties 
between an individual statement and that which it refers to, but extends to the discourse 
in which the statement is embedded.  If this is the case, within the view that language is 
used to create a perceptual experience, it is possible that the experience is sometimes best 
created presenting objects or events out of chronological order.  
1.3.2.1 Pragmatic influences on linguistic complexity. 
I propose that prior research suggesting systematic influences on comprehension 
of lexical/syntactic level language aspects, such as preposition, clause position, and 
iconicity, is likely confounded by lack of a pragmatic context.  In these studies, the 
communicative context was exceedingly narrow, constrained to individual sentences or 
paragraphs.  This reduces the possibility of uncovering potential interactions between 
these purportedly stable language attributes and pragmatic phenomena, such as discourse 
principles, and communicative figure/ground distinction.  In other words, the 
determinants of cognitive complexity associated with language may look very different 
when the sentences have communicative purpose.   
20 
 
Such an interaction may take the following form.  Imagine a situation in which we 
already discussed, and therefore established that ‘you pour the foundation before you 
build the frame’.  Here both events are therefore given, and there is no communicative 
purpose to placing one or the other in the main clause.  The presence or absence of a 
reason for one construction or the other influences the difference between the ease with 
which the two arrangements are comprehended.  Consider a situation in which we have 
established when ‘pouring the foundation’ occurs relative to a set of other events, but 
now we introduce a previously unheard of event, such as installing the floor joists.  Not 
only should the sentences that violate discourse order, i.e., mention New information 
first, be more difficult to comprehend, the sentences that 1) violate conventions for 
discourse order (present New information first) and 2) whose order does not match 
chronological order of occurrence will be most difficult of all (see Figure 1 and Tables 1, 
2, and 3 for process claims).  
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Figure 1. Interaction between iconicity and discourse order.  Effect of reversing 
chronological order is larger when the Given-New principle is violated. 
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Table 1 
 
Summary of Established and Predicted Research Findings 
 
 Effect Direction Author(s) 
1 Preposition After more difficult E. Clark (1971)  
Clark and Chase (1972) 
2 Clause Main clause last more 
difficult 
E. Clark (1971) 
Clark and Chase (1972) 
3 Chronological order  
(Iconicity 
Assumption) 
Order mismatch more 
difficult 
Clark (1965)   
Clark and Card (1968) 
French and Brown (1977)  
Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird 
(1982) 
Kavanaugh (1979)  
Trosborg (1982)  
4 Discourse Principles 
(Given-New 
Principle) 
Not observing Given-
New principles more 
difficult 
Haviland and Clark (1974) 
Kopple (1982) 
5 Semantic constraints Arbitrary constraints 
more difficult 
French and Brown (1977) 
Kavanaugh (1979)  
Trosborg (1982) 
Mandler (1986) 
6 Chronological order 
and semantic 
constraints interaction 
Effect of chronological 
order reversal larger with 
social constraints 
Mandler (1986) 
7 Chronological order 
and discourse 
principles interaction 
Effect of chronological 
order reversal larger with 
violation of discourse 
principles 
Rasmussen Prediction 
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Table 2 
 
Sources of Cognitive Complexity I. Replicated and Predicted Influences on 
Comprehension—Chronological Order. 
 
Semantic 
Constraint
s 
Discours
e Order 
Main 
Claus
e 
Effects Chronological Order Match 
First   
You pour the foundation before you build 
the frame 
Given-
Given Last 1, 2 
After you pour the foundation you build 
the frame 
First   
You pour the foundation before you 
backfill around the foundation 
Given- 
New Last 1, 2 
After you pour the foundation you 
backfill around the foundation 
First 4 
You clear the trees before you pour the 
foundation 
Physical 
New- 
Given Last 1, 2, 4 
After you clear the trees you pour the 
foundation 
First 5 
You pour the foundation before you 
deliver the windows 
Given-
Given Last 1, 2, 5 
After you pour the foundation you deliver 
the windows 
First 5 
You pour the foundation before you 
grade for the lawn 
Given- 
New Last 1, 2, 5 
After you pour the foundation you grade 
for the lawn 
First 4, 5 
You build the access road before you 
pour the foundation 
Social 
New-
Given Last 
1, 2, 4, 
5 
After you build the access road you pour 
the foundation 
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Table 3 
 
Sources of Cognitive Complexity II. Replicated and Predicted Variables on 
Comprehension—Non-chronological Order. 
 
Semantic 
Constraint
s 
Discours
e Order 
Main 
Claus
e 
Effects Chronological Order Mismatch 
First 1 
You build the frame after you pour the 
foundation 
Given-
Given Last 2 
Before you build the frame you pour 
the foundation 
First 1 
You pour the foundation after you 
clear the trees 
Given- 
New Last 2 
Before you pour the foundation you 
clear the trees 
First 2, 4 
You backfill around the foundation 
after you pour the foundation 
Physical 
New-
Given Last 1, 4 
Before you backfill around the 
foundation you pour the foundation 
First 1, 3, 5, 6 
You deliver the windows after you 
pour the foundation 
Given-
Given Last 2, 3, 5, 6 
Before you deliver the windows you 
pour the foundation 
First 1, 3, 5, 6 
You pour the foundation after you 
build the access road 
Given- 
New Last 2, 3, 5, 6 
Before you pour the foundation you 
build the access road 
First 
1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7 
You grade for the lawn after you pour 
the foundation 
Social 
New- 
Given Last 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7 
Before you grade for the lawn you 
pour the foundation 
 
 
Accordingly a sentence construction that preserves discourse expectations, 
temporal order, and emphasizes New information should be ideal.  This would be the 
sentence construction that observes discourse order, preserves chronological order, but 
places the main clause last.  The placement of new information in the main clause might 
assist in calling attention to the fact that it is indeed New information.  That is, in the 
examples in Table 2, the sentence ‘after you pour the foundation you grade for the lawn’ 
25 
 
meets these criteria.  If the preposition before is used, as in the sentence ‘you pour the 
foundation before you grade for the lawn’, the main clause must be mentioned first to 
preserve chronological order and since New information should be presented last, the 
New information must be presented in the subordinate clause.  A three-way interaction 
could therefore emerge between preposition, clause, and discourse principles (see    
Figure 2).   
Preposition, Clause Position, and Discourse Order 
Predicted Interaction
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
After/GN After/NG Before/GN Before/NG
Preposition/Discourse Order
R
T Main Clause Last
Main Clause First
 
Figure 2. Three-way interaction between preposition, clause position, and discourse 
order.  
 
1.4 Semantics and Comprehension 
In addition to order-related complexity, the systematic influences of the semantic 
content and conceptual distance on comprehension have been examined also in the 
literature.  Clark and his colleagues only examined sentences consisting of arbitrarily 
related events, e.g., ‘he tooted the horn before he swiped the cabbages’.  The nature of 
the relationship between the events and the perceived distance between them may have 
important consequences for the ease with which propositions are comprehended.  More 
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importantly, however, these variables may potentially interact with the linguistic and 
discourse level influences discussed above.  
1.4.1 Semantic Relationship 
Even though it is possible to imagine and talk about violating physical laws, we 
cannot actually violate them in the physical world.  Research in psychology has examined 
the psychological implications of reasoning about different kinds of logical relationships.  
Such studies, distinguish between two types of constraints: logical and arbitrary, which 
researchers operationalize broadly as the presence or absence of constraints on the order 
of events (French & Brown, 1977; Kavanaugh, 1979; Trosborg, 1982; Mandler, 1986).  
The sentence ‘Anna went to bed after she brushed her teeth’ would be an example of a 
logical relationship and the sentence ‘Otto washed his car before he polished his bicycle’ 
would be an example of an arbitrary relationship (Trosborg, 1982).  All of the above 
studies found that logically connected sentences were easier to comprehend, as indicated 
by faster response times (Trosborg, 1982) and shorter time to reenact (French et al, 
1977).  Further, Mandler (1986) has also determined that logically constrained 
relationships are less sensitive to manipulation of order of mention.  That is, a sentence 
concerning a logical relationship is as easily comprehended when sentence order does not 
match order of occurrence as when it does (see Figure 3).  This is not the case for 
sentences relating arbitrary relationships.  For example, there is a small response time 
difference between the sentences ‘Anna brushed her teeth before she went to bed’ and 
‘Anna went to bed after she brushed her teeth’.  There is a large difference between ‘Otto 
washed his car before he polished his bicycle’ and ‘Otto polished his bicycle after he 
washed his car’. 
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Interaction between Iconicity and Semantic Relationship 
(Mandler, 1986)
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Chronological Non-chronological
Semantic Relationship
R
T Arbitrary
Causal
 
 
Figure 3. Interaction between iconicity and semantic relationship (Mandler, 1986).  
 
Mandler accounted for this significant interaction between order of mention and 
constraint type by positing that a mental model of the logical events exists prior to the 
experimental situation, whereas a model of the arbitrarily related events must be 
constructed ad hoc.  Necessarily it takes longer to construct a model than it does to 
retrieve an existing model from memory.  A match between the order of mention and 
chronological order facilitates the construction of such a mental model, and the order 
mismatch therefore has a greater detrimental influence in the context of relationships that 
require model construction.  This account has been corroborated by later research 
concerning the construction of situation models in language comprehension.  Myers and 
O’Brien (1998) and O’Brien and Myers (1999) suggest that the building blocks for the 
construction of causally connected sentences are facilitated by bottom-up processes in 
which the words and ideas in a text resonate with concepts in semantic and episodic 
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memory.  This implies that the causal knowledge necessary to establish coherence 
between sentences can be directly accessed in memory (Kintsch, 2001).  
In contrast to nouns, temporal relationships between actions and events are likely 
physically rather than logically related.  The mental model literature distinguishes 
between the different relationships associated with actions and events.4  Goldvarg and 
Johnson-Laird (2001) suggest that these can be conceptually related via either causal or 
deontic ties.  Accordingly, whereas causal constraints adhere to physical laws (cannot be 
violated, similar to necessary truths), deontic constraints apply by virtue of duty or 
obligation and therefore adhere to social convention (and can be violated, similar to 
contingent truths).   
The main distinction between differentially constrained (physically and socially) 
relationships is the kind of restriction imposed by them on the order in which events can 
occur.  The existence of a physical relationship between events A and B entails that it is 
not possible for B to precede A in time.  The existence of a social relationship between 
two events entails that it is not probable that B precedes A in time.  Social constraints 
therefore impose weaker restrictions than physical constraints.  An example of a physical 
constraint would be ‘Anna read the letter before she burned it’—here it is not possible to 
carry out the actions in the reverse order.  An example of a social relationship would be 
                                                 
4 In the above studies, the operationalization of ‘logical’ relationships is not clear.  Whereas the early 
psychology literature examined what was referred to as ‘logical’ relationships, the more recent research on 
situation models use the term ‘causal’ instead. Philosophers as early as Leibniz have recognized that 
different kinds of truths, or logical relationships, exist: those that can be violated and those that cannot.  
Contingent truths can be violated but necessary truths cannot (Wilson, 1984).  Necessary truths are those 
that it would be contradictory to deny.  For example, ‘squares have four sides’ is a necessary truth because 
saying that ‘squares are round’ would contradict the definition.  ‘Stop signs are hexagonal’ is a contingent 
truth because they could possibly be round within a different cultural convention.   
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‘Otto washed his hands after using the restroom’.  The order in which these actions are 
carried out is not determined by physical laws, but very much by social and cultural 
convention.   
1.4.2  Psychological Distance 
Another aspect of mental organization that can potentially influence the 
complexity associated with language describing relationships between objects or events 
concerns the perceived distance between them.  
Do you enter a restaurant before you sit down at a table?  Do you enter a 
restaurant before you pay your bill?  Which of these were easier to answer?  If you found 
that the first was easier then your performance would be consistent with Foss and 
Bower’s (1986) findings that the relationship between knowledge items that are closer to 
each other in a conceptual hierarchy are easier to comprehend.  
Foss and Bower specifically examined the psychological distance between goals 
and actions that supported those goals.  Goals and actions that were further removed from 
each other were more difficult to understand.  For example, the goal-action pair ‘Sue 
wanted to protect the environment so she made a sign’ was more difficult to understand 
than ‘Sue wanted to protect the environment so she joined a rally’.  Similarly, Myers, 
Shinjo, and Duffy (1987) presented participants with pairs of sentences that were causally 
related to each other, but varied in the extent to which the causal relations were close or 
distant.  Reading times indicated that causally close sentences were processed faster than 
causally distant sentences.  
A more recent study by Franklin, Smith, and Jonides (2007) has demonstrated that 
the psychological distance between two actions, operationalized as number of interceding 
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actions, interacts with variables such as where the action resides within the action 
hierarchy.  The data from this sentence-verification study suggests that sometimes, 
depending on their familiarity with the subject matter, participants respond faster when 
actions are far apart in the routine and at other times they are faster when actions are 
closer together.  Franklin et al., therefore provide evidence for both distance and reverse-
distance effects.  
This, however, suggests an explanation for the Given-New phenomenon that 
Haviland and Clark (1974) overlooked.  It is possible that the finding that violating the 
Given-New principle increases comprehension time is confounded with psychological 
distance.  Clark and Haviland intended a difference between the sentence pairs based on 
direct and indirect grounding, but perhaps the real difference was one of psychological 
distance.  The relation between the sentences ‘we got some beer out of the trunk.  The 
beer was warm’, is indeed direct, but in the sentence ‘we checked the picnic supplies.  
The beer was warm’ the picnic supplies can be regarded as a superordinate concept, and 
the magnitude of the distance between picnic supplies and beer could be the determining 
factor in the magnitude of the difference in comprehension found in this experiment.  To 
adequately control for this potential influence, context sentences that involved less 
remotely related concepts, but nevertheless different lexical items, should be included.  
For example, ‘we checked the beverages in the trunk.  The beer was warm’ does not 
immediately ground by providing the same lexical items in the context and target 
sentences, but should still be easier to comprehend than when the context involves picnic 
supplies.   
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Clark and Haviland did examine the effects of increasing the inferential steps 
between sentences without changing the noun in order to see if the mere re-mention of 
the noun was the source of the effect, and found that inferential steps reduce the 
advantage for comprehension of observing the Given-New principle.  For example, ‘Ed 
wanted an alligator for his birthday.  The alligator was his favorite present’ was more 
difficult to comprehend than ‘Ed was given an alligator for his birthday.  The alligator 
was his favorite present’.  Again, here it is possible that the difference in comprehension 
is due to differences in the states identified in each sentence.  The first context sentence 
refers to a hypothetical, a state of ‘want’, whereas the target sentence refers to a state of 
‘having'.  It takes time to establish the relation between the two, just as it takes time to 
establish the relation between picnic supplies and beer. 
1.5 Representational Format and Cooperation 
So far I have addressed potential communicative, or pragmatic, contextual 
influences on the cognitive complexity associated with stable linguistic features.  Another 
contextual factor that may have important influences on cognitive complexity concerns 
the nature of persisting external representations available to support, or provide reference 
for the content of language.  
In real-world distributed work domains, like Mission Control, representations, 
displays, charts, diagrams, etc., often form the foundation for communication.  The 
objects and events that the communication refers to, the things that are reasoned about, 
talked about, and pointed to, exist and are shared between participants by way of these 
representations.  Just as objects and events, and the relationships between them, can be 
more or less prominent in our physical environments, the representations of objects, 
32 
 
Horse Elephant
events and their relationships can be more or less prominent in the displays and interfaces 
we use to reason about the environment.  A representation can hide or enhance an object 
or relation or conceptual entity (Palmer, 1977; Greeno, 1983, Norman, 1987).  For 
example, to represent the difference in size between a horse and an elephant, I can tell 
you that a horse weighs 600 kilos and an elephant 4500 kilos, or I can show you two lines 
whose lengths represent the weight of a horse and that of an elephant (see Figure 4.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Graphical representation of relative size. The difference between a horse and an 
elephant. 
 
The numbers tell you what each animal weighs individually, whereas the line 
representation allows you to get an immediate impression of the difference, or the 
relationship, between the weights of the two animals.  So, where one representation 
highlights individual entities, the other makes the relationship between them more 
prominent.  Consistent with this view, Carswell and Wickens (1990) found that in simple 
line graphs of two data points, the two data values were processed as configural 
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dimensions, allowing viewers to integrate information from the two dimensions 
perceptually.   
Similar to representations of spatial relationships, like the one above, 
representations of time can make use of space to enhance the relative durations of events 
and the relationships between them.  In Figure 5 the graphical representation makes the 
relationship between events Star and Plus readily apparent, whereas the numeric 
representation informs about the exact points in time at which the events begin and end. 
 
Error! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Graphical versus list format representations. 
The following sections will explore both the individual and distributed level 
implications of representations that make relationships more or less apparent.  
1.5.1 Individual Cognition 
Physical representations have the ability to structure experience (Larkin, and 
Simon, 1987; Suchman, 1987; Lave, and Wenger, 1991; Hutchins, 1999; Goodwin, 2002; 
Rasmussen, and Shalin, in preparation).  The current study predicts that the form of the 
experience will influence the structure and content of the language used to talk about 
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them, and therefore the ease with which that language is comprehended.  Particularly, 
having reasoned about temporal relationships on the basis of a corresponding spatial 
representation is likely to enhance one’s ability to resolve order related ambiguity, such 
as arises when order of mention does not match order of occurrence.    
The literature on metaphor provides evidence for the effect of the format of the 
representation on subsequent spatial reasoning.  The use of spatial prepositions to 
describe temporal relationships has inspired researchers to propose that the cognitive 
relationship between space and time is metaphorical in nature (Lakoff, 1993).  People 
who speak English often use the same prepositions, words such as ‘on,’ ‘in,’ ‘around,’ 
and ‘through’ to indicate time as well as location.  For example, compare ‘I will meet you 
at the store,’ to ‘I will meet you at 3pm’.  These linguistic examples show how time may 
be thought of metaphorically in terms of space.  Lakoff defines metaphor as a mental, 
rather than as a linguistic construct.  That is, the tendency to conceptualize one mental 
domain in terms of another.  Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) have identified seven 
conceptual metaphors for time: 
1. Time is a container (bounded) 
2. Time is a landscape we move through 
3. Time is something moving towards you 
4. Time is a pursuer 
5. Time is a changer 
6. Time is a resource 
7. Time is money 
 
The reciprocal nature of metaphors 2 and 3 become evident in their examples: 
2.  We’re coming up on Christmas. 
3.  Christmas is approaching. 
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In metaphor 2 the agent is moving and the temporal ‘landscape’ is stationary.  In 3 
the agent is stationary and time in motion.  Gentner, Imai, and Boroditsky (2002) and 
Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) have investigated the psychological status of these 
metaphors, the ego-moving and the time-moving metaphor, by showing that physical 
experience of movement can change people’s thinking about time.  They asked people 
either standing in line at an airport (ego-moving) (Gentner et al.) or riding in a train 
(perception of world moving past) (Boroditsky et al.) a question designed to reveal 
conflicts between the ego-moving and time-moving metaphors, namely: ‘This 
Wednesday’s meeting has been moved two days forward. When is the meeting?’  This has 
two possible interpretations – one where the meeting is moved to two days later, Friday 
and one where it is moved to two days earlier, Monday.  This can be explained by 
assuming that the Friday reading is based on metaphor 2, where the observer is moving 
towards the meeting, which is viewed as a stationary event in a landscape.  Moving the 
meeting forward by two days means that the observer will not “reach” the meeting until 
two days later.  The Monday reading is based on metaphor 3, where the meeting is seen 
as moving towards the stationary observer.  Moving the meeting forward by two days 
therefore results in the meeting “reaching” the observer two days earlier.  Participants 
standing in line replied Friday more often, and people riding the train replied Monday 
more often.  This supports the hypothesis that experience in space can change thinking 
about time. 
The present study manipulates representational format such that some participants 
will experience a representation that is more spatial in nature—a graphical representation.  
A pilot run of this phase of the experiment revealed the possibility that participants 
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experiencing the graphical representation temporarily adopted a certain way of reasoning 
about time that is different from the way time is conceptualized when experiencing a list 
format representation.  After completing half their schedules, pilot participants in the 
graphical representation adopted the strategy of working backwards—they entered the 
very last event move in, and added tasks to the schedule working back to the middle.  
This kind of strategy was not seen in a pilot of the numeric representation, and it is 
unlikely that it will occur, since the subtraction of dates is rather cumbersome.  However, 
the fact that the participants in the graphical condition discovered this strategy—which is 
analogous to the “time is something moving towards you” metaphor, may suggest that 
they are conceptualizing time as “in motion”.  If that were the case, when asked the 
question above, participants in the graphical condition should reply ‘Monday’ on a more 
consistent basis that those in the numeric representation.  When asked separately, two 
sets of participants experiencing the graphical representation in the pilot experiment both 
replied ‘Monday’.  The participants experiencing the numeric representation in the pilot 
were not asked this question.  The presence of such a reasoning strategy would suggest 
longer-term influences of representational format on reasoning.  
1.5.2 Distributed Cognition 
Past research in human factors on the role of representations in problem solving 
has largely focused on individual performance or the efficiency with which visual 
presentation supports problem solving (Bennett and Flach, 1992, Wickens and Andre, 
1990, Woods, 1991, Rasmussen and Vicente, 1999, Carswell and Wickens, 1990, Vicente 
and Rasmussen, 1990).  The principles extracted from such an individually focused 
research may or may not afford a straightforward extension to account for and assist in 
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the support of collaborative work.  In the context of a distributed workplace, in which the 
reasoning processes, such as planning and scheduling, are often carried out in a 
cooperative fashion, a pertinent question becomes how the differences in individual 
reasoning strategies afforded by different representational formats affect the social 
exchange.  Is there a positive relationship between how easily a relationship is 
determined in a graphical representation, such as duration, and how much it is talked 
about?  That is, perhaps the relationship is talked about more because it is explicit.  Or, is 
the converse true, relationships that are explicit in the representation are talked about less.  
It is possible that if a relationship is ‘salient’, the speaker will need less information to 
refer to it because there are fewer other competing relationships from which the target has 
to be distinguished (Beun, & Cremers, 1998).  Or, perhaps it is not necessary to discuss 
the relationships when they are ‘salient’ because they are explicit and their articulation 
would violate Grice’s principle of quantity.   
Zacks and Tversky (1999) examined the influence of representational format, bar 
graphs and line graphs, on how people describe the information presented in the graph.  
Similarly, they investigated the influences of distinct verbal descriptions on the creation 
of representations.  Zacks and Tversky found that bar graphs were described in terms of 
discrete comparisons between individual data points, using terms such as ‘higher’, 
‘lower’, ‘greater than’, and ‘less than’.  Information that was presented as lines were 
described as trends between the data points using terms like ‘rising’, ‘falling’, 
‘increasing’, and ‘decreasing’.  In their representation creation experiment, when given a 
discrete comparison description, participants drew bar graphs more often and when given 
a trend assessment description, they drew line graphs more often.   
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A potential limitation to Zacks and Tversky’s investigation is that the production 
of descriptions was not for someone else.  In an applied context, such as mission control, 
descriptions are always for someone else, someone that is listening to verbal descriptions, 
or someone reading written descriptions in the shift handover logs.  This kind of criticism 
can apply to the vast majority of language production studies and all the literature that 
examines linguistic descriptions of representations.  The present study will examine 
whether we still tend to describe or discuss the informational aspects of representations 
that are apparent when we are producing these descriptions for someone else who is also 
looking at the same representation.  For example, do people experiencing a graphical 
representation tend to discuss simultaneity more because simultaneity is spatially 
represented in graphical representations, than participants experiencing a numeric 
representation, in which simultaneity is implicit? If the converse is true and people tend 
to discuss information more when it is not apparent in the representation, i.e., it requires 
some cognitive effort to derive, this would suggest that, at least in a collaborative 
situation, humans have the ability to use language to make up for shortcomings in the 
representation. 
1.6 Implications for the Study 
The following sections describe how I used the various research findings 
described so far to inform the design of the current study. 
1.6.1 Language and Discourse Manipulations 
The present study strived to examine the previously established findings regarding 
lexical items, syntax, and iconicity (linguistic reversal relative to chronological order) as 
main effects that influence comprehension.  However, I also investigated the potential 
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influences these low level influences on cognitive complexity within a discourse context 
by including all lexical item by syntax by iconicity by discourse order combinations.   
The present study extended the findings of Clark and Haviland (1974) and van de 
Kopple (1982) to examine the effects of violating the Given-New principle in a situation 
where the Given information has been established in the context of prior conversation, 
not simply in an immediately preceding sentence or paragraph.  In order to obtain a 
baseline for determining the effect of introducing New information, I included a 
condition in which all information was Given.  Even though a complete factorial design 
would have included a condition in which all information was New (where all 
information is ungrounded), this condition would not provide baseline information over 
and above that which was obtained from the Given-Given condition.   
Some research has suggested a relationship between reading comprehension and 
permanent attributes of the readers cognitive abilities.  MacDonald, Just, and Carpenter 
(1992) found a link between working memory capacity and comprehension of 
syntactically ambiguous text.  Readers with larger working memory capacity are possibly 
able to maintain more than one mental representation of the text for a longer period of 
time.  Therefore I included three measures of cognitive ability relating specifically to 
spatial abilities and short-term memory, mainly the Card Rotations and Cube 
Comparisons tests (both from Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976), as well as the 
Sentence Span test (Daneman, & Carpenter, 1983).  
1.6.2 Semantic Manipulation 
The present study investigated the implications of a conceptual distinction 
between different types of constraints: physical and social by, investigating their 
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potentially differential implications for the comprehension of order.  I did not include 
arbitrary relationships.  Their influence on comprehension has already been investigated, 
and more importantly, because the experimental tasks, as is the case with the majority of 
real world work tasks that lend themselves to scheduling, contain very few, if any, truly 
arbitrarily related events.  
1.6.3 Psychological Distance Manipulation 
The present study controlled for psychological distance.  For example, in house 
construction, the steps pouring the foundation and building the frame are carried out in 
near succession, whereas the steps pouring the foundation and installing the carpet are 
carried out at temporally distant time points.  The psychological distance between the 
first pair therefore, for the purposes of the present experiment, represents a near 
relationship, and the second pair represents a far relationship.   
Because the task domain for the present experiment concerns the relationships 
between actions, rather than operationalizing psychological distance as how far apart 
actions are in a partonomic concept structure, like Franklin et al. (2007) I operationalized 
psychological distance as how far apart actions are temporally within an action-sequence 
by number of interceding events.   
1.6.4 Latent Conceptual Check 
All participants were asked to indicate their answer to the question ‘This 
Wednesday’s meeting has been moved two days forward. When is the meeting?’ 
immediately following the schedule production phase.  
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1.6.5 Representation Manipulation 
The present study examined the discussion of informational aspects of two types 
of representations that make these aspects more or less apparent.  Participants completed 
the experimental task using either a Graphical or a Numeric representational format. 
Within those two formats, I examined the frequencies with which people used language 
describing simultaneity, such as ‘during,’ ‘while,’ ‘same time,’ ‘overlap,’ and ‘middle of’.  
In constrast to Zacks and Tversky (1999), the present study examined production in 
dyadic interaction rather than in verbal protocol without a recipient. 
1.7 Study and Hypotheses 
 The present study will examine the production and comprehension of language 
about temporal relationships in two tasks that involve substantial temporal reasoning 
components: a schedule creation phase and a sentence verification phase.   
1.7.1 Production Phase 
In the first phase participants will work in dyads to create a house construction 
schedule, chosen for its accessibility to the general public.  Participants will use either a 
graphical representation (Gantt chart format), or a numeric format representation (list).  
The dyad members will each have their own representation (in the same formats), and 
will not have visual access to their partner’s representation.  The lack of shared visual 
access mimics the conditions of contemporary distributed work, and promotes verbal 
interaction.  A house construction schedule includes events that are successive and 
simultaneous, have physical and social semantic relationships, and are near and far in 
terms of psychological distance.  Inherently Given and New information within the 
context of the discourse will emerge.  
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1.7.1.1 Dependent measures. 
Transcripts of the verbal communication between participant dyads provided a 
background for performing quantitative as well as qualitative analyses.  I was able to 
evaluate the different representation types on the basis of how long it took to complete 
the schedules, and how much conversation was needed to accomplish this.  The amount 
of communication was be assessed by the ratio of words to units time.  This ratio further 
reflected the overall task completion time and provided insight into how well the two 
representation formats support collaborative work.  If the ratio is smaller (more silence 
relative to verbal activity) in the graphical condition, this would suggest that the 
participants feel they are able to accomplish larger portions of the task individually 
without involving their teammate, which may not be a desirable state of affairs in work 
domains where the resulting quality of the work outcome depends on teammates 
contributing their individual expertise. 
In terms of language use, I counted the number of times the various sentence 
constructions assessed in the comprehension phase were used in discourse.  I also 
counted how many times iconicity is violated, how many times it was violated in the 
context of given and new information, etc.   
1.7.2 Comprehension Phase 
The second part of the task required participants to read and verify a series of 
sentences that describe the temporal relationships between events that they had just 
reasoned about in the construction schedule task, and some new events that were not 
included in the scheduling task, counterbalanced across the variables discussed above: 
preposition, iconicity, discourse order, semantic constraint type, and psychological 
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distance.  This task provided me with a quantitative measure of comprehension, 
True/False verification time.  It departed from the standard picture-sentence or sentence-
sentence comparison task by invoking recent experience (rather than immediately 
previous experience) as the standard for evaluation.  
These tasks provided a qualitative measure of production (verbal exchange), and a 
quantitative measure of comprehension (reading time) which together allowed me to 
compare production preferences to comprehension.  For example, are the sentence 
constructions that are easy to comprehend also the ones we tend to produce in discourse?  
Although comprehension and production processes are physiologically and cognitively 
dissociable, Gricean principles assume a complementary relationship. 
1.7.2.1 Dependent measures. 
The existing literature on comprehension has employed such measures as 
reenactment time, reading time, response time (verification time), and accuracy.  Of 
these, response time is by far the most thoroughly validated measure, and the one that is 
most readily interpreted.  Response time has been recognized to consist of: reading time, 
comprehension time, and response selection and execution time.  The present experiment 
employed response time as a dependent measure. 
1.7.2.2 Hypotheses. 
Main Effects: 
 
H1: Participants who experience the graphical representation will complete a 
construction schedule faster than participants who experience the list representation. 
H2: Participants who experience the graphical representation will use 
qualitatively different language than participants who experience the list representation.  
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This hypothesis is not directional: the graphical representation may elicit more discussion 
of duration because duration is a salient feature of this representational format, or the 
graphical representation may elicit less discussion of duration because duration is a 
salient feature of this representational format in the comprehension study. 
H3: Sentence constructions with higher response times in the comprehension 
study will occur fewer times in the production study than sentence constructions with 
shorter response times. 
H4: Participants experiencing the Graphical representation will be more likely 
to adopt the time-moving metaphor and therefore reply ‘Monday’ to the conceptual 
metaphor question while participants in the Numeric representation will be more likely to 
adopt the ego-moving metaphor and therefore reply ‘Friday’. 
Two-way Interactions: 
H5: Sentences that reverse order of mention relative to chronological order 
will result in longer response time than sentences that do not.  This difference will 
interact with semantic constraints: the effect will be larger for social relationships. 
H6:  The order effect will be smaller for participants who experience the 
graphical representation. 
H7: The iconicity effect will interact with discourse order such that the 
iconicity effect will be small when the Given/New principle is observed and large when 
the Given-New principle is violated.  
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Three-way Interaction:  
H8: A three-way interaction is expected between preposition, clause, and 
discourse principle such that sentences using the preposition before will be more easily 
understood when the main clause is presented first and the penalty for violating the 
Given-New principle will be larger when the main clause is presented first.  This pattern 
is expected to be reversed when sentences use the preposition after.  
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II.   Method 
 
2.1 Production Phase 
There were two yoked phases of this experiment.  The participants’ experience 
from the first phase fed into their experience of the second.  
2.1.1 Participants 
Sixty-four undergraduate students from a large Midwestern university participated 
in this experiment.  Their mean age was 20.1 years.  They received credit applied towards 
their grade in an introductory psychology class to meet general education requirements.  
Same gender-dyads participated, constructed at sign-up.  Participants were discouraged 
from signing up at the same time as a friend and/or roommate.  One pair of participants 
split a $150 bonus based on their performance on the experimental task. 
2.1.2 Materials and Equipment 
The construction schedule and events were displayed on a desktop PC with a 17” 
monitor.  The schedules were created using Microsoft Outlook’s task function.  The 
participants wore headsets and communicated using the web-phone program Skype.5 The 
on-screen activity as well as the verbal interaction (audio) between the two participants 
was captured using the screen capture software RiverPast.  
                                                 
5  Participants were only allowed to communicate using Skype’s audio feature, and were restricted from 
using the chat and video-conferencing features. 
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2.1.3 Procedure 
The participants completed the task in dyads.  The construction steps were 
divided between the dyad members randomly but consistently across dyads, such that 
each member had 19 subtasks of the total 38.  The participants were supplied with an 
empty schedule each in either the numeric, list format or in the graphical, Gantt-like 
format (see Figure 6 andFigure 7) depending on their experimental group.  
 
 
Figure 6. Screen capture from Outlook in numeric format output mode. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Screen capture from Outlook in graphical output mode. 
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One member drew a number determining the type of representation the dyad was 
going to use.  The dyad members sat in separate rooms.  They wore headsets providing 
them with auditory contact with the other member of the dyad.   
Participants each began with identical empty construction schedules, and used 
verbal coordination to merge the construction steps that they had been assigned and filled 
out their schedules accordingly.  They had to create a schedule that included all the 
construction steps such that all the steps in the schedule were completed within a three-
month timeframe. 
The method for entering events into the schedules was the same for both groups.  
Participants would enter the name of the event, select the start and end times for the 
event, and then press the Save and Close button (see Figure 8). 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Screen capture of Outlook’s interface for adding events to the schedules 
independent of schedule format. 
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Participants were instructed to also fill in events that belong to their partner (see 
Appendix B).  When they had entered all the events in the schedule, and their schedule 
did not exceed the three-month timeframe, they had completed the production phase.  
This phase of the experiment took between 45 minutes and 1 and one half hours to 
complete including instructions.  Participants had to complete the scheduling 
(production) experiment in order to proceed to the second (comprehension) part of the 
experiment. 
After completing the schedules, all the participants were asked the conceptual 
metaphor question: “This Wednesday’s meeting has been moved two days forward. 
When is the meeting?” They indicated their answer in pencil on a piece of paper.  
2.1.4 Experimental Task 
The first experiment required dyads to create a construction schedule for a house, 
without co-location and communicating through an intercom (see Figure 9).   
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Figure 9. Illustration of experimental set-up for the production (scheduling) phase. 
 
Both participants had access to separate physical representations of the schedule 
and laminated slips of paper with the names and durations of 19 different subtasks, or 
events (38 total) within the overall task of house construction (see Table 4).6  Participants 
were asked to arrange the events in an order that ensures a fit within a three month 
period.  To meet this constraint, events had to be arranged in successive as well as  
                                                 
6  Some of the participants arranged their slips of paper by laying them out on the table next to the 
computer.  Others arranged them by shuffling them while holding them as a deck of cards. 
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simultaneous order.  Participants needed to negotiate a satisfactory order of these events 
in order to accommodate all events within a limited timeframe.  That is, some of the 
events had to take place at the same time to attain a schedule that met the time constraint.   
Table 4 
 
Table of Given Events Included in the Production (scheduling) Task.  
 
GIVEN 
excavate the basement order the tile 
pour the foundation install the vinyl floor 
connect to city water tile shower stall 
build the floor frame deliver interior trim 
install basement stairs install the baseboards 
build the frame build the bookshelves 
frame the interior walls install the cabinets 
deliver the roofing material install the countertops 
construct the roof install the hardwood floor 
install the windows install the faucets 
install the shingles install the toilets 
install the ductwork connect the switches 
test the heating system install the light fixtures 
install the water lines remove the dumpsters 
run the rough wiring plant the shrubs 
frame inspection install the gutters 
attach the exterior siding install the downspouts 
attach the drywall obtain the occupancy permit 
prime the walls move in 
 
 
A professional contractor assisted in the identification of the events in Table 4, 
which met constraints in both parts of the experiment.  The terminology was accessible to 
novices, plausibly involved or placed temporal constraints on other events, and preserved 
domain semantics.  For example, at one time had the event ‘build the fireplace’ in the set 
of 38 given events, but we decided that it did not seem to fit the type of house we were 
building and excluded it.  The 38 events in the production study served as Given events 
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in the later comprehension study in combination with a set of New events, which together 
allowed construction of a stimulus set that reflected all the independent variables in the 
comprehension study.  However, some refinements occurred to the list of Given events 
after the comprehension experiment had been programmed. 
2.1.5 Experimental Design 
Representational format served as the single, between subjects independent 
variable in the production phase of the experiment.  This variable had two levels, so that 
participants experienced either a numeric representation of their construction schedule, or 
a graphical format representation.  The numeric representation condition provided the 
participants the duration of the event in numeric format, e.g., ‘9/5/05 – 9/7/05’ (see 
Figure 6).  The graphical representation represented duration spatially as a colored 
portion of a rectangle.  The length of the colored portion corresponded to the duration of 
the event (see Figure 7).  When placed on the background of the construction schedule 
the participants could determine how much time the events required relative to the entire 
construction schedule. 
A set of dependent measures addressed the quantifiable differences between 
schedules and the scheduling process.  These dependent measures consisted of: number 
of words used in the conversation to complete the schedule, time, types of relationships 
discussed (successive or simultaneous) to create the schedule, and the accuracy of the 
schedules.  To tally the types of relationships employed in the construction of the 
schedules I employed the rule that only relationships between events that were within one 
day of each other or closer were to be counted.  The schedules were deemed to be more 
accurate the more they matched the order of only the physically related events in the 
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schedules compared to the order produced by our construction expert.  The order of 
socially related events, on which there were no inherent physical order constraints, was 
not taken into consideration by the accuracy measure, because the relationship between 
them is less obvious, and therefore less easy for the novice to determine.  The fewer 
incorrect event orders in a schedule, the fewer points were added from the overall score, 
which means that a low score translates into good performance.  This accuracy measure, 
however, did not account for time on task.  Therefore we computed a score that reflected 
accuracy as a function of time.7 We suspect that some participants did well because they 
took a long time on the task, and others did well because they were just good.  In this 
instance, the time/accuracy score therefore is a better measure because it reflects quality 
per unit time. 
Another set of dependent measures served to correlate the data obtained from the 
later comprehension phase of the experiment with the production data.  The verbal 
interaction between the dyads as they were completing the scheduling task was 
transcribed, yielding a total of 32 transcripts.  These transcripts enabled investigation of 
the language used in the process of creating the schedules, and correlation of this 
language with the data obtained from the later comprehension phase of the experiment.  
In order to compare the findings in previous comprehension research relating to 
for example Iconicity and Clause Position to production, I coded the syntax of the 
sentences describing relative temporal relationships.  That is, I coded whether the  
                                                 
7 In doing so, we first verified that the initial accuracy measure did not correlate with time for either the 
graphical or numeric representations, r(14)=0.0826; 0.341, p > .05. 
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‘before’/’after’ sentences had the main clause first or the main clause last.  I also counted 
the occurrences of lexical items indicating simultaneity: ‘during,’ ‘while,’ ‘overlap,’ 
‘middle (of),’ and ‘same time’—these relationships were explicitly represented in the 
graphical representation and implicitly represented in the numeric representation.  
Additionally, I counted the number of occurrences of relative pronouns: ‘that’, and ‘this’.  
2.2 Comprehension Phase 
2.2.1 Participants 
The same 64 participants participated as individuals in the comprehension 
experiment.  For this phase of the experiment, all participants received modest gifts from 
the university bookstore, such as pens, highlighters, cups, or stickers in addition to 5 
credits towards their psychology class. 
2.2.2 Materials 
The sentences were displayed in different randomized orders on a computer.  The 
participants used the F and J keys on a standard keyboard to indicate whether the 
sentence was true or false.  The computer recorded the participant’s response and their 
true/false judgment. 
I measured variation due to the stable cognitive attributes of the participants by 
administering the Daneman and Carpenter Sentence Span Test (Daneman, & Carpenter, 
1983), to measure working memory capacity, as well as a the Cube Comparisons and 
Card Rotation tests (both from Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976)  to measure spatial 
ability.  It is possible that the comprehension of text that describes events in the reverse 
order in which they occurred involves, not the maintenance of multiple mental 
representations, but rather a form of rotation, or righting of this order.  In this case spatial 
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abilities would serve as a better predictor of the comprehension of different syntactic 
arrangements.  
Participants also filled out a demographics questionnaire that included their 
experience with house construction.  It was likely that the speed with which the 
participants completed their schedules depended on the amount of experience with house 
construction, so I wanted to at least control for this. 
2.2.3 Procedure 
Both dyad members performed the comprehension task separately at the same 
computers they had used to complete the production task.  The participants completed 
one practice block of 8 trials and experimental blocks of 48 trials.  They placed their left 
and right index fingers on the F and J keys.  The keys were clearly marked True and 
False.  The computer presented sentence, one at the time, and waited for the participant’s 
response.  After responding to a block of practice sentences, the participant engaged the 
experimental block.  After the participant indicated a response, the computer waited 3 
seconds before presenting the next sentence.  An auditory tone warned the participant 1 
second before the next sentence appeared.  The comprehension task took about 10 
minutes to complete. 
Participants were told that they would view instructions for constructing a house 
that other participants in a similar experiment had written (see Appendix C).  The 
participants were instructed that this other (hypothetical) experiment may have used 
events that were not part of the construction schedule that they had completed, and that 
they should indicate whether this is a valid instruction in general.  Participants were 
supplied with a practice instruction set that included new events to ensure that they 
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understood the response criteria.  For example, participants could have been asked to 
evaluate the instruction ‘you pour the foundation before you install the beams’, in which 
the event installing the beams was not an event in the schedule they created.  This was, 
however, a valid order of events and participants should have accepted this as a credible 
instruction.  
After the comprehension task, the participants completed the covariate measures.  
One participant would fill out the Cube Comparisons and Card Rotations tests while the 
other completed the Sentence Span Test, and when finished they would switch.  
Subsequently they would both fill out the demographics questionnaire.  The covariate 
measures and the questionnaire took about 25 minutes to complete. 
2.2.4 Experimental Task 
The second phase of the experiment required participants to read and evaluate a 
series of temporal relations, including events included in the construction schedule they 
created and some new events that were not included in their schedule.   
These statements represented all combinations of the main variables of interest: 
preposition type, chronological order correspondence, semantic constraint type, discourse 
order correspondence, and psychological distance.  A proportion of the sentences asked 
them to verify the temporal relationship between events that were included in their 
scheduling task (Given) and events that were not (New). Table 5 presents the New events 
that were not part of the production task: 
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Table 5 
 
Table of New Events. 
 
NEW 
purchase the lot Test the heating system 
obtain the permits connect the electrical outlets 
order the lumber lay the attic insulation 
clear the trees apply the wallpaper 
schedule the excavation install the water softener 
cut the driveway install the water purifier 
stake the homesite install the interior doors 
install the septic tank stain the baseboards 
connect the temporary utilities install the interior window trim 
place the foundation forms install the interior door trim 
waterproof the foundation install the mirrors 
deliver the lumber install the closet hardware 
install the floor joists tile the shower stall 
install exterior trim install the shower doors 
backfill around the foundation install the drapery rods 
grade for the lawn install the garbage disposal 
install the exterior doors install the attic stairs 
apply the roof felt pick out the appliances 
blow in the wall insulation install the dishwasher 
finish the drywall surface install the range 
plaster the ceilings install the refrigerator 
build the chimney install the garage doors 
install the gas lines install the attic vents 
install the exterior vents attach the shutters 
deliver the furnace finish the yard grading 
 
 
The sentences were constructed around eight event contexts.  These were selected 
based on the requirement that they had a significant number of relationships with other 
events in the schedule: pour the foundation, build the frame, attach exterior siding, build 
the floor frame, construct the roof, attach the drywall, install the ductwork, and run the 
rough wiring (see Table 4).  These central construction events have a large number of 
other events that are either dependent on them or were somehow temporally constrained 
by these primary events.  The primary events were paired with a secondary event either 
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from the list of events from the production task (for Given-Given sentences) or from the 
list of New events that were not included in the production task.  Each of these secondary 
events was used no more than three times throughout the eight contexts (never with the 
same primary event).  The same secondary event was never used twice in the same cell.  
For example, ‘test the heating system’ only occurs once in the Causal, Near, Given-Given 
cell to avoid confounding the variables of interest with content.  Because participants saw 
the same primary context six times, the secondary events also appeared multiple times to 
mask the repetition of primary events.  Late changes in the stimuli for the production 
phase resulted in a change in the role of the build the fireplace event, as a New event 
rather than, as designed, as a Given event.   
2.2.5 Experimental Design 
This experiment employed a 2x2x2x2x3 factorial split-plot repeated measures 
design with only prior representation as a between-subjects variable, using response time 
as a dependent measure  
The independent variables investigated in this experiment were clause position, 
iconicity, semantic constraint type, and discourse order.  Psychological distance was a 
control variable.  Clause position (main clause first/main clause last), iconicity 
(chronological order/non-chronological order), semantic constraint type (physical/social), 
and psychological distance (near/far) each had two levels.  Discourse order 
correspondence (given-given/given-new/new-given) had three levels.  Note that the 
preposition types before/after are results of the combinations of clause position and 
iconicity (see Table 6). 
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Table 6 
 
Prepositions Types Before/After Embedded in the Interaction Between Clause Position 
and Iconicity. 
 
 Main Clause First Main Clause Last 
Chronological X is before Y After X, Y 
Non-Chronological Y is after X Before Y, X 
 
 
The sentences were constructed in collaboration with an experienced house 
construction contractor, who rated the temporal, semantic, and psychological distance 
relationships presented by the sentences.  Semantic relationships included physical or 
social constraints.  Events with hard, physical constraints, where one event necessarily 
had to take place before/after another were labeled physical.  Events without such hard 
constraints but where some social convention existed dictating that one should take place 
before/after another were labeled social.  For example, the foundation must be in place 
prior to installing the flooring, illustrating a physical relationship.  But, the roof need not 
be in place prior to laying flooring, although a social convention exists for economic 
reasons.  Psychological distance was determined based on chronological distance within 
the schedule created by our expert.  See Appendix D for a complete list of sentences.  
This provided for 48 different sentences.  Twelve foil sentences were added that 
required a False response such that 20% of the total 60 sentences required a False 
response.  The proportion of foils departed from the traditional 50% for several reasons.  
First, because socially constrained sentences would not be unambiguously false—i.e., it 
was possible to reverse the order of events and preserve truth.  False sentences must 
therefore come from the physical category.  Also, the task cover story (evaluating 
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sentences written by other participants) could not plausibly result in 50% false 
statements.  Participants were told that if they get a certain percentage correct they would 
receive a reward (that in fact everyone received) to guard against thoughtless misses.  
The eight contexts were assigned to the independent variables (a, b & c) using a Latin 
Square, as shown in Table 7.  Thus a participant in group 1 would observe all six 000 
sentences in context 1, all six 001 sentences in context eight, all six 010 sentences in 
context seven, etc.  Context was counterbalanced, but otherwise unanalyzed.  With 80 
participants and 8 contexts, each context-independent variable combination appeared 10 
times. 
Similarly, a latin-square was used to assign contexts to the 12 foil sentences.  
Sixteen unique combinations of contexts were created using the false sentences.  The 8 
true sentence/context groups were combined with the sixteen false sentence/context 
groups (repeating the true combinations once) for a total of 16 groups. 
Table 7 
 
Latin Square for Assignment of Contexts to Independent Variables.  
 
   Context 
Psychological 
Distance 
Main 
Clause 
Order 
Correspondence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1
0 1 0 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2
0 1 1 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3
1 0 0 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4
1 0 1 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 0 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1 1 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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2.2.5.1 Counterbalancing. 
Sixteen between-subjects groups had been created counterbalancing discourse 
order, as well as the other independent variables, across the eight contexts.  Discourse 
order was supposed to have been counterbalanced for each subject, meaning that each 
subject should have seen 20 given-given, 20 given-new, and 20 new-given sentences.  
Due to a late change in the stimuli in the production experiment—an event that should 
have served as a given event was actually a new event. Table 8 shows the actual 
distribution of the levels of discourse order within the sixteen groups, after the event in 
question had been coded correctly.  Groups marked with a star (*) are the groups that are 
most affected by the coding changes. 
Table 8 
 
Number of Stimuli per Level of Discourse Order within the 16 Groups.  
 
  1* 2* 3 4 5 6 7* 8* 9* 10* 11 12 13* 14* 15 16
GG 22 22 19 19 19 19 23 23 24 24 20 18 18 19 20 21
GN 18 18 21 21 21 21 19 18 18 19 20 21 22 21 20 20
NG 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 19 18 17 20 21 20 20 20 19
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III.  RESULTS 
Although participants experienced the production task first and the 
comprehension task second, I will present results for comprehension task first.  The 
literature provides better predictions for this task.  Also, the comprehension results are 
important for the interpretation of the production task. 
3.1 Sentence Verification Task: Language Comprehension 
3.1.1 Preliminary Analysis  
The following section describes the series of data-winnowing and statistical 
procedures that were carried out in order to determine the best, and in this case, most 
conservative model for describing the data. 
The comprehension data set had only one observation per cell.  A total of 13.43% 
of these observations was missing or deleted for several reasons.  Incorrect responses 
resulted in 4.69% of all the observations being excluded.  Because only causally 
connected sentences could reliably be classified as either true or false, only incorrect 
causally connected sentences were excluded.  Additionally, response times 3 standard 
deviations from the mean were excluded as outliers, resulting in the exclusion of 1.44% 
observations.  Due to the design error, 3.65% of the cells were empty.  Additionally, in 
order to that there was exactly 1 data point per cell for each participant, the wrongly 
coded stimuli were simply left out of the final analysis, accounting for an additional 
3.65% of excluded observations.  Having missing scores in a split-plot results in a slight 
correlation between the subjects and experimental conditions potentially compromising 
the interpretability of higher-order interactions (Kirk, 1994). 
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Three approaches to data analysis addressed the ambiguity of the unbalanced 
design by identifying a consistent pattern of significant effects that did not depend on a 
specific approach to the management of the ambiguity:  1) Replacement of missing 
scores with estimates based on the subject means, condition means, and regressed means, 
2) fitting subject effects to the data first, and using the resulting residuals in an ordinary 
unbalanced ANOVA, and 3) an ordinary, unbalanced ANOVA using Type III SS, 
adjusted for the presence of all effects in the model.  The first two analyses serve as 
checks against spurious effects in the analysis.  In addition, the unbalanced design 
precludes the use of SAS’s repeated function, which automatically provides sphericity 
tests.  In the cases involving the variable with three levels, I assume violation of 
sphericity and use the Geisser-Greenhouse correction.  The results section below focuses 
on those results that are robust using all three approaches.  Next, the three approaches are 
briefly presented, focusing at the end on the third and simplest approach, which supports 
more extensive analysis. 
3.1.1.1 Replacement of missing scores. 
A common approach to the management of an unbalanced design is to replace 
missing scores.  I carried out three separate analyses using different approaches for 
replacing missing scores.  First, I replaced missing scores by substituting in condition 
means, second by substituting with subject means, and finally using SPSS’s missing 
value analysis to compute missing data through a regression algorithm.  The patterns of 
significant effects resulting from using these different approaches for replacing missing 
scores were not different (see Appendixes E-G for full ANOVA tables, Appendixes H-J 
for full ANOVA tables on Log transformed scores, and Appendix K for means).  These 
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analyses all suggested the presence of two three-way interactions, discourse order by 
iconicity by semantic relationship, and discourse order by clause position by semantic 
relationship, as well as two two-way interactions involving psychological distance by 
semantic relationship, and iconicity by clause position (see Table 9 for summary of 
significant results).  These interactions subsume all main effects, precluding the option of 
collapsing across a variable to balance the design. 
3.1.2 ANOVA on Residuals after Fitting Subject Effects 
Another approach to managing the unbalanced design is to assign subjects all 
ambiguous variance (i.e., variance that could be a treatment effect or could be a subject 
effect).  A preliminary model included only variables for the 64 subjects, with the 
resulting residuals then submitted to a second repeated measures ANOVA—testing 
against an aggregated error term (see Appendix L for full ANOVA table).8 To examine 
the possibility that this procedure inappropriately assigned variability to subjects I 
adjusted the raw scores for my covariates, and used those residuals in the same second 
analysis, and I got the same patterns of results, although still without breaking out 
separate error terms (see Table 9 for a summary of effects across these different analyses, 
and Appendixes M-O for full ANOVA tables).  
                                                 
8 Using an aggregated error term inflates power. I also ran the analysis with separate error terms for each 
effect. This did not change the pattern of significant results. 
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Table 9 
 
Summary of Significant Omnibus Results.9  
 
 Raw Log LSmeans Raw Log 
 
Missing 
Scores 
Missing 
Scores
Subject 
Residuals 
Condition 
Means 
Condition 
Means 
DISCO ** ** ** ** ** 
ICON*REP      
SEMREL ** ** ** ** ** 
DISCO*CLAUSE  *    
ICON*CLAUSE ** ** ** ** ** 
DIS*CLAUSE*REP      
DISCO*SEMREL    *  
DISCO*SEMREL*REP      
DIS*SEMREL ** * * ** ** 
CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP    *  
DISCO*ICON*DIS *     
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL ** ** ** ** ** 
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL     * 
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL   * ** ** 
DISCO*ICON*DIS*SEMREL  *    
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE  *    
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS*SEMREL ** *    
 
                                                 
9 * indicates significance level of <.05. ** indicates significance level of <.01. 
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Table 9 
 
Summary of Significant Omnibus Results (Continued). 
 
 Raw Log Raw Log 
 
Subject 
Means 
Subject 
Means 
Regressed 
Values 
Regressed 
Values 
DISCO ** ** ** ** 
ICON*REP  *  * 
SEMREL ** ** ** ** 
DISCO*CLAUSE     
ICON*CLAUSE ** ** ** ** 
DIS*CLAUSE*REP   *  
DISCO*SEMREL     
DISCO*SEMREL*REP   * * 
DIS*SEMREL * ** ** ** 
CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP *    
DISCO*ICON*DIS     
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL ** ** ** ** 
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL  *  * 
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL ** ** ** ** 
DISCO*ICON*DIS*SEMREL     
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE     
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS*SEMREL     
 
The same three interactions that were significant in the previous analyses were 
also significant using this method of analysis.  The three-way interaction between 
discourse order, clause, and semantic relationship, F(2, 124)= 4.470, p =.0120 is not 
significant using a correction for sphericity, F critical (1,11)=4.84, p > .05. 
3.1.3 Omnibus Results—Unbalanced ANOVA   
This ANOVA uses only original data, with no substitutions and without first 
removing subject effects.  The response times were not normally distributed.  Therefore, I 
first confirmed that the patterns of results were robust in the presence of a log 
transformation (see Appendix P for full ANOVA table). 
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I then proceeded to analyze the unbalanced, untransformed dataset.  Because non-
significant terms in the model could be spuriously reducing the Type III sums of squares 
for the error terms in an unbalanced dataset I removed non-significant higher order 
interactions from the model.  I analyzed the data again first without the insignificant six-
way and its error term, then without the insignificant five-ways (and their error terms), 
and lastly without insignificant four-ways (and their error terms).  Borderline significant 
five-ways, and four-ways were included, using the > .2 criteria for exclusion (Kirk, 1995) 
(see Appendixes Q-S for full ANOVA tables).  One 5-way interaction (representation by 
discourse order, by iconicity by psychological distance by semantic relationship, F(2, 
106)= 5.96, p < .0054) was initially significant in the full-model version of the missing-
values analysis (see Appendix T for full ANOVA table, and Appendix U for means).  
However, this interaction was not significant when other insignificant five- and four-way 
interactions had been subtracted from the model.  I therefore think it is spurious and 
uninterpretable and I will not analyze it further.  
There are some F-ratios that are much smaller than 1, which suggests that 
homogeneity of variance should be checked.  I used Fmax (Hartley, 1950) to check 
homogeneity of variance for the significant effects reported below (see Appendix T, 
footnote on ANOVA table).  With this many DFs, any departure from one is significant, 
suggesting the need for Box adjustment due to violations of homogeneity of variance10, 
as well as specialized tests for simple effects using error terms specific to the cells  
                                                 
10 The Box adjustment for homogeneity of variance, like adjustment for sphericity, reduces the degrees of 
freedom in the critical F denominator. For the completely randomized factorial design the reduced degrees 
of freedom are equivalent to the smallest number of scores per group minus one, i.e., original degrees of 
freedom divided by the number of groups. In the spirit of the box adjustment, for the critical F I divided the 
error terms in our within subjects design by the number of groups. 
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included in the contrast of interest (Keppel, & Wickens, 2004). 
The analysis of raw data suggested the presence of one three-way interaction, 
discourse order by iconicity by semantic relationship, and two two-way interactions 
involving psychological distance by semantic relationship, and iconicity by clause 
position.  The three-way interaction between discourse order, clause, and semantic 
relationship was not significant in this analysis, and given that it was only marginally 
significant when I adjusted for subjects effects and sphericity, I will not analyze it further. 
Hypotheses five through eight predicted interactions between iconicity and 
semantic relationship, iconicity and representation, iconicity and discourse order, as well 
as a three-way interaction between discourse order, iconicity, and clause.  None of the 
predicted interactions were significant (see Appendix T for ANOVA table—only 
significant results will be reported in the text, for non-significant results see appendix).  
One significant three-way and two significant two-way interactions were stable across 
analyses, and are reported below.  
3.1.3.1 The effects of semantics and discourse order on order reversal.  
The interaction between discourse order, iconicity, and semantic relationship was 
consistently significant across the different methods of analysis and with raw scores, F(2, 
106)= 10.710, p < .0001.  This unexpected three-way interaction subsumes two predicted 
two-way interactions, which I will review in the following.11  
The previous literature suggested an interaction between semantic relationship 
and iconicity, such that the effect of an order reversal should be magnified in the context 
                                                 
11 The error term in these analyses consist of data specific to each comparison. So the differences in degrees 
of freedom reflect differences in the number of contributing datapoints. 
69 
 
of arbitrary relationships.  I had predicted an interaction between iconicity and discourse 
order, such that the effect of an order reversal should be magnified in the context of a 
violation of discourse order (see Figure 1).  Neither of these two-way interactions were 
significant, F(2, 124)=1.35; 0.01, p = .2618; .9929 respectively, however the above 
mentioned significant three-way interaction involving all three of these variables was 
significant, F(2, 124)=10.71, p < .0001.  Because I had predicted interactions, though not 
the observed pattern, I examined the effects using a priori criteria. 
Although Figure 10 presents the response times relevant to this three-way 
interaction, the pattern is not entirely consistent with the pattern of significance.  In the 
case of Given-New there is an interaction between iconicity and semantic relationship, 
F(1, 62)=12.19, p = .000912 (middle panel of Figure 10).  Here it appears that there is no 
effect of semantic relationship when the events are in chronological order.  
In the case of Given-Given (top panel of Figure 10) and New-Given sentences (bottom 
panel of Figure 10) the main effect of semantic relationship is significant, F(1, 
63)=12.09, p = .0009.  Sentences with socially related events are always more difficult.  
The effect of order reversal does not appear to be systematically magnified in the context 
of social relationships for either Given-Given or Given-New respectively, F(1,63)=2.48, 
p = .1205 and Tukey-Kramer F(1,63)=2.74, p > .05 (see Appendix V for table of paired 
comparisons). 
                                                 
12 I conducted the simple-simple effects analysis on the significant three-way interaction by splitting by 
discourse order to isolate cell specific error terms.   
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Figure 11. Discourse order, iconicity and semantic relationship as a function of response 
time. 
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The absence of systematic difficulty for order reversal also means that there is no 
evidence to support my prediction that sentences reversing order are more difficult in the 
context of a violation of the Given-New principle. There is little to no evidence that non-
chronological is more difficult anywhere, except for the unpredicted Given-New 
circumstance in the context of social relationships, F(1,63)=5.53, p = .0219. 
 
Figure 12.  Discourse order, iconicity and semantic relationship as a function of response 
time (Figure 10 replotted). 
  
 
The a priori predictions do not explain this three-way interaction.  Further results 
involving semantic relationship appear below. 
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3.1.3.2 The effects of syntax on order reversal. 
Previous literature has established interactions between iconicity and clause.  I 
further predicted that those variables would interact with discourse order.  This predicted 
three-way interaction between discourse order, iconicity, and clause position was not 
significant (see Appendix T).  This predicted three-way interaction reflected the 
differences I was expecting in verification times of before/after depending on whether or 
not the given-new principle was violated (see Figure 13 for predictions for a two-way 
between iconicity and clause position based on the literature).  However, only the two-
way interaction involving iconicity and clause position was significant, F(1,62)= 7.300, p 
=.0090.  
 
 
Figure 13. Iconicity and clause position as a function of response time (predicted) 
excluding the third variable, Discourse Order.  
 
Any differences in the current study between before and after would emerge as an 
interaction between iconicity and clause position.  The significant interaction therefore 
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indicates differences between before and after (see Figure 14).  The analysis of simple-
simple effects revealed that before was verified significantly faster than after when the 
sentence preserved order, F(1, 63)=9.96, p = .0025.  This difference was not significant 
when the sentence reversed order, F(1, 63)=3.49, P = .0662.  These results also only 
support the prediction that sentences presenting the main clause first should be easier to 
comprehend when sentences preserve order. When sentences reverse order, there is no 
difference between main clause first and last. 
In the context of this interaction, the notion that sentences preserving 
chronological order are easier to comprehend is only supported in the case of main clause 
last sentences, F(1, 63)=12.61, P = .0007.  There is no effect of order reversal for the 
main clause first sentences, F(1, 63)=2.16, P = .1466. 
 
 
Figure 14. Iconicity and clause position as a function of response time (subject residuals, 
grand mean added). 
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Error proportions support the response time findings for iconicity by clause.  
Figure 15 shows the total numbers of errors in each category as a function of the 
opportunities to make that error.  The pattern of errors, i.e., incorrectly verified causally 
related sentences, reinforces the unexpected pattern of response times, i.e., sentences that 
took longer to verify also had more errors associated with them (see Figure 15).  This is 
mostly consistent with the response time data; sentences with after always result in more 
errors.13 
 
 
Figure 15. Iconicity by clause position, proportion of errors (physical relationships only). 
3.1.3.3 The effects of psychological distance on semantic interpretation.  
Psychological distance was included as a control variable.  Sentences with events 
that were far apart should be more difficult to comprehend than sentences where the 
events are close together.  There was no main effect of psychological distance (see  
Figure 16).  However, psychological distance did participate in an interaction with 
semantic relationship, F(1, 62)= 4.690, p = .0300.  There were no effects of 
psychological distance  
                                                 
13 Because these errors come from a repeated measures design, they are not independent and are not 
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for physically or socially related events.  Semantic relationship is only important when 
events are near, F(1, 63)=32.46, P < .0001.  This indicates that the difference between 
socially and physically related events depends on the perceived distance between the 
events.  
 
 
Figure 16. Psychological distance by semantic relationship as a function of response time 
(subject residuals, grand mean added). 
 
3.1.3.4 Summary of Comprehension Results. 
Regarding the replication of effects, the presence of an interaction between 
iconicity and clause position is in itself not surprising.  The differences between response 
times associated with before and after have been demonstrated many times in the 
literature.  My finding that beforemc1st constructions are verified faster than aftermc2nd 
in the context of sentences that preserve chronological order is a replication.  
In terms of predictions, I had predicted two-way interactions between discourse 
order and iconicity and between iconicity and semantic relationship.  Instead I obtained a 
three-way interaction involving all these variables.  The predicted patterns of differences 
within the two-way interactions do not appear to help clarify the nature of this three-way 
___________________________________________________________ 
appropriate for a chi-squared analysis. 
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interaction.  It appears that the predicted difficulty associated with socially related 
relationships holds up across all levels of iconicity and discourse order except for 
chronological sentences that observe the Given-New principle.  Nevertheless, the finding 
does demonstrate a sensitivity to new stimuli, relative to the prior task.  
It was surprising, however, that there was no difference between main clause first 
and main clause last for non-chronological order.  Similarly, the absence of a difference 
between chronological, main clause first and non-chronological main clause last was 
unexpected. 
The interaction between semantic relationship and psychological distance is also 
surprising since psychological distance was only included as a control variable.  I did not 
expect it to interact with my main variables of interest, but included it to make sure that I 
sampled equally across near and far relationships.  These results indicate that other 
factors influencing reasoning about objects or events may be affected by the 
psychological distance between the events, or objects in question. 
3.2 Scheduling Task: Language Production 
3.2.1 Preliminary Data Analysis.  
The covariate measures administered at the end of the task, the sentence span, 
cube comparisons, and card rotation tests yielded a set of general ability scores.  The 
demographics questionnaire, among other things provided information about the 
participants’ experience with house construction.  These covariate measures of course 
yielded data points for each participant, a total of 64.  In order to examine the potential 
influences of ability and experience on the team performance measures, I calculated team 
covariate scores, using a median split to classify participants as high or low on a 
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particular covariate.  For each of the ability tests, the teams were divided into three 
groups reflecting whether the two participants (1) both received a low score on the test in 
question, (2) one participant received a low and the other a high score, or (3) both 
participants received a high score.  I performed a median split on the experience ratings 
and similarly assigned each team to one of three groups using the same logic as above. 
3.2.2 General Findings 
3.2.2.1 Equivalence of experimental groups. 
When I split by representation I end up with 16 pairs and 32 participants per 
representation.  The assignment of participants to representations was not related to the 
covariates (see Table 10). 
Table 10 
 
Correlations between Performance, Covariate Measures, and Representation, n = 64. 
 
 SENSPAN CARDROT CUBECOMP 
r -0.14434 -0.08839 -0.25286 REP p 0.4306 0.6305 0.1626 
 
This means that the participants in the two experimental groups did not differ in 
terms of short term memory, measured by the sentence span test, nor did participants in 
one group have better spatial ability than in the other, as indicated by the cube 
comparisons and card rotation tests.  Additionally, the participants in the two 
experimental groups reported similar levels of experience with house construction, 
t(1,30)=-0.739, p > .05.  
3.2.2.2 Ability-Performance relationships. 
I also determined that general ability did not account for potential variance in 
performance.  Each dyad received a performance measure.  In order to convert individual 
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ability scores to dyad scores, covariate ability measures were coded -1, 0, or +1 for each 
pair reflecting whether the individuals had obtained low-low, high-low, or high-high 
scores.  The correlations between ability and performance were not significant (see Table 
11).   
Table 11 
Correlations between Performance and General Ability, N=32. 
 TIMEACC TIME WORDS 
r 0.16195 -0.13549 -0.10126 SENSPAN 
p 0.3759 0.4597 0.5813 
r -0.18796 0.09867 0.15323 CARDROT 
p 0.3029 0.5911 0.4024 
r -0.21808 0.20689 0.19288 CUBECOM
P p 0.2305 0.2559 0.2902 
 
The number of words did predict the quality of the schedule, r(30)= -0.8028,        
p < .01.  Additionally, the variability in scores was unrelated to time spent on the task, 
i.e., no evidence for a speed accuracy trade-off, r(30), 0.1677, p > .05.  
To examine the effects of language on performance, I first checked whether 
general ability was a predictor of language use.  As noted in the methods section, these 
language variables were a proportion of the total number of content words/constructions 
(those used as predictors), thereby controlling for length of the planning session.  I had 
tentatively predicted that better performance on the spatial ability tests and the sentence 
span tests may predict the degree to which participants would tend to use language with 
complex syntactic structure.  There were no significant correlations between ability 
(dyad-coded as above) and any of the language variables (see Table 12).   
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Table 12 
 
Correlations between language and ability, N=32. 
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3.2.3 Main Effects of Representation and Language on Performance 
My prediction concerning effects of the representation used to complete the 
scheduling task was that participants who experienced the graphical representation would 
complete the construction schedule faster and more efficiently, i.e., using fewer words, 
than participants who experienced the list representation.  
I examined the equivalence of the experimental groups for the dependent 
measures time/accuracy, time and number of words.  The participants in one condition 
did not appear to perform better than the other (see Table 13). 
Table 13 
 
Correlations between Representation and Performance, N=32. 
 
 TIME/ACC TIME WORDS 
r 0.01637 -0.0032 -0.0724REP p 0.9291 0.9863 0.6939
 
 
I did not have a priori expectations as to how the schedules created by participants 
in the two experimental groups might differ, i.e., qualitative or quantitative differences 
between them.  However, because I was interested in the types of temporal relationships 
discussed in the construction of the schedules, it seemed natural to investigate the types 
of relationships that were actually used in the final schedules. 
An analysis of the relationships used by the participants in creating the schedules 
revealed that the participants in the numeric condition used significantly more 
simultaneous relationships (i.e., relationships where the events either overlapped, or 
occurred completely inside, or during other events) than participants in the graphical 
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condition, t(30)=18.09, p < .0001.  There was no difference between the graphical and 
numeric conditions in the number of successive relationships employed, t(30)=0.233,      
p > .05.  
There were, however, numerous effects of language on the performance of the 32 
dyads (see Table 14).  The time/accuracy measure is reverse scored, hence the negative r-
values.  
Table 14 
 
Correlations between Language and Performance. 
 
 
CHRONO 
MC1ST 
NCHRONO 
MC2ND 
NCHRONO 
MC1ST 
CHRONO 
MC2ND 
r -0.4817 -0.2366 -0.3798 -0.3698TIMEACC p 0.0052 0.1922 0.0320 0.0373
   DURING WHILE OVERLAP SAMETIME 
r -0.2664 -0.3910 -0.3999 -0.2623TIMEACC p 0.1405 0.0269 0.0233 0.1470
   MIDDLE THAT THIS ANDTHEN 
r -0.1729 -0.5887 -0.5517 -0.4586TIMEACC p 0.3438 0.0004 0.0011 0.0083
 
 This means that language can be used as a predictor of performance. 
 
3.2.4 Main Effects of Representation on Language 
Generally, I predicted that participants who experienced the graphical 
representation would use qualitatively different language than participants who 
experienced the numeric representation.  More specifically I was interested in differences 
in terms of the cognitive and syntactic complexity of the sentences used to describe 
temporal relationships, predicting that the graphical representation would allow use of 
more complex language.  Additionally, I expected there to be differences in the number 
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of references to duration, i.e., the number of prepositions/descriptors relating 
simultaneity.  That hypothesis was not directional.  This hypothesis was not supported.  
There was no difference in the pattern of relations referred to (succession or simultaneity) 
in Graphical versus Numeric.  
Similarly, there was no correlation between any of the language measures and 
representation as a main effect (see Table 15).  
Table 15 
Correlations between Representation and Language. 
 
CHRONO 
MC1ST 
NCHRONO 
MC2ND 
NCHRONO 
MC1ST 
CHRONO 
MC2ND 
r -0.0120 0.0139 0.1601 0.2699REP p 0.9479 0.9397 0.3816 0.1352
 
 DURING WHILE OVERLAP SAMETIME 
r 0.0697 -0.1806 0.0094 -0.3121REP 
  p 0.7046 0.3225 0.9594 0.082
 
 MIDDLE THAT THIS ANDTHEN 
r 0.1680 -0.0748 -0.2735 0.0596REP 
  p 0.3581 0.6843 0.1298 0.7459
 
 
I did find a difference between number of questions (scaled by number of content 
words), t(30)=-2.22, p = 0.0341, assuming unequal variances.14 Importantly there were 
more questions in the graphical condition, a mean of 219.8 and 163.1 questions in the 
graphical and numeric conditions respectively.  
                                                 
14 I did compute using arcsine transformed proportions, but it doesn’t compute for ratios larger than one.  
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3.2.5 Correlations Among Individual Variables 
The above analyses of language main effects, however, did not test the possibility 
of an interaction between language and representation in their effect on performance.  
Therefore, because I had predicted qualitative differences in language use, I went on to 
explore differences in the patterns of language use for the sixteen pairs of participants 
using each representation.  Doing so provides evidence for differences in language usage 
across representations.  
I set out to determine whether the same or different language measures predicted 
performance within the two representations.  Importantly, I am not looking to identify the 
‘best’ model to predict performance, rather, to demonstrate that the models of language 
usage are different for the two representations. 
I used the time/accuracy measure, raw time, and the total number of words within 
each transcript as the dependent measures in a correlational analysis.  The independent 
variables, or predictors were the language measures (syntax and lexical items) calculated 
as proportions relative to the total number of predictor measures per transcript.15  I used 
an arcsine transformation to normalize these proportion measures.  I initially included the 
covariate measures as alternative explanations of quality.  
The important predictors for time/accuracy in the graphical condition are this, 
that, while, and overlap (see Table 16).  The important predictors for time/accuracy in the 
numeric condition are this, that, same time, chronomc1st, and nchronomc1st (see 
Appendix A for naming key).  The relative pronouns “this” and that” are common to both 
representations.  Examining content words, nchronomc1st (sentences presenting events in 
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non-chronological order placing the main clause first) accounts for 36% of the variance 
in quality for data generated from the numeric representation, but none of the variance in 
quality for data generated from the graphical representation.  In addition, while accounts 
for none of the variance in quality for the numeric representation but accounts for 35% of 
the variance in quality for data from the graphical representation.  The effect of while is 
particularly surprising as the schedule quality measure does not include the socially 
constrained relationships such as overlap and while.16  
Similar analyses for time and number of words continue to suggest different 
patterns of important content words and syntax for the graphical and numeric data (see 
Table 17 and 
___________________________________________________________ 
15 This adjusts for the total number of words—and equates those measures for time on task. 
16  Note that there were no events in the construction schedule which necessarily needed to occur at the 
same time—i.e., there were no physically constrained simultaneous relationships. This means that only 
successive relationships could be physically constrained. 
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Table 18).  The presence and absence of an effect provides the strongest evidence for 
representational differences, e.g., while or overlap in the graphical versus numeric 
conditions.  The available power is not sufficient to distinguish between significant R2 
values.  Most of the slope comparisons are different due to the presence or absence of a 
significant slope.  In addition, the slope comparison on that with words as a dependent 
measure is significant for representation, t(28) = 2.12, p <  .05.   
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Table 16 
 
Correlation Matrix for Word Variables with Time/Accuracy as a Dependent Measure. 
 
 
Graphical Numeric 
TIMEACC 
Beta Adj R-sq t-Value p Beta Adj R-sq t-Value P 
Chronomc1st -255.67 0.0409 -1.28 0.2213 -487.89 0.3754 -3.16 0.0069
Nchronomc1s
t -125.99 0.0116 -1.08 0.2964 -432.51 0.3166 -2.82 0.0136
Chronomc2n
d -793.66 0.653 -1.43 0.1743
-
1695.69 0.1677 -2.01 0.0647
Nchronomc2
nd -847.26 -0.0109 -0.92 0.3755
-
2032.08 0.0114 -1.08 0.2970
During -926.77 -0.0517 -0.51 0.6165 -1818.05 0.0808 -1.52 0.1501
While 
-
1698.2
7 
0.3407 -2.96 0.0104 -437.41 0.0095 -1.07 0.3030
Overlap 
-
1985.0
4 
0.2417 -2.40 0.0306 -784.99 0.0273 -1.19 0.2532
Same time 
-
4685.3
5 
-0.0646 -0.30 0.7683 11303 0.2164 2.27 0.0397
Middle 
-
1270.4
6 
-0.0477 -0.56 0.5824 -2144.89 -0.0212 -0.83 0.4205
That -121.08 0.3605 -3.07 0.0082 -69.59 0.2950 -2.70 0.0173
This -822.91 0.4293 -3.50 0.0035 -382.70 0.2193 -2.28 0.0386
Andthen -169.65 0.1152 -1.72 0.1078 -198.42 0.2028 2.19 0.0456
Senspan 0.13 -0.0575 0.43 0.6737 0.29 0.0089 1.07 0.3048
Cube 
Comparison -0.25 -0.0552 -0.46 0.6498 -0.34 -0.0035 -1.03 0.3222
Card 
Rotation -0.41 -0.0113 -0.91 0.3772 -0.14 -0.0541 -0.48 0.6387
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Table 17 
 
Correlation Matrix for Word Variables with Time as a Dependent Measure 
 
 
Graphical Numeric 
TIME 
Beta Adj R-sq t-Value P Beta 
Adj R-
sq t-Value p 
Chronomc1st 2200.25 -0.0567 0.44 0.6650 9550.26 0.4721 3.80 0.0020
Nchronomc1
st 2564.91 -0.0103 0.92 0.3730 8469.42 0.4009 3.32 0.0050
Chronomc2n
d 25525.00 0.1797 2.07 0.0574
26371.0
0 0.1121 1.70 0.1110
Nchronomc2
nd 19840.00 -0.0125 0.90 0.3820
31225.0
0 -0.0093 0.93 0.3691
During 46460.00 0.0165 1.12 0.2820 34481.00 0.1024 1.65 0.1219
While 41007.00 0.3552 3.04 0.0088 8093.74 0.0165 1.12 0.2820
Overlap 63325.00 0.4944 3.96 0.0014 16994.00 0.0754 1.49 0.1582
Same time -4685.35 -0.0646 2.27 0.0397 11303.00 0.2164 -0.30 0.7683
Middle 22516.00 -0.0582 0.42 0.6821 29899.00 -0.0404 0.65 0.5289
That 2051.33 0.1487 1.90 0.0779 1309.82 0.3406 2.96 0.0104
This 19469.00 0.4262 3.48 0.0036 5969.09 0.1531 1.93 0.0746
Andthen 3145.15 0.0424 1.29 0.2179 3729.34 0.2360 2.37 0.0325
Senspan -0.50 -0.0710 -0.07 0.9445 -5.81 0.0294 -1.21 0.2477
Cube 
Comparison 10.27 -0.0240 0.80 0.4344 5.63 -0.0073 0.94 0.3610
Card 
Rotation 6.90 -0.0407 0.64 0.5309 0.90 -0.0692 0.17 0.8667
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Table 18 
 
Correlation Matrix for Word Variables with Number of Words as a Dependent Measure. 
 
Graphical Numeric 
WORDS 
Beta Adj R-sq 
t-
Value p Beta 
Adj R-
sq 
t-
Value P 
Chronomc1st 123577.00 0.2969 2.71 0.0170 136014.00 0.3548 3.04 0.0088
Nchronomc1st 55303.00 0.1532 1.93 0.0745 124028.00 0.3202 2.84 0.0131
Chronomc2nd 164099.00 0.0106 1.08 0.2994 455277.00 0.1401 1.86 0.0847
Nchronomc2n
d 227101.00 -0.0104 0.92
0.373
3 792271.00 0.0831 1.54 0.1468
During 464897.00 -0.0018 0.99 0.3406 667980.00 0.1808 2.08 0.0568
While 362823.00 0.1927 2.14 0.0504 187810.00 0.1116 1.70 0.1115
Overlap 371650.00 0.0827 1.53 0.1474 178477.00 -0.0088 0.93 0.3671
Same time 124836.00 -0.0329 0.72 0.4818 176502.00 0.2000 2.18 0.0469
Middle 795409.00 0.0590 1.39 0.1853
1083267.0
0 0.0858 1.55 0.1430
That 43680.00 0.7177 6.26 0.0001 19863.00 0.2949 2.70 0.0174
This 244393.00 0.5486 4.39 0.0006 138894.00 0.3985 3.31 0.0052
Andthen 71502.00 0.3939 3.28 0.0055 54061.00 0.1784 2.06 0.0582
Senspan 31.43 -0.0594 0.40 0.6967 -99.59 0.0428 -1.29 0.2171
Cube 
Comparison 104.76 -0.0325 0.73
0.479
3 66.63 -0.0366 0.69 0.5042
Card Rotation 160.13 0.0593 1.40 0.1847 6.30 -0.0710 0.07 0.9416
 
3.2.6 Multi-variable Language Models 
I then took the significant predictor words for each dependent measure and each 
representation separately and put them in SAS's model selection regression procedure to 
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identify the best adjusted R-squared model and to get the beta weights for the predictor 
variables, which in combination could be of different magnitudes relative to the above 
analysis. 
While I developed models for the numeric data and for the graphical data 
separately, I also cross-fit the models to demonstrate that alternative representation-
specific models were not equally good accounts for data generated from the other type of 
representation.  
Compared to the previous table, in which predictor variables were analyzed 
separately, the beta weights here reflect the presence of other predictors in the model.  In 
general, the terms this and that together are picking up substantial performance variance 
within both representations.  The numeric models of language usage suggest a generally 
better fit for numeric data than they are for graphical data, R2=0.6063 versus R2=0.4419 
for time/accuracy data, R2=0.6094 versus R2=-0.078017 respectively for time data, with 
the exception of R2=0.7856 versus R2=0.8196 for word frequency.  However, the 
statistical comparison of R2 values across data sets depends on N, which provides 
insufficient power to document statistical significance for the present data.   
Similarly, the graphical models of language usage appear to be a better fit for 
graphical data than they are for numeric data, R2=0.4255 versus R2=0.1964 respectively 
for time/accuracy data R2=0.6860 versus R2=0.2610 for time data, and R2=0.8848 versus 
R2=0.3257 for word frequency, p < .05 in all cases.  Again, the N precludes a claim of 
statistical significance.  
                                                 
17  All r-squared values reported are adjusted. 
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Comparing the right hand column of Table 19 and Table 20, sentences using 
chronological order provide an account for performance with the numeric representation 
and overlap and and then account for performance with the graphical representation.  
This supports the claim that different models of language account for the performance 
within the different representations.18 
                                                 
18 One could possibly argue that this and that are common to both representations and they are correlated 
with all the other language variables. So I ran R2 regressions on only the content specific language variables 
(everything but this and that). This did not provide a more revealing pattern of results.  
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Table 19 
 
Adjusted R-Squared Values: Numeric Word-Models Fit to Numeric and Graphical 
Performance Data (time/accuracy).  
 
NUMERIC MODELS 
FIT WITH NUMERIC DATA  CROSS-FIT WITH GRAPHICAL DATA 
     
TIMEACC     TIMEACC     
Variables 
R^2  
Adj. P   Variables 
R^2  
Adj. P   
THIS, 
THAT 0.6063 0.0009   
THIS, 
THAT 0.4419 0.0089   
           
Variables Beta 
t-
Value P  Variables Beta 
t-
Value P 
THIS -351.13 -3.25 0.0063  THIS -624.61 -2.21 0.0458
THAT -69.1 -3.95 0.0017  THAT -53.23 -1.19 0.2560
           
TIME     TIME     
Variables 
R^2  
Adj. P   Variables 
R^2  
Adj. P   
CHRONO 
MC1ST, 
NCHRONO 
MC1ST 
0.6094 0.0009 
  
CHRONO 
MC1ST,  
NCHRONO 
MC1ST 
-0.0780 0.6428 
  
           
Variables Beta 
t-
Value P  Variables Beta 
t-
Value P 
CHRONO 
MC1ST 6999.11 2.91 0.0122  
CHRONOM
C1ST -2638.66 -0.35 0.7334
NCHRONO 
MC1ST 5566.38 2.43 0.0301  
NCHRONO
MC1ST -3698.39 0.85 0.4106
           
WORDS     WORDS     
Variables 
R^2  
Adj. P   Variables 
R^2  
Adj. P   
THIS, 
THAT 0.7856 <.0001   
THIS, 
THAT 0.8196 <.0001   
           
Variables Beta 
t-
Value P  Variables Beta 
t-
Value P 
THIS 144262 5.75 <.0001  THIS 128412 2.98 0.0106
THAT 20838 5.13 0.0002   THAT 31999 4.69 0.0004
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Table 20 
 
Adjusted R-Squared Values: Graphical Word-Models Fit to Numeric and Graphical 
Performance Data (time/accuracy). 
 
GRAPHICAL MODELS 
FIT WITH GRAPHICAL DATA  CROSS-FIT WITH NUMERIC DATA 
          
TIMEACC     TIMEACC     
Variables 
R^2  
Adj. P   Variables 
R^2  
Adj. P   
THIS 0.4255 0.0037   THIS 0.1964 0.0486   
         
Variables Beta 
t-
Value P  Variables Beta 
t-
Value P 
THIS -817.56 -3.48 0.0037  THIS -333.33 -2.16 0.0486
          
TIME     TIME     
Variables 
R^2  
Adj. P   Variables 
R^2  
Adj. P   
THIS,  
OVERLAP 0.6860 0.0002   
THIS,  
OVERLAP 0.2610 0.0552   
         
Variables Beta 
t-
Value P  Variables Beta 
t-
Value P 
THIS 13717 3.09 0.0086  THIS 6155.54 2.13 0.0533
OVERLAP 48045 3.55 0.0036  OVERLAP 17793 1.74 0.1046
         
WORDS     WORDS     
Variables 
R^2  
Adj. P   Variables 
R^2  
Adj. P   
THAT,  
ANDTHEN 0.8848 <.0001   
THAT,  
ANDTHEN 0.3257 0.0304   
         
Variables Beta 
t-
Value P  Variables Beta 
t-
Value P 
THAT 36685 7.79 <.0001  THAT 15835 2.01 0.0651
ANDTHEN 46343 4.61 0.0005   ANDTHEN 33181 1.28 0.2226
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3.2.7 Latent Representation Effects 
I predicted that participants experiencing the graphical representation would be 
more likely to adopt the time-moving metaphor and therefore reply ‘Monday’ to the 
conceptual metaphor question than participants in the numeric condition.  A chi-squared 
analysis revealed that the type of representation did not predict whether participants 
answered Monday or Friday to the metaphor question, X2(1)=0.2032, p > .05.  Although 
it appeared that there was a preference for responding ‘Friday’, this difference was only 
approximating statistical significance, X2(1)=3.2608, p > .05. 
3.2.8 Summary Representation Effects 
I did not find any main effects of representation on performance, on language, or 
on the latent task.  Participants used more simultaneous relationships in the numeric 
condition.  However, examining the language patterns within each representation 
provided some evidence of different language patterns within each representation.  Rather 
than a straightforward relationship between representation and performance, it is the 
combination of language and representational format that predicts performance.  
3.3 General Language Findings 
Apart from the influence of representation, the data permit the evaluation of two 
additional language related phenomena.  
3.3.1 Discourse as Context for Production 
In the comprehension study, I had predicted that discourse order would interact 
with iconicity, such that the difficulty associated with an order reversal would be smaller 
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in the context of sentences that observed the Given-New discourse principle.  Although I 
did observe an interaction between discourse order and iconicity in the comprehension 
study, it was further complicated by semantic relationship.  Additionally, the predicted 
relationship between discourse order and iconicity did not appear to account for this 
three-way interaction.  However, I did want to examine the relationship between 
discourse order and iconicity in the context of production—the hypothesis here being that 
most of the sentences reversing chronological order would be observing the Given-New 
principle. 
The issue became how to operationalize givenness in the context of my 
transcripts.  Could an event be assumed to be given only if it occurred in the immediately 
preceding sentence, or if it was mentioned up to 10 minutes, 20 minutes, or an hour 
earlier than the sentence in question? A sure indication in discourse that an object or 
event is given, or mutually understood, is the use of pronouns.  In an effort to examine if 
the participants generally observed the Given-New principle, I therefore did a count on 
the frequency of use of ‘that’ (and ‘it’, ‘this’, ‘those’, ‘these’, of these though, ‘that’ was 
by far the most frequent) within the different sentences constructions. 
Again, I was most interested in the two sentence constructions that are used most 
frequently, beforemc1st and aftermc1st.  Beforemc1st does not reverse chronological 
order, aftermc1st does.  For comparison purposes, I also counted the sentences in which 
event names (not pronouns) were used as the referent.  These will serve as the baseline 
comparison, since those instances will both include events that are given and new ones as 
well. When participants use the name to refer to an event, it is possible that they are 
introducing it for the first time, i.e., it is new.  
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Figure 17 illustrates the proportions of before/after sentences using event name or 
a pronoun to refer to the object in the main clause.  Again, I expect the after sentences 
with main clause first to have pronouns more frequently than beforemc1st sentences.  
That is, aftermc1st sentences will be used to refer to given events more often than 
beforemc1st sentences:  
Before Main Clause First, Event Name: 
(‘you pour the foundation before you build the frame’) 
 
Before Main Clause First, Relative Pronoun: 
(‘you do that before you build the frame’) 
 
After Main Clause First, Event Name: 
(‘you build the frame after you pour the foundation’) 
 
After Main Clause First, Relative Pronoun: 
(‘you do that after you pour the foundation’) 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Main clause referent as a function of clause position.  
 
The predicted pattern appears to be supported.  I did identify a significant overall 
effect of event reference, F(1,93)=9.37, p < .0001.  On closer inspection, after sentences 
did use relative pronouns significantly more often than the before sentences, 
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F(1,31)=24.83, P < .0001.  Conversely, the before sentences used event name references 
significantly more often than the after sentences, F(1,31)=8.56, p = .0064.  There was no 
difference between the number of before sentences (MC first, in blue squares) that use 
event names versus relative pronouns, F(1,31)=2.08, p > .05.  However, there was a 
difference between the number of after sentences (MC first, in red diamonds) that use 
event names versus relative pronouns, F(1,31)=40.86, p < .0001.  
I also used this notion of pronoun use as an indicator of Givenness to examine the 
effect of representation.  My hypothesis regarding the representation was that the 
graphical representation would provide better common ground than the numeric.  This 
was not supported using a frequency of references to simultaneity; however, it was 
possible that the graphical representation allowed participants to use pronouns more 
often—as a function of having a better shared workspace.  There was no main effect of 
representation on event referencing.  There were no differences between the frequencies 
with which participants in the two conditions used pronouns to refer to events, F(1,31)= -
0.8039, p > .05. 
Overall, these results do support the idea that temporal order ambiguity is less 
problematic when the given-new principle is observed.  Overall, the results indicate 
functionally different patterns of usage of the before and after main clause first 
constructions.   
3.3.2 Comprehension versus Production 
I predicted that sentence constructions with higher response times in the 
comprehension study would occur fewer times in the production study than sentence 
constructions with shorter response times.  In other words, the pattern of difficulty should 
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be comparable across comprehension and production.  In comparing our production and 
comprehension results, I focused mainly on the frequencies of iconicity and clause 
position within the production data since it could readily be compared to the interaction 
obtained in the comprehension data.  An ANOVA on the relative frequencies (Arcsine 
transformed proportions) of sentences in the transcripts that observed/reversed 
chronological order and placed the main clause first or last also revealed that the 
frequencies of main clause first or last depended on iconicity, F(1,30)=5.170, p < .0300 
(see Figure 18). 
This pattern does support the notion that main clause first is easier.  However, the 
pattern of difference within the production results did not mirror those of the 
comprehension results. Figure 18 illustrates the production results overlayed with the 
comprehension results. Figure 18 juxtaposes the iconicity by clause position interaction 
in the context of both the production and comprehension experiments.  The production 
results, in arcsine transformed proportions, are indicated using the unfilled symbols and 
are plotted against the left hand side y-axis.  The comprehension results, measured in 
response time (least squared means), are indicated using the filled symbols and are 
plotted against the right hand side y-axis.  This graph shows clearly that the chronological 
pattern (on the right) is largely the same for production and comprehension.  The main 
clause first constructions are both produced more often and are responded to faster.  
However, this does not hold for non-chronological order.  Here there is no difference 
between main clause first and main clause last constructions for the comprehension data, 
but there is a significant difference for the production data.  Again, main clause first 
constructions are produced significantly more often. 
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Figure 18. Iconicity by clause, comprehension and production results.19 
                                                 
19  To enable direct comparison with response times the lowest proportions are at the top of the y-axis, 
while the highest proportions are at the bottom. Filled-in symbols denote comprehension data and are using 
the y-axis on the left, unfilled symbols denote production data and are using the y-axis on the right. 
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IV.   Discussion 
The following sections will discuss the ways in which my results address the 
syntactic, semantic, and contextual influences, i.e., discourse principles and 
representation on measures of language complexity, and by inference cognitive 
complexity.  Syntactic influences include clause position and iconicity, semantic 
influences address semantic relationship/psychological distance, and contextual 
influences address role of discourse principles and representation—in all these sections I 
combine results from both comprehension and production. 
The present set of experiments provide evidence to suggest that the context in 
which language is situated has an important influence on the cognitive complexity 
associated with that language—perhaps a more important influence than variables 
identified independently of the context (like lexical marking, clause position, and 
iconicity).  The two aspects of the context examined in this study include 1) discourse 
principles, especially those related to the prior introduction of a topic, and 2) the nature of 
the representation.  
4.1 Methodological Differences 
Before I discuss findings from either study, it is worth mentioning some of the 
differences between the current comprehension study, study I, and previous research on 
comprehension.  First, the present study uses meaningful stimuli: stimuli that have real 
inherent constraints and temporal relationships.  Second, and more importantly, 
participants in the current comprehension study had been grounded in thinking about 
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temporal relationships in the production study before they started verifying the 
comprehension sentences.  This means that they are not fresh off the street, as is often the 
case, and they have actively been thinking about temporal relationships rather than 
merely reading about them, which is sometimes used as a way to provide content for the 
subsequent reasoning task (Foss, & Bower, 1986).  That means that not only have they 
reasoned about the contents of the comprehension task, the events and their relationships, 
some of their strategies for thinking about time could carry over.  Or, at the very least, 
they had some practice resolving temporal order in language before they went into the 
comprehension task. 
These differences alone, however, do not account for the difference between the 
response times seen in the present study, and response times seen in previous 
comprehension research.  The response times are much longer in my study (on the 
average about 5.7 seconds) than in previous studies.  This increase could be a result of 
using meaningful stimuli or of the participants having reasoned about some of the 
relationships before (see Anderson and Bower’s fan effect, 1973).  The most obvious 
difference, though, between this study and previous studies is that I am using a sentence 
verification paradigm.  Mandler (1986) used simple reading time—the response times in 
her study were on the order of about 2.2 seconds.  It is therefore plausible that on the 
average, my participants used that amount of time to read the sentence, and perhaps 
resolve any temporal ambiguity associated with it.  But, this does not even account for 
half the total time spent on the stimuli by participants in my study. 
Mandler (1986) asked her participants to indicate that they had comprehended the 
sentence.  In the present study participants were asked to indicate comprehension by 
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responding true or false.  This difference in paradigm alone, though, does not account for 
the magnitude of the difference between the present and Mandler’s response times either. 
Foss and Bower (1986), in one of their experiments, also used a sentence verification 
task.  In that study, participants we asked to verify an action sequence based on a manual 
they read immediately preceding the sentence verification task.  The mean verification 
time in that experiment was about 2.5 seconds.  This means, the nature of the 
experimental paradigm alone does not account for the long response times.  Instead, I 
believe the reasoning processes involved in producing the response is responsible for the 
added response time.  I will discuss these reasoning processes in the context of my 
results. 
4.2 Contextual Influences on Complexity 
The contextual influences on comprehension included aspects of discourse and 
representational format.  First I will discuss the results I obtained with respect to the 
effects of including a discourse context on subsequent comprehension, as well as 
compare these comprehension results to the patterns of language actually produced in real 
discourse in my production study.  
4.2.1 Discourse as a Context for Comprehension 
I had predicted an interaction between iconicity and discourse order, such that the 
effect of an order reversal should be magnified in the context of a violation of discourse 
order, i.e., New-Given.  An interaction in which the effect of iconicity, or chronological 
order reversal, was magnified by a violation of discourse principles would have important 
theoretical implications.  Such a finding would call into question any theory concerning 
linguistic and/or cognitive complexity derived from experimental tasks that do not take 
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into consideration the larger communicative context, be it produced or comprehended 
language.  The previous literature suggested an interaction between semantic relationship 
and iconicity, such that the effect of an order reversal should be magnified in the context 
of arbitrary relationships.  Neither of these two-way interactions were significant, 
however the three-way interaction involving all three variables was significant.  The 
presence of any interaction involving discourse order provides initial evidence that the 
communicative context plays a role in determining cognitive complexity. 
Generally, sentences with socially related events were more difficult than 
sentences with physically related events.  This difference appeared to be magnified for 
certain combinations of chronological order and discourse order—namely for sentence in 
non-chronological order in Given-New, and for chronological order in New-Given.  In 
order to provide an account of this pattern of differences, I have developed a model that 
assumes that the bulk of the response time variation in the present study is due to the 
inference processes involved in verifying the stimuli, as opposed to reading time. 
In Clark et al.’s (1971) study, participants were comparing the contents of the 
sentence to the contents of a picture.  In producing a response in the sentence-verification 
task, participants did not have to generate a reason, or an explanation, for their answer—
the picture provided ground truth.  That is, ‘star is above plus’ would unequivocally be 
false if the picture depicted a plus above a star.  In Foss and Bower’s study, the manual, 
or long-term working memory, provided the ground truth.  In the present study, it was 
necessary to infer the connections between the events in question in order to generate an 
explanation that could support one’s answer.  In other words, ground truth had to be 
constructed ad hoc.  For example, in order to falsify the sentence ‘you pour the 
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foundation before you dig the hole’ you have to generate the explanation that ‘you have 
to have a hole to pour the foundation into’.  
Sometimes the explanations, or reasons needed to justify an answer are simple, 
like the one above.  This was an example of a physical relationship—one event is a 
necessary precondition for another.  In the case of the social relationships, one event may 
be related to another, but one does not act as a precondition for the other.  For example, 
‘you prime the walls before you install the carpet’ is true by social convention because ‘if 
you install the carpet first then you have to cover it up so that you do not spill primer on 
it’.  This can account for my finding that social relationships appear to be associated with 
longer response times on the average. 
 
Figure 19 summarizes the proposed explanation-based verification model.  First, 
the sentence order is translated into a baseline order. When the sentence order matches 
chronological order, sentence event 1 becomes baseline event 1, and sentence event 2 
becomes baseline event 2. When the sentence order does not match chronological order, 
sentence event1 becomes baseline event2, and vice versa. 
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Figure 19. An explanation-based model of sentence verification. 
 
Then, in order to verify the relationship, an explanation for the baseline order is 
generated.  First, a necessary explanation for the relationship is generated and evaluated 
—“do you have to___?” In order to do this evaluation, the participant must determine 
whether event1 is a pre-condition for event2.  If it is, then the relationship is necessary, 
and the truth index is executed.  If it is not, then a desirability explanation is generated 
and evaluated—“would you___?” If executing the baseline order does not result in 
undesirable outcomes, then the relationship is desirable, and the truth index is executed 
(default truth index is True).  If it is not, which can happen both in the case of a false 
physical relationship, and a false social relationship, then the truth index is changed to 
false, and then executed.  Evaluating whether an order of events is desirable requires a 
different kind of explanation than is required for evaluating whether it is necessary.  See 
Table 21 for the additional types of explanations generated to evaluate necessary versus 
desirable relationships. 
 
Generate 
baseline 
order
Identify 
necessity 
conditions 
for event2
SenEvent1=
BaseEvent2 
SenEvent2=
BaseEvent1 
Is sentence in 
chronological 
order? 
No 
SenEvent1=
BaseEvent1 
SenEvent2=
BaseEvent2 
Yes Is event1 
then event2 
necessary? 
Execute 
truth index 
No 
Yes 
Change 
truth 
Is event1 
then event2 
desirable? 
No 
Do you have to ____? 
Should you ____? 
Identify 
desirability 
conditions 
for event 2
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Table 21 
 
Necessary versus desirable explanations.  
 
 
 
 
It is also possible that in order to examine desirability conditions, participants use 
a falsification strategy (Johnson-Laird, 1970).  Instead of verifying that event1 is a 
desirable pre-condition for event2, participants might examine whether event2 can indeed 
occur without event1 having occurred first.  In doing so, participants might imagine what 
would happen if event2 occurred first, i.e., event2 then event1.  If this order is 
undesirable, then the opposite relationship must be true.  This strategy may only be 
necessary for the social relationships because the events do not impose direct constraints 
on each other.  The physical relationships do, and therefore imagining them in the 
opposite order is unnecessary. 
You SenEvent1 
after SenEvent2 
Event1                   
then                              
Event2
You have to event1 in 
order to event2. 
You dig the hole 
after you pour the 
foundation 
Pour the foundation 
then                              
dig the hole
You have to dig the 
hole in order to pour 
the foundation. 
You attach the 
drywall after you 
install the exterior 
doors 
Install exterior 
doors then                   
attach drywall
If you don’t event1 
then event2 then 
event3 
You SenEvent1
after SenEvent2
Event1                  
then                              
Event2
If you don’t install 
exterior doors then 
attach drywall then 
drywall might get wet. 
SENTENCE 
ORDER 
BASELINE 
ORDER 
DESIRABLE 
EXPLANATION 
Social 
Example 
(True) 
Physical 
Example 
(False) 
SENTENCE 
ORDER 
BASELINE 
ORDER 
NECESSARY 
EXPLANATION 
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A falsification strategy could also account for the slow responses when social 
relationships are presented in chronological order in the context of Given-Given and 
New-Given.  The falsification process carried out on the social relationships might result 
in a mental representation that is in reverse chronological order.  This means that when 
the sentence on the screen presents events in non-chronological order, the reversal 
generates the easily remembered chronological order for evaluation.  However, when the 
sentence on the screen presents events in chronological order, the reversal generates the 
less accessible non-chronological order for evaluation.  This model does not account for 
the odd, slow verification of physical relationships presented in chronological order in the 
context of observing the Given-New principle (Given-New).  Because physical 
relationships should not require reversals for explanation, there is no reason for the 
chronological sentences to be slow. 
This falsification account goes part of the way towards explaining my finding that 
the relative difficulties involved in verifying physical and social relationships interact 
with whether or not the Given-New principle is observed.  Haviland and Clark’s (1974) 
process account of the Given-New effect, concluded that presenting Given information 
first provides the reader with a mental scaffold onto which New information can be 
attached.  If New information is presented first, the readers must keep New information 
in memory while they wait for the antecedent for this information.   
Within the spirit of this process account, though, it makes sense that it would then 
be particularly advantageous, when you are reasoning about a social relationship, to have 
thought about the events in question previously.  That is, because constructing social 
explanations is more difficult than constructing physical explanations, consistent with 
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Mandler’s (1986) model-building account, having reasoned about events previously 
ensures that they are easier to sustain in working memory.  This is particularly helpful in 
the case of social relationships, which require additional working memory resources.  
Because a Given event exists in long term working memory, when it is in the first 
position, it provides a better anchor for the baseline relationship. When a New event is in 
the first position, there is no such anchor and the baseline relationship must be rehearsed 
more often, interfering with the inference processes involved in generating an 
explanation.  
Most theoretical accounts of comprehension (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1983; Zwaan, 
& Radvansky, 1998) assume that a reader interprets a sentence by constructing a 
discourse model that is a mental representation of people, objects and events described.  
An important question in psycholinguistic research is whether processing decisions at one 
level of representation (e.g., the discourse model) can influence lower-level processing 
decisions (e.g., decisions about syntactic structure).  At the very least, the present study 
demonstrates that lower level processing decisions, such as whether or not the sentence 
presents events in chronological order, are influenced by discourse level decisions—such 
as, have I heard about an event or object before.  This means in particular, that absolute 
statements about what is difficult, or cognitively complex, are misguided.  My results 
demonstrate that complexity depends on the whole set of things that have to be reasoned 
about.  Therefore, if you must constrain the context so much in order to get the results 
observed in previous research, this may indicate that these low level variables do not 
provide a useful account of how people reason about language in the real world.   
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Results obtained in the production study corroborate my claim that low level 
language dimensions (marking (before/after), syntax (clause position), and iconicity) 
cannot be thought of as absolute influences on complexity.  These production results 
show that certain low-level dimensions are associated with specific pragmatic purposes.  
That is it appears that after, main-clause-first constructions are specifically used to 
produce events in an order that is consistent with the previous discourse.  This may call 
into question any claimed cognitive complexity associated with them that may have been 
observed in individual cognition studies that did not consider this functional dimension of 
language.  My results support the notion that it is not meaningful to study language 
separately from its role as a tool for social coordination.  
4.2.2 Discourse as Context for Production 
In the production study, I examined the extent to which participants observed 
discourse order by focusing on their usage of pronouns in sentences relating temporal 
information, i.e., chronological order.  Pronouns can be regarded as markers of Givenness 
as they are used to refer to an object or event that has been previously mentioned.  If an 
event had not been mentioned before, a pronoun would be a very unlikely referent to use.  
Participants produced sentences with the main clause first significantly more 
often. When they produced sentences that violated chronological order they used the 
preposition after, and they were more likely to use relative pronouns in place of the object 
in the main clause (see Figure 20).  
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Figure 20. Temporality of discourse. Event referencing using pronoun. 
 
When participants produced sentences that did not violate chronological order 
they used the preposition before, and they were more likely to use the name of the event 
to refer to it (see Figure 21).  
 
 
Figure 21. Temporality of discourse. Event referencing using event name. 
 
These results demonstrate that people use syntax that reflects the temporality of 
the discourse itself and in this way utilize word-choice and syntax deliberately in order to 
‘cooperate’.  These findings provide initial evidence that the preposition after, and syntax 
that violates chronological order, is used functionally to present events in an order that is 
consistent with the previous discourse.  In Figure 20, speaker B intends for the order ‘dig 
the hole before you pour the foundation’.  However, instead of saying that, they use the 
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after, main clause first construction to present events in an order that is consistent with 
the order they have been talked about in the discourse. 
This suggests that, in the context of discourse, the comprehension of language 
violating chronological order may be facilitated by the local context of the discourse 
itself.  That is, the discourse itself provides a temporal context which can serve to 
disambiguate the temporality of the content of the conversation.  The discourse example 
in Figure 21 demonstrates that this is not merely a matter of observing the Given-New 
principle.  In this example, both waterlines and ductwork have been mentioned in the 
immediately preceding discourse, and should both be assumed to be Given.  The choice 
of a sentence construction that places the ‘oldest’ information first shows that the speaker 
is using temporality from the discourse situation to guide production.  Just like speakers 
can violate discourse maxims to imply meaning (implicature; Grice, 1981), speakers can 
present information out of chronological order, using more ‘complex’ syntax in order to 
make their language coherent within a larger meaning system.  Fittingly, Schegloff 
(1991) notes that conversational language is not precise and unambiguous, exactly 
because the entire interactive and situational context, not just a speaker's words, is 
available for establishing shared understanding among participants.  
My results demonstrate then, that in discourse, coordination of communicative 
actions trumps ordering of content.  This means that the discourse itself provides a 
context for comprehension that may efface low level influences on cognitive complexity, 
i.e., the local context overrides general rules about difficulty.  In this case, context 
appears to reduce complexity rather than to increase it.  Results such as these suggest that 
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our understanding of the relationship between language and cognition is better enhanced 
by studying language in use, when it is produced for someone.  
4.3 Semantic Influences on Complexity 
Prior research suggests that objects and events that are logically related are easier 
to reason about than objects and events which are arbitrarily related.  This suggests that 
the nature of the relationship between two events should influence cognitive processing.  
I had predicted that socially related events would be more difficult to reason about than 
physically related events.  I did indeed find that socially related events were more 
difficult to reason about than physically related events, but only when events were closer 
together in time (see Table 22). There was no difference between physical and social 
events when the events were far apart in time.  I therefore have partial support for the 
claim that physical laws and social convention pose different constraints on reasoning, 
which is consistent with previous research.  This is also consistent with my earlier 
suggestion that social relationships require a different, and more involved verification 
process. 
Table 22  
 
Sample Sentences from Psychological Distance by Semantic Relationship. The Difficult 
Near/Social Case is Highlighted. 
 
 Near Far 
Physical You pour the foundation before  you build the frame 
You deliver the lumber before 
you run the rough wiring 
Social You install the exterior doors before you attach the drywall 
You build the floor frame before 
you pour the concrete driveway 
 
The question that remains, however, is why the processes involved in reasoning 
about different types of relationships are influenced by the perceived distance between 
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the events? The absence of an overall distance effect was somewhat surprising.  This 
result is in contradiction with the literature suggesting that it is more difficult to reason 
about actions and goals that are further apart conceptually and temporally (Foss, & 
Bower, 1986).  
Franklin, Smith, and Jonides (2007), however, provide some evidence that the 
psychological distance effect may depend on familiarity with the material.  In a similar 
study to Foss and Bower (1986), Franklin et al. used different task domains, half of which 
participants had rated high familiarity with and half that they had rated that they were 
unfamiliar with.  Franklin et al. found a reverse-distance effect, i.e., they were faster 
when events were closer together, in the context of familiar task domains, such as going 
to a restaurant.  In the context of an unfamiliar task domain such as making new clothes, 
they found a distance effect, i.e., they were faster when events were further apart.  
Franklin et al. propose a hybrid model of temporal codes, such that events are coded both 
in terms of their exact position within a routine and terms of their coarse position—early, 
middle, and late.  In the case of low familiarity, participants are more likely to have a 
coarse coding which can be used to estimate position within the routine and produce fast 
responses for events that are far apart.  A coarse coding, however, makes it more difficult 
to discern fine distinctions.  Low familiarity therefore results in slower responses when 
events are close in time. When participants have high familiarity, events are more likely 
to be represented with specific position information, which takes longer to scan—the 
closer events are, the less time it should take to scan position information. 
My results provide support for a partial distance effect.  It can certainly be argued 
that my participants have low familiarity with the material (their self-ratings indicated 
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this).  This distance effect, however, only appeared for socially related events.  This could 
suggest that my participants are indeed using some form of estimation process due to 
their low familiarity.  The absence of a distance effect in the context of the physically 
related events suggests that the estimation process is somehow influenced by the 
semantics of the relationship, though.  The social conventions for temporal order of 
activities in house construction are more likely to be unfamiliar to participants than 
physical laws constraining the same activities.  It makes sense then, as found by Franklin 
et al. (2007), that the less familiar relationships are influenced more by psychological 
distance.  It is possible that in the case of the social relationships, the explanations are 
more difficult to construct, and participants are resorting to coarse estimation making the 
temporally close events more difficult to discern. 
4.4 Syntactic Influences on Complexity 
The present research examined the effects of syntax, or sentence construction, on 
comprehension by varying the positions of the main and subordinate clauses in the 
production experiment.  Similarly, frequency counts of sentences with main clause first 
and main clause last sentence constructions in comprehension experiment provide 
information about syntactic production patterns, which provides a basis for a comparison 
of comprehension and production. 
4.4.1 Linguistic Order 
The two main findings related to the Iconicity and Clause Position interaction, 
which speak to the influences of linguistic order on cognitive complexity, concern the 
preference for main clause first and for the preposition before.  I will relate these two 
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findings to the potential role of discourse context in the comprehension and production of 
linguistic order. 
4.4.1.1 Main-clause-first advantage. 
In the present study, participants comprehended sentence constructions with 
main-clause-first, before sentences more easily than main-clause-last, after sentences.20 
Similarly, participants produced sentence constructions with the main clause first 
significantly more often than sentence constructions with main clause last, regardless of 
the preposition.  Although these production results are not similar to the comprehension 
results established in the previous literature, they are comparable to the results obtained 
from the analysis of the mission control production data.  The presence of a similar 
pattern of production in these two different task contexts and populations lends credibility 
to the results.  
Clark and Clark (1968) put forth that the position of the main clause is the most 
important cognitive feature of a sentence.  That is, in computational terms, the position of 
the main clause is the feature of the sentence that is evaluated first.  If the main clause is 
positioned first, the sentence is considered unmarked for clause position; if it positioned 
last, it is considered marked.  
One could interpret my results as supporting Clark and Chase’s original cognitive 
marking notion, predicting that main clause first is easier than main clause last, and that 
before is easier than after.  However an alternative explanation is that Clark and Clark’s 
participants simply produced the main clause first, before sentences more often because 
                                                 
20 There were no differences between comprehending main clause first, after and main clause last, before 
sentences. 
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the main clause first, after sentences have a functionally different significance when used 
in the context of real discourse (see earlier discussion of the functional significance of 
after).  Because their experiment was devoid of such a context, it was also devoid of a 
reason to use that particular sentence construction.  
4.4.1.2 ‘Before’ advantage. 
Surprisingly, main clause last, before sentences appeared to be just as easy to 
comprehend as main clause first, before sentences. Within the cognitive marking 
framework, main clause last, before sentences should be the most difficult sentence 
construction to comprehend.  This was consistently the finding in all the research 
presented earlier by Clark and his colleagues as well as in most of the developmental 
literature.  This particular sentence construction should be difficult because it presents 
events non-chronologically and it places the main clause last.  
Given the numerous methodological differences between the present study and 
the studies which have examined the marking phenomenon, though, it is not surprising 
that I should obtain a somewhat different pattern of results.  The fact that the cognitive 
marking framework does not provide an adequate account of the present findings 
suggests that the data cannot be explained simply by appealing to the low level linguistic 
aspects of the sentences.  Instead, the pragmatic context for the stimuli provided in this 
experiment likely has contributed to the pattern of results.  As discussed earlier, it appears 
that the low level aspects of language can be utilized in discourse to attain functionally 
different ends.  In particular, after sentences that reversed chronological order appeared 
to be used to communicate events in correspondence with the temporal order of the 
discourse, i.e., to preserve Given-New, or to follow up on a partner’s previous comment.  
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Because my participants had recently participated in a discourse in which before and after 
were associated with different pragmatic purposes, it is possible that they had these 
purposes in mind when resolving the temporal ambiguity of the comprehension stimuli.  
Only, in the context of the sentence verification task, there was no real pragmatic purpose 
associated with the sentences, and expecting such a purpose could serve to distract, or 
somehow disrupt the comprehension of the after sentences in particular. 
Therefore, rather than concluding that after is uniformly marked, or uniformly 
cognitively more complex, I lean towards the conclusion that after is used differently 
within real discourse.  Because it has a different purpose, it behaves differently within 
artificial comprehension tasks in which the purpose of the language changes as a function 
of the experimental task.  
4.4.2 Comprehension versus Production 
Another important prediction in the present study was that production patterns 
should mirror comprehension patterns.  If speakers take ease of comprehension into 
consideration in their choice of 'words' and syntax then the words and syntax used most 
often in discourse should be the ones that have the least complexity associated with them.  
Grice's conversational principles provide evidence to support the above premise. 
I did observe an interaction between Iconicity by Clause Position within both my 
comprehension and my production studies.  However, not only were the patterns of the 
interactions not the same, neither patterns resembled the pattern of differences reported in 
the previous literature.  I had reasoned that if comprehension and production patterns did 
not converge, then either Grice’s principles do not always hold; we do not always 
produce that which is comprehensible, or, consistent with Grice’s concept of implicature, 
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we produce language that is deliberately more complicated to call special attention to the 
content.  The last alternative, which is not necessarily disjunctive with the first two, is 
that predictions from comprehension literature about what is comprehensible in real 
discourse are wrong. 
Even though my data does not allow me to choose one of these options 
definitively, it does allow me to speculate about a fourth option which I had not 
anticipated.  The fourth option being that the discourse itself can provide a pragmatic 
context which can serve to disambiguate complexity.  
4.5 Representational Format and Cooperation 
The other contextual factor which can have important influences on cognitive 
complexity examined in the present study concerns the format of the external 
representations available to support, or provide reference for the content of language.  I 
hypothesized that representational format would influence the online production of 
language in the context of a cooperative task.  I further predicted that representational 
format would have an effect on later comprehension of information which had been 
reasoned about in the context of a specific external representation.  This latter prediction 
was not supported by the data, and will therefore be discussed first. 
4.5.1 Representations as Contexts for Comprehension 
I was interested in determining whether the representation would have persisting 
influences on the patterns of cognitive complexities associated with the language 
variables.  The absence of a main effect or interactions involving representational format 
indicates that the nature of the representation used to create the schedules did not appear 
to have a differential effect on the ease with which participants resolved chronological 
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ambiguity in the later comprehension study.  This means that the present study did not 
succeed in uncovering persisting influences of representational format on the manner in 
which temporal information is stored and retrieved.  
Similarly, the finding that participants did not appear to systematically reply 
Monday or Wednesday to the temporal metaphor question indicated that there was no 
effect of representation on the propensity to adopt a time-moving or an ego-moving 
metaphor.  
4.5.2 Representations as Contexts for Cooperation 
Even though the present study did not demonstrate differential lasting effects of 
representational format on language comprehension, it did demonstrate modest effects of 
representation on performance and reliable effects on language production. 
4.5.2.1 Effect of representation on performance. 
The main predicted effect of representation on performance was that participants 
experiencing the graphical condition would complete the schedules faster and more 
efficiently (using fewer words) than participants in the numeric condition.  There were no 
differences between the groups on the amount of time they spent on the task or the 
number of words they used.  Although I did not have specific predictions about the 
quality or the appearance of the schedules, I did examine these dimensions. 
In terms of the appearance of the schedules, the question here was whether or not 
the format of the schedule somehow influenced participants to use a different strategy for 
creating their schedules—resulting in different types of schedules.  It did appear that 
participants in the numeric condition used more simultaneous relationships.  There was 
no difference between the groups in the number of successive relationships used.  The 
119 
 
reason using different types of relationships did not affect the quality scores (no 
differences) is that the quality measure only evaluated the order of the physical 
relationships—which, per definition, had to be ordered successively.  It is possible that 
the participants in the graphical condition felt less pressured to use simultaneous 
relationships because the graphical representation gave them a more clear idea of how 
much time was left of the three month time limit.  Or, conversely, it is possible that the 
participants used simultaneous relationships, or overlapped days, due to inattention. 
There were no differences for quality as indicated by the performance measure.  
Attempts to decrease performance variance with language and ability variables did not 
reveal an effect of representation.  This result is relevant to Human Factors.  My data 
indicates that, in the context of distributed, cooperative work, there are dimensions of the 
task that are more important to performance than the representation—in this case it is 
language.  So even if I did identify a combination of covariates that revealed a main 
effect of representation on a performance dimension, I would likely conclude that the 
representation effect was minute in comparison to the other variables.  This suggests that 
representational format is not as important a constraint on distributed cognition as it has 
been demonstrated to be on individual cognition.  
4.5.2.2 Main effect of representation on language. 
The exploratory hypothesis I posed in regards to the relationship between 
representational format and language production, queried whether the differences in 
individual reasoning strategies afforded by different representational formats affect the 
cooperative exchange in a distributed work situation.  The main dimension of interest was 
the relationship between how easily a relationship is determined in a graphical 
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representation, such as duration, and how much it is talked about.  That is, would the 
relationship be talked about more because it is explicit?  Or, is the converse true, 
relationships that were explicit in the representation would be talked about less.   
There were no differences between the frequencies with which participants 
discussed simultaneous relationships in the graphical versus numeric conditions. (Note 
that the numeric condition did use more simultaneous events in their schedules).  Also, 
there were no differences in the number of times participants used pronouns to refer to 
events.  The idea here was that participants could use pronouns much in the way 
participants working in a collocated fashion might use body language to physically point 
to a shared representation.  Because the graphical representation represented objects 
spatially, it should have been easier to ‘point’ to these objects with language.  
This means that the language measures used in this study did not establish 
differences between how different representational formats may provide better or worse 
common ground in the context of non-collocated, distributed work.  Nevertheless, I do 
not believe that this experiment has provided definitive support for the alternative 
hypothesis, that graphical and numeric representations provide common ground equally 
well.  The limitation of the current study in this regard is that in this experimental task, 
the schedule was the output of the cognitive work.  This means that the cognitive 
operations were not necessarily carried out on the schedule itself—i.e., participants would 
be most likely to talk about a temporal relationship before they had entered it into the 
schedule.  That is, they talked about a relationship before they had a lasting, physical 
representation of that relationship in front of them.  An alternative manipulation might 
have the participants place in order a set of events which have already been entered on 
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the computer—i.e., objects already exist in the representation, and the cognitive work 
would therefore take place on these objects. 
The finding that participants in the graphical condition asked more questions of 
each other, i.e., cooperated more, suggests that the representation may have had an effect 
on the work process.  I therefore went go on to examine whether representation and 
language might jointly have an effect on performance. 
4.5.2.3 Interaction between representation and language. 
An interaction between representation and language in the context of the 
production study would manifest itself in differences between how well the language 
measures predicted performance within the two representations.  Because I did not have 
enough power to distinguish between the R2 values, I was not able to determine whether 
the same combinations of language measures provided better models of performance 
within on representation or the other.  However, I did have enough power to make claims 
about which models worked better to account for performance within each of the two 
representations. 
Apart from the pronoun that, which is common to both representations, a different 
set of language variables is correlated with the performance measures for graphical and 
numeric representations.  In particular, overlap is correlated with time/accuracy for 
graphical representations while sentences relating successive temporal order with main 
clause first (chronomc1st and nchronomc1st) are correlated with time/accuracy for 
numeric representations.  Further, the slopes on that are different.  These findings suggest 
that language is used differently to accomplish the task in the context of the numeric 
representation, than in the context of the graphical.  
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The preceding discussion suggests that there are two ways that language can be 
related to representational format.  The first is that language is compensatory (Beun, & 
Cremers, 1998).  That is, language can make up for deficiencies in the representation.  
For example, if something is not explicit, it is discussed more.  The present experiment 
did not find support for this idea.  The second way that language can be related to 
representational format is that language is synergistic. Within this view, language picks 
up on features of the representation, i.e., if something is explicit, it is discussed more.  
The finding that overlap has a different relationship with time to completion in the 
graphical representation than in the numeric representation seems to support a synergistic 
account of the language/representation relationship.  
4.6 Limitations 
4.6.1 Comprehension 
Although I did obtain an effect of discourse order in the comprehension study, it 
is possible that I did not operationalize the discourse order variable in a manner that 
compares to how it manifests itself in produced language.  In produced discourse, Given 
information is information that has been grounded in previous discourse and that can be 
assumed to be shared among the discourse participants.  This notion of sharedness is 
difficult to reproduce in a sentence verification paradigm—where there is only one 
‘discourse participant’.  Therefore, in the comprehension study, Given events were events 
that participants had reasoned about in the earlier production study; New events were 
ones that they had not.  This means that some time had passed in between the point at 
which participants first saw and reasoned about the Given events and the point in the 
comprehension study when they were asked to verify a sentence containing that event.  It 
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is possible therefore that my discourse order manipulation really relates to short term 
memory; i.e., do the events exist in memory (Given) or are they encoded for the first time 
(New).  
One could also argue, however, that this difference, between existence in memory 
versus encoded for the first time, is merely a description of the Given-New phenomenon 
at the level of individual cognition.  The question does remain as to how to operationalize 
Givenness and Newness at the individual level—i.e., how much time can pass until a 
Given event is no longer given, or how much interceding information (discourse) can 
come between the time when the event is first mentioned and the time when it if 
referenced? These bounds should be defined within the context of production.  
Participants in discourse know implicitly, for the most part, when an event can no longer 
be assumed to be common knowledge.  A much more interesting question for psychology 
instead of the temporal and informational bounds on memory, might be ‘how do people 
know when an event can no longer be assumed to be common knowledge?’.  The answer 
to this question, rather than focusing on absolute dimensions of memory, concerns 
instead people’s understanding of the phenomenon of memory itself, i.e., our knowledge 
of what other people can be expected to remember.  Our folk understanding of memory 
may place a just as important constraint on ‘what people say’ as low level process-
oriented variables. 
4.6.2 Production 
It is possible that the absence of solid representation effects on performance is an 
artifact of the experimental constraints imposed on the task.  The fact that I allowed 
participants to work to criterion, that is, until they finished the schedules, may have 
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eradicated potential effects of the representation on performance.  The decision to let 
them work to criterion, however, was made to ensure that all participants would have 
experienced all the experimental stimuli—and so that these could be assumed to be Given 
in the subsequent comprehension study. 
4.7 Future Research 
I plan to further examine the hypothesis that sentences violating chronological 
order, but observing the given-new principle are just as easy to comprehend as sentences 
that do not violate chronological order using my production dataset. Within this dataset I 
can examine ease of comprehension by looking at the ‘time to produce a response’ 
associated with the sentences that violate chronological order, but observe the discourse 
principle (use pronoun) versus sentences that violate chronological order but in which the 
discourse principle may not apply (do not use pronoun).  Response time in the production 
context means the time in between the utterance of a sentence until the recipient initiates 
a response.  I expect it will take longer to respond to sentences that violate chronological 
order for which the discourse principle does not apply.  This would provide further 
evidence to suggest that the discourse context influences comprehension. 
4.8 Summary 
The present study offers preliminary evidence that cognition-in-the-lab and 
cognition-in-the-world diverge.  In and of itself, this is not a surprising revelation: 
cognitive anthropologists have long known this, and to a certain extent Human Factors 
psychologists as well. What the present study has uncovered that is novel, is that 
linguistic variables that have previously been established to be associated with cognitive 
complexity, do not appear to be complex when they are examined in a communicative 
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context.  That is, discourse can provide a context for the production and comprehension 
of language which resolves or effaces (some of) the low level influences on cognitive 
complexity which have been established in more traditional experimental paradigms 
(language isolated from context).  
In terms of what we should be studying in the laboratory, the more general idea, 
that what may look like complexity does not straightforwardly equate to complexity once 
you provide a context, is a problem for psychological research in general.  Context is a 
problem for psychology because it is potentially an unbounded variable—how much 
context is enough, and what are the right aspects of context to include? The present study 
suggests that a good place to start, in the spirit of pragmatics, is with purpose. When the 
purpose of language in the experimental situation (scheduling) is the same as the purpose 
of language when it is used to accomplish a real task, such as the mission control task, the 
results are more likely to transfer. 
In terms of how we should be studying language in the laboratory, the present 
study took the comprehension paradigm, put it in context, and the results did not 
replicate.  Furthermore, the results obtained in this comprehension paradigm did not 
predict the production results collected—on the same participants.  This indicates that 
response time and reading time measures may provide very precise information about the 
kinds of influences on cognitive complexity that can exist in a very controlled, context-
free situation, but these findings do not hold up when we try to add more context to the 
comprehension task, nor do they help us predict how people will use language to 
cooperate with each other. 
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The fundamental assumption underlying leading theories of cognitive linguistics 
is that language and linguistic organization is an expression of conceptual organization 
(Talmy, 2000; Langacker, 1991; Jackendoff, 1983).  That is, there is a ‘real’ world and a 
conceptualized world, and language provides insight into the organization of the latter 
conceptualized realm.  My findings suggest that the discourse context is an important 
aspect of what cognitive linguistics considers the ‘real’ world because it imposes 
constraints on linguistic complexity.  Or, at the very least, my results suggest that we 
need to expand our notion of which parts of the ‘real’ world are conceptualized.  
Even though the present study has not uncovered a specific principle which can 
aid in the design of external support for reasoning, it has demonstrated some general 
points about the differences between individual and collaborative work.  The present 
study has demonstrated that, in the context of collaborative work tasks, representational 
format may have as strong an influence on performance as it does in the context of 
individual work. When people are collaborating to accomplish the task, they tend to use 
language, as a form of representation in itself, to coordinate aspects of the task that can 
lead to good performance.  This means that in the context of collaborative work, language 
may provide us with important insight into the dynamics of poor and good team 
performance as well as poor and good persisting representations.  The idea of using 
language as a dependent measure is at the forefront of Human Factors research.  At the 
same time, the Human Factors community, in recognition of the fact that more and more 
work domains require division of labor, and therefore collaboration has been seeking to 
develop ways to improve work conditions for teams.  This requires, however, that we 
have a way of distinguishing poor team performance from good team performance.  
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Recent research has successfully employed semantic language variables to assess team 
cognition (Kiekel, Cooke, Foltz, & Shope, 2001).  The present study suggests that 
pragmatic language variables may offer additional information to assist in the 
development of reliable metrics of team performance.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Variable Naming Key. 
 
 
      Name Name 
Before Main Clause First Chronological chronomc1st beforemc1st 
After Main Clause First Non-chronological nchronomc1st aftermc1st 
After Main Clause Last Chronological chronomc2nd aftermc2nd 
Before Main Clause Last Non-chronological nchronomc2nd beforemc2nd
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APPENDIX B 
 
Instructions for Production Phase. 
 
 
HOUSE CONSTRUCTION EXPERIMENT 
[Production Phase] 
 
 You two are now a team. In this experiment you will work together to create the 
best possible schedule for building a house. You will be supplied with a list of tasks that 
have to take place when one is constructing a house, such as ‘pouring the foundation’, 
‘building the frame’, etc. The list also tells you how long each task normally takes to 
complete when an average sized construction crew is building a house. You will only see 
a small selection of all the tasks that must be carried out to complete a house. Your list 
will contain 19 tasks and your partner’s list will also contain 19 tasks for a total of 38 
tasks that you have to put in order. 
 
 It is your job to place the 38 house construction tasks in the best possible order, 
such that you can complete all the tasks in a three-month time period. This part of the 
experiment will be completed when you have met this goal. In order to meet this 
requirement you will have to decide which tasks must be carried out successively, and 
which can take place at the same time. You will have to carry out some of the tasks 
simultaneously to fit all the tasks in the three-month time period.  
 
 You and your partner will be placed in two different rooms. You will each have 
access to a computer with software that will help you each create a house construction 
plan. You will be able to communicate with your partner through a speaker-phone. You 
are encouraged to decide the order of your own events before you start communicating 
with your partner.  
 
 Even though the software is made for creating schedules it is a little difficult to 
add an event to the middle of an existing list of events, so you are encouraged to be extra 
careful that you are sure about the order before you enter an event into the schedule. 
 
 You should end up with identical schedules on each of your computers. 
Approximately 40 teams will participate in this experiment and the team that performs 
the best will receive a $150 reward of which you will be notified via email. You will be 
evaluated on the degree to which you and your partner’s schedules agree with each other, 
and a professional contractor will grade your schedules based on how closely they 
resemble a real construction schedule.  
 
 You will now watch a video that instructs you in how to use the scheduling 
software. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Instructions for Comprehension Phase. 
 
 
HOUSE CONSTRUCTION EXPERIMENT 
[Comprehension Phase] 
 
 You will now see (on a computer) a set of sentences describing some of the tasks 
that must be carried out to construct a house. These sentences are written by other 
participants, like yourself, but in a slightly different version of this experiment. These 
participants were asked to write down instructions for constructing a house. I would like 
you to rate whether or not you think they have done a good job. That is, I will show you 
48 sentences, one at the time, and I want you indicate Yes or No for each sentence 
whether or not you would be likely to follow the instruction it gives if you were about to 
build a house. 
 
 For example, would be likely to follow this instruction: 
 
 
 
You excavate the basement before you build the frame 
 
 
 The participants who wrote these instructions may have seen events that were not 
part of the schedule you just created. You should indicate whether this is a good 
instruction in general. For example, would you be likely to follow this instruction 
Yes/No: 
 
  
After you install the floor joists you purchase the lot 
 
 
 There is no reward for being fast; however, a professional contractor has already 
rated whether or not he would be likely to follow these instructions. The team member 
whose answers agree the most with the ratings of the professional contractor will receive 
a small gift from the university bookstore.  
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APPENDIX D 
 
Comprehensive List of Sentences for Comprehension Phase. 
 
 
Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Match (1. pour the foundation) 
First You pour the foundation 
before 
you build the frame 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you pour the foundation you build the frame 
First You pour the foundation 
before 
you backfill around the foundation 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you pour the foundation you backfill around the foundation 
First You clear the trees 
before 
you pour the foundation 
Near 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you clear the trees you pour the foundation 
First You pour the foundation 
before 
you install the fireplace 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you pour the foundation you install the fireplace 
First You pour the foundation 
before 
you install the mirrors 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you pour the foundation you install the mirrors 
First You schedule the excavation 
before 
you pour the foundation 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you schedule the excavation you pour the foundation 
First You pour the foundation 
before 
you deliver the windows 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you pour the foundation you deliver the windows 
First You pour the foundation 
before 
you grade for the lawn 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you pour the foundation you grade for the lawn 
First You build access road 
before 
you pour the foundation 
Near 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you build access road you pour the foundation 
First You pour the foundation 
before 
you deliver interior trim 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you pour the foundation you deliver interior trim 
First You pour the foundation 
before 
you pour the concrete driveway 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you pour the foundation you pour the concrete driveway 
First You obtain the permits 
before 
you pour the foundation 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you obtain the permits you pour the foundation 
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Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Mismatch (1. pour the foundation) 
First You build the frame 
after 
you pour the foundation 
Given -
Given Last Before you build the frame you pour the foundation 
First You pour the foundation 
after 
you clear the trees 
Given - 
New Last Before you pour the foundation you clear the trees 
First You backfill around the foundation 
after 
you pour the foundation 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you backfill around the foundation you pour the foundation 
First You install the fireplace 
after 
you pour the foundation 
Given -
Given Last Before you install the fireplace you pour the foundation 
First You pour the foundation 
after 
you schedule the excavation 
Given - 
New Last Before you pour the foundation you schedule the excavation 
First You install the mirrors 
after 
you pour the foundation 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you install the mirrors you pour the foundation 
First You deliver the windows 
after 
you pour the foundation 
Given -
Given Last Before you deliver the windows you pour the foundation 
First You pour the foundation 
after 
you build access road 
Given - 
New Last Before you pour the foundation you build access road 
First You grade for the lawn 
after 
you pour the foundation 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you grade for the lawn you pour the foundation 
First You deliver interior trim 
after 
you pour the foundation 
Given -
Given Last Before you deliver interior trim you pour the foundation 
First You pour the foundation 
after 
you obtain the permits 
Given - 
New Last Before you pour the foundation you obtain the permits 
First You pour the concrete driveway 
after 
you pour the foundation 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you pour the concrete driveway you pour the foundation 
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Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Match (2. build the frame) 
First You build the frame before you install the windows 
Given -
Given Last After you build the frame you install the windows 
First You build the frame before you apply the roof felt 
Given - 
New Last After you build the frame you apply the roof felt 
First You deliver the lumber before you build the frame 
Near 
New - 
Given Last After you deliver the lumber you build the frame 
First You build the frame before you connect the switches 
Given -
Given Last After you build the frame you connect the switches 
First You build the frame before you apply the wallpaper 
Given - 
New Last After you build the frame you apply the wallpaper 
First You order the lumber before you build the frame 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last After you order the lumber you build the frame 
First You build the frame before you install the ductwork 
Given -
Given Last After you build the frame you install the ductwork 
First You build the frame before you grade for the lawn 
Given - 
New Last After you build the frame you grade for the lawn 
First You waterproof the foundation before you build the frame 
Near 
New - 
Given Last After you waterproof the foundation you build the frame 
First You build the frame before you remove the dumpsters 
Given -
Given Last After you build the frame you remove the dumpsters 
First You build the frame before you install the garbage disposal 
Given - 
New Last After you build the frame you install the garbage disposal 
First You order dumpster before you build the frame 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last After you order dumpster you build the frame 
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Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Mismatch (2. build the frame) 
First You install the windows 
after 
you build the frame 
Given -
Given Last Before you install the windows you build the frame 
First You build the frame 
after 
you deliver the lumber 
Given - 
New Last Before you build the frame you deliver the lumber 
First You apply the roof felt 
after 
you build the frame 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you apply the roof felt you build the frame 
First You connect the switches 
after 
you build the frame 
Given -
Given Last Before you connect the switches you build the frame 
First You build the frame 
after 
you order the lumber 
Given - 
New Last Before you build the frame you order the lumber 
First You apply the wallpaper 
after 
you build the frame 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you apply the wallpaper you build the frame 
First You install the ductwork 
after 
you build the frame 
Given -
Given Last Before you install the ductwork you build the frame 
First You build the frame 
after 
you waterproof the foundation 
Given - 
New Last Before you build the frame you waterproof the foundation 
First You grade for the lawn 
after 
you build the frame 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you grade for the lawn you build the frame 
First You remove the dumpsters 
after 
you build the frame 
Given -
Given Last Before you remove the dumpsters you build the frame 
First You build the frame 
after 
you order dumpster 
Given - 
New Last Before you build the frame you order dumpster 
First You install the garbage disposal 
after 
you build the frame 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you install the garbage disposal you build the frame 
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Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Match (3. attach the exterior siding) 
First You attach the exterior siding before you attach the drywall 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you attach the exterior siding you attach the drywall 
First You attach the exterior siding before you install exterior trim 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you attach the exterior siding you install exterior trim 
First You place the foundation forms before you attach the exterior siding 
Near 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you place the foundation forms you attach the exterior siding 
First You attach the exterior siding before you install the downspouts 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you attach the exterior siding you install the downspouts 
First You attach the exterior siding before you attach the shutters 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you attach the exterior siding you attach the shutters 
First You backfill around the foundation before you attach the exterior siding 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you backfill around the foundation you attach the exterior siding 
First You attach the exterior siding before you install the vinyl floor 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you attach the exterior siding you install the vinyl floor 
First You attach the exterior siding before you build the deck 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you attach the exterior siding you build the deck 
First You hook up the sewer before you attach the exterior siding 
Near 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you hook up the sewer you attach the exterior siding 
First You attach the exterior siding before you install the baseboards 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you attach the exterior siding you install the baseboards 
First You attach the exterior siding before you apply the wallpaper 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you attach the exterior siding you apply the wallpaper 
First You purchase the lot before you attach the exterior siding 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you purchase the lot you attach the exterior siding 
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Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Mismatch (3. attach the exterior siding) 
First You attach the drywall after you attach the exterior siding 
Given -
Given Last Before you attach the drywall you attach the exterior siding 
First You attach the exterior siding after you place the foundation forms 
Given - 
New Last Before you attach the exterior siding you place the foundation forms 
First You install exterior trim after you attach the exterior siding 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you install exterior trim you attach the exterior siding 
First You install the downspouts after you attach the exterior siding 
Given -
Given Last Before you install the downspouts you attach the exterior siding 
First You attach the exterior siding after you backfill around the foundation 
Given - 
New Last Before you attach the exterior siding you backfill around the foundation 
First You install the downspouts after you attach the exterior siding 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you attach the shutters you attach the exterior siding 
First You install the vinyl floor after you attach the exterior siding 
Given -
Given Last Before you install the vinyl floor you attach the exterior siding 
First You attach the exterior siding after you hook up the sewer 
Given - 
New Last Before you attach the exterior siding you hook up the sewer 
First You build the deck after you attach the exterior siding 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you build the deck you attach the exterior siding 
First You install the baseboards after you attach the exterior siding 
Given -
Given Last Before you install the baseboards you attach the exterior siding 
First You attach the exterior siding after you purchase the lot 
Given - 
New Last Before you attach the exterior siding you purchase the lot 
First You apply the wallpaper after you attach the exterior siding 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you apply the wallpaper you attach the exterior siding 
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Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Match (4. install the floor joists) 
First You install the floor joists before you frame the interior walls 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you install the floor joists you frame the interior walls 
First You install the floor joists before you install the exterior doors 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you install the floor joists you install the exterior doors 
First You schedule the excavation before you install the floor joists 
Near 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you schedule the excavation you install the floor joists 
First You install the floor joists before you install the carpet 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you install the floor joists you install the carpet 
First You install the floor joists before you install the interior doors 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you install the floor joists you install the interior doors 
First You stake the homesite before you install the floor joists 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you stake the homesite you install the floor joists 
First You install the floor joists before you deliver the roofing material 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you install the floor joists you deliver the roofing material 
First You install the floor joists before you deliver the windows 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you install the floor joists you deliver the windows 
First You order dumpster before you install the floor joists 
Near 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you order dumpster you install the floor joists 
First You install the floor joists before you order the tile 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you install the floor joists you order the tile 
First You install the floor joists before you pour the concrete driveway 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you install the floor joists you pour the concrete driveway 
First You hook up the sewer before you install the floor joists 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you hook up the sewer you install the floor joists 
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Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Mismatch (4. install the floor joists) 
First You frame the interior walls 
after 
you install the floor joists 
Given -
Given Last Before you frame the interior walls you install the floor joists 
First You install the floor joists 
after 
you schedule the excavation 
Given - 
New Last Before you install the floor joists you schedule the excavation 
First You install the exterior doors 
after 
you install the floor joists 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you install the exterior doors you install the floor joists 
First You install the carpet 
after 
you install the floor joists 
Given -
Given Last Before you install the carpet you install the floor joists 
First You install the floor joists 
after 
you stake the homesite 
Given - 
New Last Before you install the floor joists you stake the homesite 
First You install the interior doors 
after 
you install the floor joists 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you install the interior doors you install the floor joists 
First You deliver the roofing material 
after 
you install the floor joists 
Given -
Given Last Before you deliver the roofing material you install the floor joists 
First You install the floor joists 
after 
you order dumpster 
Given - 
New Last Before you install the floor joists you order dumpster 
First You deliver the windows 
after 
you install the floor joists 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you deliver the windows you install the floor joists 
First You order the tile 
after 
you install the floor joists 
Given -
Given Last Before you order the tile you install the floor joists 
First You install the floor joists 
after 
you hook up the sewer 
Given - 
New Last Before you install the floor joists you hook up the sewer 
First You pour the concrete driveway 
after 
you install the floor joists 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you pour the concrete driveway you install the floor joists 
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Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Match (5. construct the roof) 
First You construct the roof before you install the shingles 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you construct the roof you install the shingles 
First You construct the roof before you install the attic vents 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you construct the roof you install the attic vents 
First You deliver the lumber before you construct the roof 
Near 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you deliver the lumber you construct the roof 
First You construct the roof before you install the gutters 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you construct the roof you install the gutters 
First You construct the roof before you plaster the ceilings 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you construct the roof you plaster the ceilings 
First You clear the trees before you construct the roof 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you clear the trees you construct the roof 
First You construct the roof before you install the windows 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you construct the roof you install the windows 
First You construct the roof before you deliver the furnace 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you construct the roof you deliver the furnace 
First You backfill around the foundation before you construct the roof 
Near 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you backfill around the foundation you construct the roof 
First You construct the roof before you plant the shrubs 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you construct the roof you plant the shrubs 
First You construct the roof before you install the water softener 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you construct the roof you install the water softener 
First You build access road before you construct the roof 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you build access road you construct the roof 
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Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Mismatch (5. construct the roof) 
First You install the shingles 
after 
you construct the roof 
Given -
Given Last Before you install the shingles you construct the roof 
First You construct the roof 
after 
you deliver the lumber 
Given - 
New Last Before you construct the roof you deliver the lumber 
First You install the attic vents 
after 
you construct the roof 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you install the attic vents you construct the roof 
First You install the gutters 
after 
you construct the roof 
Given -
Given Last Before you install the gutters you construct the roof 
First You construct the roof 
after 
you clear the trees 
Given - 
New Last Before you construct the roof you clear the trees 
First You plaster the ceilings 
after 
you construct the roof 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you plaster the ceilings you construct the roof 
First You install the windows 
after 
you construct the roof 
Given -
Given Last Before you install the windows you construct the roof 
First You construct the roof 
after 
you backfill around the foundation 
Given - 
New Last Before you construct the roof you backfill around the foundation 
First You deliver the furnace 
after 
you construct the roof 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you deliver the furnace you construct the roof 
First You plant the shrubs 
after 
you construct the roof 
Given -
Given Last Before you plant the shrubs you construct the roof 
First You construct the roof 
after 
you build access road 
Given - 
New Last Before you construct the roof you build access road 
First You install the water softener 
after 
you construct the roof 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you install the water softener you construct the roof 
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Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Match (6. attach the drywall) 
First You attach the drywall before you prime the walls 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you attach the drywall you prime the walls 
First You attach the drywall before you plaster the ceilings 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you attach the drywall you plaster the ceilings 
First You install wall insulation before you attach the drywall 
Near 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you install wall insulation you attach the drywall 
First You attach the drywall before you install the baseboards 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you attach the drywall you install the baseboards 
First You attach the drywall before you install the light fixtures 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you attach the drywall you install the light fixtures 
First You pour the foundation before you attach the drywall 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you pour the foundation you attach the drywall 
First You attach the drywall before you deliver interior trim 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you attach the drywall you deliver interior trim 
First You attach the drywall before you install the interior doors 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you attach the drywall you install the interior doors 
First You install the exterior doors before you attach the drywall 
Near 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you install the exterior doors you attach the drywall 
First You attach the drywall before you install the faucets 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you attach the drywall you install the faucets 
First You attach the drywall before you install the carpet 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you attach the drywall you install the carpet 
First You waterproof the foundation before you attach the drywall 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you waterproof the foundation you attach the drywall 
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Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Mismatch (6. attach the drywall) 
First You prime the walls 
after 
you attach the drywall 
Given -
Given Last Before you prime the walls you attach the drywall 
First You attach the drywall 
after 
you install wall insulation 
Given - 
New Last Before you attach the drywall you install wall insulation 
First You plaster the ceilings 
after 
you attach the drywall 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you plaster the ceilings you attach the drywall 
First You install the baseboards 
after 
you attach the drywall 
Given -
Given Last Before you install the baseboards you attach the drywall 
First You attach the drywall 
after 
you pour the foundation 
Given - 
New Last Before you attach the drywall you pour the foundation 
First You install the light fixtures 
after 
you attach the drywall 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you install the light fixtures you attach the drywall 
First You deliver interior trim 
after 
you attach the drywall 
Given -
Given Last Before you deliver interior trim you attach the drywall 
First You attach the drywall 
after 
you install the exterior doors 
Given - 
New Last Before you attach the drywall you install the exterior doors 
First You install the interior doors 
after 
you attach the drywall 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you install the interior doors you attach the drywall 
First You install the faucets 
after 
you attach the drywall 
Given -
Given Last Before you install the faucets you attach the drywall 
First You attach the drywall 
after 
you waterproof the foundation 
Given - 
New Last Before you attach the drywall you waterproof the foundation 
First You install the carpet 
after 
you attach the drywall 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you install the carpet you attach the drywall 
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Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Match (7. run the rough wiring) 
First You run the rough wiring before you connect the switches 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you run the rough wiring you connect the switches 
First You run the rough wiring before you connect the electrical outlets 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you run the rough wiring you connect the electrical outlets 
First You frame the interior walls before you run the rough wiring 
Near 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you frame the interior walls you run the rough wiring 
First You run the rough wiring before you install the light fixtures 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you run the rough wiring you install the light fixtures 
First You run the rough wiring before you install the dishwasher 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you run the rough wiring you install the dishwasher 
First You deliver the lumber before you run the rough wiring 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you deliver the lumber you run the rough wiring 
First You run the rough wiring before you attach the exterior siding 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you run the rough wiring you attach the exterior siding 
First You run the rough wiring before you install wall insulation 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you run the rough wiring you install wall insulation 
First You install the furnace before you run the rough wiring 
Near 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you install the furnace you run the rough wiring 
First You run the rough wiring before you install the vinyl floor 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you run the rough wiring you install the vinyl floor 
First You run the rough wiring before you lay the sod 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you run the rough wiring you lay the sod 
First You connect temporary electric before you run the rough wiring 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you connect temporary electric you run the rough wiring 
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Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Mismatch (7. run the rough wiring) 
First You connect the switches 
after 
you run the rough wiring 
Given -
Given Last Before you connect the switches you run the rough wiring 
First You run the rough wiring 
after 
you frame the interior walls 
Given - 
New Last Before you run the rough wiring you frame the interior walls 
First You connect the electrical outlets 
after 
you run the rough wiring 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you connect the electrical outlets you run the rough wiring 
First You install the light fixtures 
after 
you run the rough wiring 
Given -
Given Last Before you install the light fixtures you run the rough wiring 
First You run the rough wiring 
after 
you deliver the lumber 
Given - 
New Last Before you run the rough wiring you deliver the lumber 
First You install the dishwasher 
after 
you run the rough wiring 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you install the dishwasher you run the rough wiring 
First You attach the exterior siding 
after 
you run the rough wiring 
Given -
Given Last Before you attach the exterior siding you run the rough wiring 
First You run the rough wiring 
after 
you install the furnace 
Given - 
New Last Before you run the rough wiring you install the furnace 
First You install wall insulation 
after 
you run the rough wiring 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you install wall insulation you run the rough wiring 
First You install the vinyl floor 
after 
you run the rough wiring 
Given -
Given Last Before you install the vinyl floor you run the rough wiring 
First You run the rough wiring 
after 
you connect temporary electric 
Given - 
New Last Before you run the rough wiring you connect temporary electric 
First You lay the sod 
after 
you run the rough wiring 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you lay the sod you run the rough wiring 
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Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Match (8. install the ductwork) 
First You install the ductwork before you test the heating system 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you install the ductwork you test the heating system 
First You install the ductwork before you apply the wallpaper 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you install the ductwork you apply the wallpaper 
First You deliver ductwork before you install the ductwork 
Near 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you deliver ductwork you install the ductwork 
First You install the ductwork before you install the cabinets 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you install the ductwork you install the cabinets 
First You install the ductwork before you blow in the attic insulation 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you install the ductwork you blow in the attic insulation 
First You place the foundation forms before you install the ductwork 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you place the foundation forms you install the ductwork 
First You install the ductwork before you run the rough wiring 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you install the ductwork you run the rough wiring 
First You install the ductwork before you install the hardwood floor 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you install the ductwork you install the hardwood floor 
First You apply the roof felt before you install the ductwork 
Near 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you apply the roof felt you install the ductwork 
First You install the ductwork before you build the bookshelves 
Given -
Given Last 
After 
you install the ductwork you build the bookshelves 
First You install the ductwork before you install the range 
Given - 
New Last 
After 
you install the ductwork you install the range 
First You backfill around the foundation before you install the ductwork 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last 
After 
you backfill around the foundation you install the ductwork 
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Semantic 
Constraint 
Psychological 
Distance 
Discourse 
Order 
Main 
Clause Absolute Time Mismatch (8. install the ductwork) 
First You test the heating system 
after 
you install the ductwork 
Given -
Given Last Before you test the heating system you install the ductwork 
First You install the ductwork 
after 
you deliver ductwork 
Given - 
New Last Before you install the ductwork you deliver ductwork 
First You apply the wallpaper 
after 
you install the ductwork 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you apply the wallpaper you install the ductwork 
First You install the cabinets 
after 
you install the ductwork 
Given -
Given Last Before you install the cabinets you install the ductwork 
First You install the ductwork 
after 
you place the foundation forms 
Given - 
New Last Before you install the ductwork you place the foundation forms 
First You blow in the attic insulation 
after 
you install the ductwork 
Causal 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you blow in the attic insulation you install the ductwork 
First You run the rough wiring 
after 
you install the ductwork 
Given -
Given Last Before you run the rough wiring you install the ductwork 
First You install the ductwork 
after 
you apply the roof felt 
Given - 
New Last Before you install the ductwork you apply the roof felt 
First You install the hardwood floor 
after 
you install the ductwork 
Near 
New - 
Given Last Before you install the hardwood floor you install the ductwork 
First You build the bookshelves 
after 
you install the ductwork 
Given -
Given Last Before you build the bookshelves you install the ductwork 
First You install the ductwork 
after 
you backfill around the foundation 
Given - 
New Last Before you install the ductwork you backfill around the foundation 
First You install the range 
after 
you install the ductwork 
Social 
Far 
New - 
Given Last Before you install the range you install the ductwork 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Omnibus ANOVA Using Raw Scores: Subject Means (Missing Scores Replaced with 
Subject Means). 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
REP 1 76.92 76.92 0.72 0.3994    
Error 62 6624.32 106.84      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO 2 137.11 68.56 8.35 0.0004 0.0008 0.0006 **
DISCO*REP 2 7.60 3.80 0.46 0.6308 0.6040 0.6121  
Error(DISCO) 124 1018.31 8.21      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON 1 13.17 13.17 1.91 0.1716    
ICON*REP 1 14.11 14.11 2.05 0.1572    
Error(ICON) 62 426.80 6.88      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS 1 14.13 14.13 1.54 0.2198    
DIS*REP 1 4.59 4.59 0.50 0.4826    
Error(DIS) 62 570.13 9.20      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
CLAUSE 1 15.56 15.56 2.07 0.1554    
CLAUSE*REP 1 8.87 8.87 1.18 0.2817    
Error(CLAUSE) 62 466.39 7.52      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
SEMREL 1 197.10 197.10 24.27 <.0001 **   
SEMREL*REP 1 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.9051    
Error(SEMREL) 62 503.45 8.12      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON 2 4.96 2.48 0.39 0.6782 0.6719 0.6782  
DISCO*ICON*REP 2 12.66 6.33 1.00 0.3726 0.3707 0.3726  
Error(DISCO*ICON) 124 788.87 6.36      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS 2 21.41 10.71 1.22 0.2998 0.2993 0.2998  
DISCO*DIS*REP 2 22.40 11.20 1.27 0.2838 0.2835 0.2838  
Error(DISCO*DIS) 124 1091.58 8.80      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS 1 1.97 1.97 0.28 0.5994    
ICON*DIS*REP 1 5.84 5.84 0.82 0.3673    
Error(ICON*DIS) 62 439.14 7.08      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
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DISCO*CLAUSE 2 39.54 19.77 2.41 0.0942 0.0945 0.0942  
DISCO*CLAUSE*REP 2 5.37 2.68 0.33 0.7219 0.7208 0.7219  
Error(DISCO*CLAUSE) 124 1018.07 8.21      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*CLAUSE 1 101.48 101.48 12.73 0.0007 **   
ICON*CLAUSE*REP 1 0.21 0.21 0.03 0.8703    
Error(ICON*CLAUSE) 62 494.10 7.97      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*CLAUSE 1 3.23 3.23 0.31 0.5788    
DIS*CLAUSE*REP 1 33.40 33.40 3.22 0.0775    
Error(DIS*CLAUSE) 62 642.48 10.36      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*SEMREL 2 25.03 12.51 1.78 0.1731 0.1732 0.1731  
DISCO*SEMREL*REP 2 33.27 16.64 2.37 0.0981 0.0983 0.0981  
Error(DISCO*SEMREL) 124 872.20 7.03      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*SEMREL 1 1.31 1.31 0.23 0.6337    
ICON*SEMREL*REP 1 5.31 5.31 0.93 0.3391    
Error(ICON*SEMREL) 62 354.56 5.72      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*SEMREL 1 36.27 36.27 6.75 0.0117 *   
DIS*SEMREL*REP 1 1.69 1.69 0.32 0.5766    
Error(DIS*SEMREL) 62 333.25 5.38      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 2.14 2.14 0.58 0.4475    
CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 17.97 17.97 4.90 0.0306 *   
Error(CLAUSE*SEMREL) 62 227.54 3.67      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 13.18 6.59 0.64 0.5267 0.4996 0.5055  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*REP 2 9.57 4.78 0.47 0.6275 0.5925 0.6002  
Error(DISCO*ICON*DIS) 124 1268.14 10.23      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE 2 16.41 8.21 1.35 0.2637 0.2620 0.2625  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE*REP 2 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.9917 0.9812 0.9836  
Error(DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE) 124 755.16 6.09      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 18.61 9.31 1.08 0.3434    
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*REP 2 20.61 10.31 1.19 0.3065    
Error(DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE) 124 1070.45 8.63      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
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ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.9802    
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*REP 1 5.69 5.69 0.50 0.4808    
Error(ICON*DIS*CLAUSE) 62 701.34 11.31      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL 2 119.97 59.99 11.89 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 **
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL*REP 2 4.09 2.04 0.40 0.6679 0.6675 0.6679  
Error(DISCO*ICON*SEMREL) 124 625.66 5.05      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 18.80 9.40 1.43 0.2426 0.2426 0.2426  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL*REP 2 0.99 0.49 0.08 0.9274 0.9271 0.9274  
Error(DISCO*DIS*SEMREL) 124 813.49 6.56      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 2.34 2.34 0.52 0.4737    
ICON*DIS*SEMREL*REP 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.9880    
Error(ICON*DIS*SEMREL) 62 279.08 4.50      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 78.11 39.05 5.02 0.0080 0.0081 0.0080 **
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 2 10.39 5.20 0.67 0.5145 0.5136 0.5145  
Error(DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 124 964.51 7.78      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.38 0.38 0.05 0.8266    
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 6.77 6.77 0.87 0.3552    
Error(ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 62 483.59 7.80      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.9361    
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 0.41 0.41 0.05 0.8154    
Error(DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 62 459.12 7.41      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ICON*DIS*CLAU 2 1.04 0.52 0.06 0.9461 0.9222 0.9285  
DISC*ICON*DIS*CLAU*REP 2 5.14 2.57 0.27 0.7605 0.7233 0.7325  
Error(DISC*ICON*DIS*CLAU) 124 1162.27 9.37      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ICON*DIS*SEMR 2 22.67 11.33 1.62 0.2026 0.2031 0.2026  
DISC*ICON*DIS*SEMR*REP 2 31.81 15.90 2.27 0.1077 0.1087 0.1077  
Error(DISC*ICON*DIS*SEMR) 124 869.08 7.01      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ICON*CLAU*SEMR 2 18.31 9.15 1.34 0.2661 0.2660 0.2661  
DISC*ICON*CLAU*SEMR*REP 2 5.61 2.80 0.41 0.6645 0.6639 0.6645  
Error(ICON*ORDC*CLAU*SEMR) 124 848.16 6.84      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
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DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR 2 38.51 19.25 2.18 0.1170 0.1184 0.1170  
DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR*REP 2 0.49 0.24 0.03 0.9727 0.9705 0.9727  
Error(DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR) 124 1093.45 8.82      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS*CLAU*SEMR 1 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.8777    
ICON*DIS*CLAU*SEMR*REP 1 6.67 6.67 0.98 0.3268    
Error(ICON*DIS*CLAU*SEMR) 62 423.44 6.83      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DIS*ICO*DIS*CLA*SEM 2 13.29 6.65 0.66 0.5200 0.5004 0.5065  
DIS*ICO*DIS*CLA*SEM*REP 2 5.76 2.88 0.28 0.7526 0.7226 0.7320  
Error(DIS*ICO*DIS*CLA*SEM) 124 1253.49 10.11      
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APPENDIX F 
 
Omnibus ANOVA Using Raw Scores: Condition Means (Missing Scores Replaced with 
Condition Means). 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
REP 1 59.27 59.27 0.69 0.4105    
Error 62 5351.66 86.32      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO 2 187.09 93.55 10.33 <.0001 0.0002 0.0002 **
DISCO*REP 2 4.88 2.44 0.27 0.7640 0.7238 0.7328  
Error(DISCO) 124 1122.41 9.05      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON 1 17.52 17.52 2.56 0.1145    
ICON*REP 1 10.54 10.54 1.54 0.2191    
Error(ICON) 62 423.84 6.84      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS 1 11.59 11.59 1.20 0.2781    
DIS*REP 1 4.70 4.70 0.49 0.4884    
Error(DIS) 62 599.93 9.68      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
CLAUSE 1 12.73 12.73 1.77 0.1886    
CLAUSE*REP 1 5.73 5.73 0.79 0.3761    
Error(CLAUSE) 62 446.63 7.20      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
SEMREL 1 205.96 205.96 20.16 <.0001 **   
SEMREL*REP 1 2.98 2.98 0.29 0.5909    
Error(SEMREL) 62 633.35 10.22      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON 2 3.58 1.79 0.26 0.7726 0.7689 0.7726  
DISCO*ICON*REP 2 12.08 6.04 0.87 0.4204 0.4188 0.4204  
Error(DISCO*ICON) 124 858.07 6.92      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS 2 26.15 13.07 1.42 0.2460 0.2462 0.2460  
DISCO*DIS*REP 2 30.96 15.48 1.68 0.1906 0.1917 0.1906  
Error(DISCO*DIS) 124 1142.90 9.22      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS 1 5.01 5.01 0.66 0.4205    
ICON*DIS*REP 1 4.30 4.30 0.57 0.4550    
Error(ICON*DIS) 62 472.28 7.62      
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Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*CLAUSE 2 43.63 21.81 2.48 0.0875 0.0876 0.0875  
DISCO*CLAUSE*REP 2 4.17 2.08 0.24 0.7891 0.7885 0.7891  
Error(DISCO*CLAUSE) 124 1088.54 8.78      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*CLAUSE 1 145.73 145.73 17.23 0.0001 **   
ICON*CLAUSE*REP 1 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.9598    
Error(ICON*CLAUSE) 62 524.54 8.46      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*CLAUSE 1 3.59 3.59 0.35 0.5590    
DIS*CLAUSE*REP 1 34.38 34.38 3.30 0.0741    
Error(DIS*CLAUSE) 62 645.63 10.41      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*SEMREL 2 41.70 20.85 3.12 0.0475 0.0479 0.0475 * 
DISCO*SEMREL*REP 2 33.85 16.93 2.54 0.0833 0.0837 0.0833  
Error(DISCO*SEMREL) 124 827.77 6.68      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*SEMREL 1 5.33 5.33 0.83 0.3656    
ICON*SEMREL*REP 1 6.14 6.14 0.96 0.3315    
Error(ICON*SEMREL) 62 397.57 6.41      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*SEMREL 1 54.27 54.27 9.87 0.0026 **   
DIS*SEMREL*REP 1 3.41 3.41 0.62 0.4339    
Error(DIS*SEMREL) 62 340.97 5.50      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 2.30 2.30 0.52 0.4715    
CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 25.85 25.85 5.90 0.0180 *   
Error(CLAUSE*SEMREL) 62 271.57 4.38      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 21.19 10.60 1.08 0.3434 0.3347 0.3368  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*REP 2 9.27 4.64 0.47 0.6250 0.5916 0.5993  
Error(DISCO*ICON*DIS) 124 1218.79 9.83      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE 2 22.71 11.36 1.86 0.1596 0.1645 0.1628  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE*REP 2 0.36 0.18 0.03 0.9713 0.9598 0.9643  
Error(DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE) 124 756.13 6.10      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 19.77 9.88 1.18 0.3097 0.3078 0.3092  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*REP 2 18.55 9.28 1.11 0.3326 0.3300 0.3319  
Error(DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE) 124 1035.80 8.35      
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Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.95 0.95 0.08 0.7767    
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*REP 1 2.78 2.78 0.24 0.6288    
Error(ICON*DIS*CLAUSE) 62 729.02 11.76      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL 2 141.03 70.52 12.58 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 **
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL*REP 2 5.15 2.58 0.46 0.6325 0.6308 0.6325  
Error(DISCO*ICON*SEMREL) 124 694.83 5.60      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 16.45 8.22 1.15 0.3190 0.3189 0.3190  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL*REP 2 1.01 0.51 0.07 0.9316 0.9308 0.9316  
Error(DISCO*DIS*SEMREL) 124 884.36 7.13      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 2.21 2.21 0.51 0.4789    
ICON*DIS*SEMREL*REP 1 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.9124    
Error(ICON*DIS*SEMREL) 62 269.48 4.35      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 76.37 38.18 5.25 0.0065 0.0068 0.0065 **
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 2 10.78 5.39 0.74 0.4785 0.4761 0.4785  
Error(DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 124 901.30 7.27      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 4.07 4.07 0.45 0.5067    
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 7.22 7.22 0.79 0.3775    
Error(ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 62 566.48 9.14      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.9799    
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 0.32 0.32 0.05 0.8320    
Error(DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 62 434.83 7.01      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ICON*DIS*CLAU 2 1.57 0.78 0.08 0.9196 0.8924 0.8998  
DISC*ICON*DIS*CLAU*REP 2 8.25 4.13 0.44 0.6436 0.6123 0.6203  
Error(DISC*ICON*DIS*CLAU) 124 1156.94 9.33      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ICON*DIS*SEMR 2 30.16 15.08 2.16 0.1191 0.1198 0.1191  
DISC*ICON*DIS*SEMR*REP 2 33.45 16.72 2.40 0.0948 0.0956 0.0948  
Error(DISC*ICON*DIS*SEMR) 124 863.74 6.97      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ICON*CLAU*SEMR 2 23.71 11.86 1.72 0.1828 0.1828 0.1828  
DISC*ICON*CLAU*SEMR*REP 2 9.80 4.90 0.71 0.4925 0.4924 0.4925  
Error(DISC*ICON*CLAU*SEMR) 124 853.19 6.88      
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Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR 2 40.76 20.38 2.32 0.1026 0.1044 0.1026  
DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR*REP 2 0.52 0.26 0.03 0.9711 0.9685 0.9711  
Error(DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR) 124 1089.85 8.79      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS*CLAU*SEMR 1 1.49 1.49 0.22 0.6417    
ICON*DIS*CLAU*SEMR*REP 1 4.85 4.85 0.71 0.4020    
Error(ICON*DIS*CLAU*SEMR) 62 422.65 6.82      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DIS*ICO*DIS*CLA*SEM 2 12.15 6.08 0.63 0.5330 0.5131 0.5194  
DIS*ICO*DIS*CLA*SEM*REP 2 14.22 7.11 0.74 0.4791 0.4627 0.4680  
Error(DIS*ICO*DIS*CLA*SEM) 124 1191.34 9.61      
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APPENDIX G 
 
Omnibus ANOVA Raw Scores. (Regressed Means. Missing Scores Replaced through 
Regression Procedure). 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
REP 1 96.60 96.60 1.09 0.3010    
Error 62 5506.63 88.82      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO 2 200.45 100.23 11.13 <.0001 0.0001 <.0001 **
DISCO*REP 2 4.71 2.36 0.26 0.7702 0.7311 0.7402  
Error(DISCO) 124 1116.43 9.00      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON 1 23.96 23.96 3.35 0.0720    
ICON*REP 1 25.77 25.77 3.60 0.0623    
Error(ICON) 62 443.32 7.15      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS 1 7.51 7.51 0.81 0.3728    
DIS*REP 1 5.52 5.52 0.59 0.4446    
Error(DIS) 62 577.84 9.32      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
CLAUSE 1 18.32 18.32 2.62 0.1105    
CLAUSE*REP 1 9.75 9.75 1.40 0.2419    
Error(CLAUSE) 62 433.10 6.99      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
SEMREL 1 174.34 174.34 16.99 0.0001 **   
SEMREL*REP 1 0.69 0.69 0.07 0.7957    
Error(SEMREL) 62 636.37 10.26      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON 2 2.72 1.36 0.20 0.8219 0.8201 0.8219  
DISCO*ICON*REP 2 16.85 8.43 1.22 0.2992 0.2990 0.2992  
Error(DISCO*ICON) 124 857.59 6.92      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS 2 25.98 12.99 1.32 0.2704 0.2702 0.2704  
DISCO*DIS*REP 2 35.26 17.63 1.79 0.1706 0.1720 0.1706  
Error(DISCO*DIS) 124 1218.76 9.83      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS 1 4.84 4.84 0.64 0.4271    
ICON*DIS*REP 1 3.04 3.04 0.40 0.5289    
Error(ICON*DIS) 62 469.89 7.58      
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Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*CLAUSE 2 33.46 16.73 1.91 0.1519 0.1521 0.1519  
DISCO*CLAUSE*REP 2 10.68 5.34 0.61 0.5444 0.5439 0.5444  
Error(DISCO*CLAUSE) 124 1084.19 8.74      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*CLAUSE 1 190.59 190.59 22.18 <.0001 **   
ICON*CLAUSE*REP 1 1.09 1.09 0.13 0.7224    
Error(ICON*CLAUSE) 62 532.75 8.59      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*CLAUSE 1 6.27 6.27 0.62 0.4334    
DIS*CLAUSE*REP 1 59.89 59.89 5.94 0.0177 *   
Error(DIS*CLAUSE) 62 625.34 10.09      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*SEMREL 2 37.29 18.65 2.79 0.0654 0.0657 0.0654  
DISCO*SEMREL*REP 2 53.78 26.89 4.02 0.0203 0.0205 0.0203 * 
Error(DISCO*SEMREL) 124 829.23 6.69      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*SEMREL 1 6.41 6.41 1.02 0.3157    
ICON*SEMREL*REP 1 8.80 8.80 1.41 0.2403    
Error(ICON*SEMREL) 62 388.24 6.26      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*SEMREL 1 69.01 69.01 11.96 0.0010 **   
DIS*SEMREL*REP 1 0.69 0.69 0.12 0.7308    
Error(DIS*SEMREL) 62 357.71 5.77      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.70 0.70 0.15 0.6964    
CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 12.90 12.90 2.84 0.0968    
Error(CLAUSE*SEMREL) 62 281.35 4.54      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 23.91 11.95 1.14 0.3221 0.3174 0.3191  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*REP 2 17.34 8.67 0.83 0.4388 0.4260 0.4303  
Error(DISCO*ICON*DIS) 124 1296.28 10.45      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE 2 21.00 10.50 1.71 0.1853 0.1884 0.1871  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE*REP 2 0.47 0.23 0.04 0.9626 0.9519 0.9570  
Error(DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE) 124 761.86 6.14      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 20.43 10.22 1.21 0.3011 0.2997 0.3008  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*REP 2 17.67 8.83 1.05 0.3538 0.3507 0.3532  
Error(DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE) 124 1045.22 8.43      
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Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 3.68 3.68 0.29 0.5909    
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*REP 1 15.84 15.84 1.26 0.2667    
Error(ICON*DIS*CLAUSE) 62 781.85 12.61      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL 2 149.80 74.90 12.60 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 **
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL*REP 2 12.40 6.20 1.04 0.3555 0.3548 0.3555  
Error(DISCO*ICON*SEMREL) 124 737.32 5.95      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 15.38 7.69 1.09 0.3391 0.3389 0.3391  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL*REP 2 1.44 0.72 0.10 0.9029 0.9022 0.9029  
Error(DISCO*DIS*SEMREL) 124 874.15 7.05      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 3.54 3.54 0.77 0.3832    
ICON*DIS*SEMREL*REP 1 2.03 2.03 0.44 0.5082    
Error(ICON*DIS*SEMREL) 62 284.48 4.59      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 85.91 42.96 6.07 0.0031 0.0033 0.0031 **
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 2 19.71 9.85 1.39 0.2525 0.2526 0.2525  
Error(DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 124 878.00 7.08      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 8.92 8.92 0.98 0.3252    
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 19.72 19.72 2.18 0.1452    
Error(ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 62 561.99 9.06      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 1.11 1.11 0.16 0.6950    
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.9950    
Error(DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 62 442.82 7.14      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ORDC*DIS*CLAU 2 1.22 0.61 0.07 0.9363 0.9108 0.9176  
DISC*ORDC*DIS*CLAU*REP 2 15.21 7.61 0.82 0.4432 0.4259 0.4302  
Error(DISC*ORDC*DIS*CLAU) 124 1151.51 9.29      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ORDC*DIS*SEMR 2 26.24 13.12 1.88 0.1564 0.1569 0.1564  
DISC*ORDC*DIS*SEMR*REP 2 38.94 19.47 2.79 0.0650 0.0656 0.0650  
Error(DISC*ORDC*DIS*SEMR) 124 863.98 6.97      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ORDC*CLAU*SEMR 2 17.44 8.72 1.25 0.2908 0.2908 0.2908  
DISC*ORDC*CLAU*SEMR*REP 2 15.07 7.53 1.08 0.3434 0.3434 0.3434  
Error(DISC*ORDC*CLAU*SEMR) 124 866.51 6.99      
         
163 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR 2 39.10 19.55 2.29 0.1055 0.1066 0.1055  
DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR*REP 2 3.92 1.96 0.23 0.7954 0.7915 0.7954  
Error(DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR) 124 1058.65 8.54      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ORDC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR 1 7.19 7.19 1.06 0.3078    
ORDC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR*REP 1 15.50 15.50 2.28 0.1362    
Error(ORDC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR) 62 421.67 6.80      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DIS*ORD*DIS*CLA*SEM 2 10.79 5.40 0.58 0.5634 0.5400 0.5469  
DIS*ORD*DIS*CLA*SEM*REP 2 16.82 8.41 0.90 0.4099 0.3977 0.4014  
Error(DIS*ORD*DIS*CLA*SEM) 124 1160.92 9.36      
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APPENDIX H 
 
ANOVA Log scores: Subject Means (Missing Scores Replaced with Subject Means). 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
REP 1 1.39 1.39 0.61 0.4396    
Error 62 141.91 2.29      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO 2 4.15 2.08 9.70 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 **
DISCO*REP 2 0.31 0.15 0.71 0.4924 0.4914 0.4924  
Error(DISCO) 124 26.55 0.21      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON 1 0.20 0.20 1.01 0.3182    
ICON*REP 1 0.79 0.79 4.01 0.0496 *   
Error(ICON) 62 12.15 0.20      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS 1 0.54 0.54 2.43 0.1242    
DIS*REP 1 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.8374    
Error(DIS) 62 13.90 0.22      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
CLAUSE 1 0.07 0.07 0.32 0.5741    
CLAUSE*REP 1 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.7176    
Error(CLAUSE) 62 12.86 0.21      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
SEMREL 1 2.60 2.60 13.05 0.0006 **   
SEMREL*REP 1 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.7279    
Error(SEMREL) 62 12.34 0.20      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON 2 0.09 0.05 0.24 0.7835 0.7613 0.7710  
DISCO*ICON*REP 2 0.28 0.14 0.75 0.4763 0.4640 0.4693  
Error(DISCO*ICON) 124 22.93 0.18      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS 2 1.00 0.50 2.41 0.0936 0.0959 0.0936  
DISCO*DIS*REP 2 0.72 0.36 1.72 0.1827 0.1840 0.1827  
Error(DISCO*DIS) 124 25.74 0.21      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS 1 0.15 0.15 0.67 0.4164    
ICON*DIS*REP 1 0.47 0.47 2.16 0.1466    
Error(ICON*DIS) 62 13.46 0.22      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*CLAUSE 2 1.24 0.62 2.98 0.0544 0.0557 0.0544  
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DISCO*CLAUSE*REP 2 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.9797 0.9781 0.9797  
Error(DISCO*CLAUSE) 124 25.69 0.21      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*CLAUSE 1 3.25 3.25 12.72 0.0007 **   
ICON*CLAUSE*REP 1 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.6915    
Error(ICON*CLAUSE) 62 15.82 0.26      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.12 0.12 0.41 0.5233    
DIS*CLAUSE*REP 1 0.27 0.27 0.93 0.3391    
Error(DIS*CLAUSE) 62 17.76 0.29      
         
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*SEMREL 2 0.48 0.24 1.14 0.3234 0.3233 0.3234  
DISCO*SEMREL*REP 2 1.05 0.52 2.51 0.0852 0.0854 0.0852  
Error(DISCO*SEMREL) 124 25.88 0.21      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*SEMREL 1 0.22 0.22 1.19 0.2793    
ICON*SEMREL*REP 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.9934    
Error(ICON*SEMREL) 62 11.38 0.18      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*SEMREL 1 1.18 1.18 9.34 0.0033 **   
DIS*SEMREL*REP 1 0.06 0.06 0.46 0.4985    
Error(DIS*SEMREL) 62 7.86 0.13      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.8417    
CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 0.36 0.36 2.73 0.1032    
Error(CLAUSE*SEMREL) 62 8.22 0.13      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 0.08 0.04 0.17 0.8437 0.8221 0.8314  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*REP 2 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.8854 0.8657 0.8743  
Error(DISCO*ICON*DIS) 124 28.63 0.23      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE 2 0.29 0.14 0.71 0.4941 0.4716 0.4770  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE*REP 2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.9887 0.9790 0.9817  
Error(DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE) 124 24.92 0.20      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 0.41 0.20 0.79 0.4557 0.4510 0.4557  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*REP 2 0.29 0.14 0.56 0.5736 0.5665 0.5736  
Error(DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE) 124 31.79 0.26      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.09 0.09 0.32 0.5763    
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ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*REP 1 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.9254    
Error(ICON*DIS*CLAUSE) 62 17.99 0.29      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL 2 3.53 1.76 11.02 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 **
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL*REP 2 0.05 0.03 0.17 0.8445 0.8381 0.8445  
 
Error(DISCO*ICON*SEMREL)  124 19.85 0.16      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 1.33 0.66 3.92 0.0223 0.0224 0.0223 * 
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL*REP 2 0.37 0.18 1.08 0.3426 0.3425 0.3426  
Error(DISCO*DIS*SEMREL) 124 20.98 0.17      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.6807    
ICON*DIS*SEMREL*REP 1 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.9048    
Error(ICON*DIS*SEMREL) 62 8.46 0.14      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 1.94 0.97 5.55 0.0049 0.0050 0.0049 **
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 2 0.13 0.07 0.37 0.6887 0.6879 0.6887  
Error(DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 124 21.71 0.18      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.10 0.10 0.51 0.4798    
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 0.10 0.10 0.50 0.4806    
Error(ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 62 12.64 0.20      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.05 0.05 0.28 0.5989    
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.7253    
Error(DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 62 10.76 0.17      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ORDC*DIS*CLAU 2 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.9434 0.9309 0.9373  
DISC*ORDC*DIS*CLAU*REP 2 0.42 0.21 0.90 0.4094 0.4018 0.4056  
Error(DISC*ORDC*DIS*CLAU) 124 29.02 0.23      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ORDC*DIS*SEMR 2 0.63 0.32 1.44 0.2399 0.2407 0.2405  
DISC*ORDC*DIS*SEMR*REP 2 0.57 0.29 1.31 0.2741 0.2726 0.2732  
Error(DISC*ORDC*DIS*SEMR) 124 27.09 0.22      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ORDC*CLAU*SEMR 2 0.64 0.32 1.44 0.2408 0.2410 0.2408  
DISC*ORDC*CLAU*SEMR*REP 2 0.24 0.12 0.54 0.5840 0.5808 0.5840  
Error(DISC*ORDC*CLAU*SEMR) 124 27.64 0.22      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR 2 1.13 0.56 2.45 0.0909 0.0912 0.0909  
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DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR*REP 2 0.28 0.14 0.62 0.5420 0.5411 0.5420  
Error(DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR) 124 28.58 0.23      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ORDC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR 1 0.06 0.06 0.23 0.6325    
ORDC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR*REP 1 0.28 0.28 1.11 0.2970    
Error(ORDC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR) 62 15.48 0.25      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DIS*ORD*DIS*CLA*SEM 2 0.33 0.17 0.65 0.5217 0.5103 0.5169  
DIS*ORD*DIS*CLA*SEM*REP 2 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.9077 0.8941 0.9021  
Error(DIS*ORD*DIS*CLA*SEM) 124 31.29 0.25      
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APPENDIX I 
 
Omnibus ANOVA LOG scores: Condition Means (Missing Scores Replaced with 
Condition Means). 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
REP 1 0.72 0.72 0.40 0.5276    
Error 61 108.87 1.78      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO 2 5.56 2.78 12.25 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 **
DISCO*REP 2 0.17 0.09 0.38 0.6842 0.6812 0.6842  
Error(DISCO) 122 27.71 0.23      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON 1 0.28 0.28 1.39 0.2427    
ICON*REP 1 0.58 0.58 2.86 0.0962    
Error(ICON) 61 12.41 0.20      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS 1 0.55 0.55 2.31 0.1339    
DIS*REP 1 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.7954    
Error(DIS) 61 14.42 0.24      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
CLAUSE 1 0.09 0.09 0.47 0.4957    
CLAUSE*REP 1 0.05 0.05 0.26 0.6104    
Error(CLAUSE) 61 11.80 0.19      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
SEMREL 1 2.42 2.42 10.61 0.0018 **   
SEMREL*REP 1 0.15 0.15 0.64 0.4253    
Error(SEMREL) 61 13.93 0.23      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON 2 0.08 0.04 0.21 0.8077 0.7936 0.8038  
DISCO*ICON*REP 2 0.41 0.21 1.12 0.3300 0.3274 0.3292  
Error(DISCO*ICON) 122 22.56 0.18      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS 2 1.09 0.55 2.50 0.0867 0.0903 0.0875  
DISCO*DIS*REP 2 1.10 0.55 2.51 0.0851 0.0887 0.0860  
Error(DISCO*DIS) 122 26.70 0.22      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS 1 0.23 0.23 1.02 0.3172    
ICON*DIS*REP 1 0.45 0.45 1.98 0.1641    
Error(ICON*DIS) 61 13.79 0.23      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
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DISCO*CLAUSE 2 1.21 0.60 2.80 0.0646 0.0670 0.0646  
DISCO*CLAUSE*REP 2 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.9848 0.9823 0.9848  
Error(DISCO*CLAUSE) 122 26.33 0.22      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*CLAUSE 1 4.88 4.88 17.38 <.0001 **   
ICON*CLAUSE*REP 1 0.07 0.07 0.24 0.6274    
Error(ICON*CLAUSE) 61 17.13 0.28      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.11 0.11 0.37 0.5428    
DIS*CLAUSE*REP 1 0.30 0.30 1.08 0.3024    
Error(DIS*CLAUSE) 61 17.18 0.28      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*SEMREL 2 0.81 0.40 1.92 0.1512 0.1514 0.1512  
DISCO*SEMREL*REP 2 1.16 0.58 2.75 0.0679 0.0680 0.0679  
Error(DISCO*SEMREL) 122 25.66 0.21      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*SEMREL 1 0.36 0.36 1.83 0.1813    
ICON*SEMREL*REP 1 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.9346    
Error(ICON*SEMREL) 61 12.03 0.20      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*SEMREL 1 1.83 1.83 13.38 0.0005 **   
DIS*SEMREL*REP 1 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.7313    
Error(DIS*SEMREL) 61 8.34 0.14      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.8194    
CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 0.55 0.55 3.66 0.0605    
Error(CLAUSE*SEMREL) 61 9.19 0.15      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 0.26 0.13 0.55 0.5778 0.5616 0.5693  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*REP 2 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.9189 0.9032 0.9108  
Error(DISCO*ICON*DIS) 122 28.74 0.24      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE 2 0.37 0.18 0.89 0.4140 0.4049 0.4088  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE*REP 2 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.9291 0.9130 0.9202  
Error(DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE) 122 25.18 0.21      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 0.42 0.21 0.83 0.4395 0.4345 0.4393  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*REP 2 0.21 0.10 0.41 0.6646 0.6547 0.6643  
Error(DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE) 122 30.77 0.25      
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Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.23 0.23 0.74 0.3916    
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*REP 1 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.8897    
Error(ICON*DIS*CLAUSE) 61 19.24 0.32      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL 2 4.10 2.05 11.53 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 **
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL*REP 2 0.08 0.04 0.22 0.8014 0.7941 0.8014  
Error(DISCO*ICON*SEMREL) 122 21.68 0.18      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 1.50 0.75 4.22 0.0169 0.0172 0.0169 * 
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL*REP 2 0.26 0.13 0.72 0.4867 0.4856 0.4867  
Error(DISCO*DIS*SEMREL) 122 21.61 0.18      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 0.06 0.06 0.48 0.4895    
ICON*DIS*SEMREL*REP 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.9656    
Error(ICON*DIS*SEMREL) 61 8.03 0.13      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 1.97 0.99 5.62 0.0046 0.0048 0.0046 **
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 2 0.13 0.07 0.38 0.6817 0.6790 0.6817  
Error(DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 122 21.41 0.18      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.35 0.35 1.56 0.2160    
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 0.13 0.13 0.61 0.4384    
Error(ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 61 13.53 0.22      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.05 0.05 0.28 0.5968    
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 0.04 0.04 0.21 0.6451    
Error(DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 61 10.09 0.17      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ICON*DIS*CLAU 2 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.9798 0.9723 0.9759  
DISC*ICON*DIS*CLAU*REP 2 0.53 0.26 1.12 0.3281 0.3241 0.3259  
Error(DISC*ICON*DIS*CLAU) 122 28.70 0.24      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ICON*DIS*SEMR 2 0.74 0.37 1.68 0.1904 0.1938 0.1926  
DISC*ICON*DIS*SEMR*REP 2 0.76 0.38 1.73 0.1811 0.1850 0.1836  
Error(DISC*ICON*DIS*SEMR) 122 26.84 0.22      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ICON*CLAU*SEMR 2 0.89 0.44 1.90 0.1541 0.1545 0.1541  
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DISC*ICON*CLAU*SEMR*REP 2 0.51 0.25 1.09 0.3398 0.3393 0.3398  
Error(DISC*ICON*CLAU*SEMR) 122 28.54 0.23      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR 2 1.20 0.60 2.60 0.0782 0.0786 0.0782  
DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR*REP 2 0.39 0.19 0.84 0.4327 0.4321 0.4327  
Error(DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR) 122 28.18 0.23      
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APPENDIX J 
 
Omnibus ANOVA Log scores: Regressed Means (Missing Scores Replaced through 
Regression Procedure). 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
REP 1 1.78 1.78 0.96 0.3314    
Error 62 114.88 1.85      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO 2 5.86 2.93 12.76 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 **
DISCO*REP 2 0.14 0.07 0.30 0.7378 0.7347 0.7378  
Error(DISCO) 124 28.46 0.23      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON 1 0.36 0.36 1.78 0.1866    
ICON*REP 1 1.05 1.05 5.18 0.0263 *   
Error(ICON) 62 12.59 0.20      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS 1 0.38 0.38 1.69 0.1987    
DIS*REP 1 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.8279    
Error(DIS) 62 14.13 0.23      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
CLAUSE 1 0.07 0.07 0.33 0.5693    
CLAUSE*REP 1 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.7211    
Error(CLAUSE) 62 12.83 0.21      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
SEMREL 1 2.09 2.09 9.44 0.0031 **   
SEMREL*REP 1 0.09 0.09 0.41 0.5240    
Error(SEMREL) 62 13.75 0.22      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON 2 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.9260 0.9130 0.9202  
DISCO*ICON*REP 2 0.34 0.17 0.86 0.4236 0.4159 0.4201  
Error(DISCO*ICON) 124 24.65 0.20      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS 2 0.98 0.49 2.11 0.1259 0.1290 0.1266  
DISCO*DIS*REP 2 1.00 0.50 2.14 0.1216 0.1247 0.1223  
Error(DISCO*DIS) 124 28.90 0.23      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS 1 0.22 0.22 0.97 0.3285    
ICON*DIS*REP 1 0.45 0.45 2.00 0.1621    
Error(ICON*DIS) 62 13.86 0.22      
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Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*CLAUSE 2 1.23 0.62 2.86 0.0613 0.0638 0.0613  
DISCO*CLAUSE*REP 2 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.9244 0.9175 0.9244  
Error(DISCO*CLAUSE) 124 26.71 0.22      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*CLAUSE 1 6.10 6.10 22.26 <.0001 **   
ICON*CLAUSE*REP 1 0.16 0.16 0.58 0.4481    
Error(ICON*CLAUSE) 62 17.00 0.27      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.14 0.14 0.50 0.4804    
DIS*CLAUSE*REP 1 0.68 0.68 2.38 0.1278    
Error(DIS*CLAUSE) 62 17.65 0.28      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*SEMREL 2 0.80 0.40 1.92 0.1503 0.1504 0.1503  
DISCO*SEMREL*REP 2 1.62 0.81 3.91 0.0225 0.0226 0.0225 * 
Error(DISCO*SEMREL) 124 25.66 0.21      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*SEMREL 1 0.39 0.39 2.07 0.1555    
ICON*SEMREL*REP 1 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.9069    
Error(ICON*SEMREL) 62 11.65 0.19      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*SEMREL 1 2.11 2.11 15.51 0.0002 *   
DIS*SEMREL*REP 1 0.06 0.06 0.47 0.4967    
Error(DIS*SEMREL) 62 8.45 0.14      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.9349    
CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 0.30 0.30 2.07 0.1548    
Error(CLAUSE*SEMREL) 62 8.92 0.14      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 0.23 0.11 0.45 0.6381 0.6267 0.6356  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*REP 2 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.9282 0.9192 0.9263  
Error(DISCO*ICON*DIS) 124 31.08 0.25      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE 2 0.31 0.16 0.75 0.4752 0.4644 0.4698  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE*REP 2 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.8944 0.8779 0.8863  
Error(DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE) 124 25.83 0.21      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 0.39 0.19 0.79 0.4582 0.4531 0.4582  
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DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*REP 2 0.22 0.11 0.45 0.6375 0.6286 0.6375  
Error(DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE) 124 30.45 0.25      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.34 0.34 1.05 0.3093    
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*REP 1 0.09 0.09 0.26 0.6089    
Error(ICON*DIS*CLAUSE) 62 20.24 0.33      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL 2 3.96 1.98 10.54 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 **
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL*REP 2 0.11 0.06 0.30 0.7418 0.7374 0.7418  
Error(DISCO*ICON*SEMREL) 124 23.32 0.19      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 1.41 0.70 3.88 0.0232 0.0234 0.0232 * 
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL*REP 2 0.32 0.16 0.89 0.4145 0.4141 0.4145  
Error(DISCO*DIS*SEMREL) 124 22.51 0.18      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 0.04 0.04 0.29 0.5945    
ICON*DIS*SEMREL*REP 1 0.05 0.05 0.34 0.5606    
Error(ICON*DIS*SEMREL) 62 8.18 0.13      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 2.15 1.08 6.44 0.0022 0.0023 0.0022 **
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 2 0.30 0.15 0.91 0.4063 0.4054 0.4063  
Error(DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 124 20.73 0.17      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.47 0.47 2.12 0.1505    
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 0.40 0.40 1.79 0.1853    
Error(ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 62 13.77 0.22      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.8215    
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL*REP 1 0.03 0.03 0.18 0.6704    
Error(DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL) 62 10.49 0.17      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ORDC*DIS*CLAU 2 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.9168 0.9009 0.9086  
DISC*ORDC*DIS*CLAU*REP 2 0.91 0.46 1.97 0.1432 0.1477 0.1457  
Error(DISC*ORDC*DIS*CLAU) 124 28.61 0.23      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ORDC*DIS*SEMR 2 0.78 0.39 1.79 0.1717 0.1755 0.1740  
DISC*ORDC*DIS*SEMR*REP 2 0.82 0.41 1.87 0.1584 0.1627 0.1609  
Error(DISC*ORDC*DIS*SEMR) 124 27.19 0.22      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*ORDC*CLAU*SEMR 2 0.63 0.31 1.32 0.2713 0.2712 0.2713  
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DISC*ORDC*CLAU*SEMR*REP 2 0.72 0.36 1.52 0.2231 0.2232 0.2231  
Error(DISC*ORDC*CLAU*SEMR) 124 29.41 0.24      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR 2 0.95 0.48 2.09 0.1284 0.1295 0.1284  
DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR*REP 2 0.57 0.29 1.26 0.2886 0.2883 0.2886  
Error(DISC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR) 124 28.27 0.23      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F    
ORDC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR 1 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.8189    
ORDC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR*REP 1 0.56 0.56 2.22 0.1415    
Error(ORDC*DIS*CLAU*SEMR) 62 15.69 0.25      
         
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F G - G H - F  
DIS*ORD*DIS*CLA*SEM 2 0.37 0.19 0.79 0.4571 0.4486 0.4537  
DIS*ORD*DIS*CLA*SEM*REP 2 0.24 0.12 0.52 0.5985 0.5848 0.5929  
Error(DIS*ORD*DIS*CLA*SEM) 124 29.18 0.24      
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APPENDIX K 
 
Means, Subject Residuals (Grand Mean Added). 
 
 
Discourse Order by Iconicity by Semantic Relationship 
     
  Physical Social Physical Social 
  Chrono Chrono Nchrono Nchrono
GivenGiven 5.025 5.958 5.159 5.606
GivenNew 6.263 5.857 5.460 6.411
NewGiven 5.463 6.474 5.498 5.988
     
     
Iconicity by Clause     
     
  
Main 
Clause 
First 
Main 
Clause 
Last   
Chronological 5.546 6.134   
Non-Chronological 5.827 5.547   
     
     
Semantic Relationship by Psychological Distance 
     
  Physical Social   
Near 5.428 6.247   
Far 5.528 5.851   
     
     
Discourse Order     
     
GG 5.437    
GN 5.998    
NG 5.856    
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APPENDIX L 
 
Omnibus ANOVA Subject Residuals (Tested Against an Aggregated Error Term. 
Missing Scores not Replaced). 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
Model 95 1397.07 14.71 1.71 <.0001  
Error 2582 22170.28 8.59    
Corrected 2677 23567.34     
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
REP 1 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.9263  
DISCO 2 147.35 73.67 8.58 0.0002 **
REP*DISCO 2 9.70 4.85 0.56 0.5686  
ICON 1 15.43 15.43 1.80 0.1801  
REP*ICON 1 17.67 17.67 2.06 0.1515  
DIS 1 14.45 14.45 1.68 0.1947  
REP*DIS 1 3.91 3.91 0.46 0.5000  
CLAUSE 1 15.71 15.71 1.83 0.1763  
REP*CLAUSE 1 7.86 7.86 0.92 0.3387  
SEMREL 1 214.87 214.87 25.02 <.0001 * 
REP*SEMREL 1 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.8910  
DISCO*ICON 2 1.76 0.88 0.10 0.9026  
REP*DISCO*ICON 2 15.58 7.79 0.91 0.4037  
DISCO*DIS 2 23.92 11.96 1.39 0.2485  
REP*DISCO*DIS 2 25.40 12.70 1.48 0.2280  
ICON*DIS 1 3.62 3.62 0.42 0.5164  
REP*ICON*DIS 1 6.24 6.24 0.73 0.3940  
DISCO*CLAUSE 2 30.05 15.03 1.75 0.1740  
REP*DISCO*CLAUSE 2 7.08 3.54 0.41 0.6621  
ICON*CLAUSE 1 124.16 124.16 14.46 0.0001 **
REP*ICON*CLAUSE 1 0.18 0.18 0.02 0.8851  
DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.70 0.70 0.08 0.7760  
REP*DIS*CLAUSE 1 20.87 20.87 2.43 0.1191  
DISCO*SEMREL 2 29.92 14.96 1.74 0.1753  
REP*DISCO*SEMREL 2 41.67 20.84 2.43 0.0885  
ICON*SEMREL 1 2.24 2.24 0.26 0.6093  
REP*ICON*SEMREL 1 7.23 7.23 0.84 0.3590  
DIS*SEMREL 1 40.31 40.31 4.69 0.0304 * 
REP*DIS*SEMREL 1 3.00 3.00 0.35 0.5547  
CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 1.11 1.11 0.13 0.7188  
REP*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 21.11 21.11 2.46 0.1170  
DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 23.79 11.89 1.39 0.2504  
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 8.31 4.15 0.48 0.6165  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE 2 15.28 7.64 0.89 0.4110  
REP*DISC*ICON*CLAUS 2 1.30 0.65 0.08 0.9270  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 19.45 9.73 1.13 0.3223  
REP*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 24.34 12.17 1.42 0.2426  
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.28 0.28 0.03 0.8564  
REP*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 10.17 10.17 1.18 0.2765  
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DISCO*ICON*SEMREL 2 126.75 63.38 7.38 0.0006 **
REP*DISC*ICON*SEMRE 2 8.55 4.28 0.50 0.6078  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 13.09 6.55 0.76 0.4666  
REP*DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 1.74 0.87 0.10 0.9039  
ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 3.96 3.96 0.46 0.4970  
REP*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.9719  
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 76.78 38.39 4.47 0.0115 * 
REP*DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 7.82 3.91 0.46 0.6343  
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 4.17 4.17 0.49 0.4858  
REP*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 8.78 8.78 1.02 0.3121  
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.9130  
REP*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.44 0.44 0.05 0.8213  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUS 2 0.27 0.13 0.02 0.9844  
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 2 3.80 1.90 0.22 0.8014  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 2 25.47 12.74 1.48 0.2271  
REP*DIS*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 2 32.83 16.42 1.91 0.1480  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 15.61 7.81 0.91 0.4030  
REP*DIS*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 5.84 2.92 0.34 0.7116  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 27.56 13.78 1.60 0.2012  
REP*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 0.40 0.20 0.02 0.9770  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 3 20.33 6.78 0.79 0.4998  
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 3 19.57 6.52 0.76 0.5166  
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APPENDIX M 
 
Omnibus ANOVA Covariate Residuals (Cube Comparisons Test. Tested Against an 
Aggregated Error Term. Missing Scores not Replaced). 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
Model 95 1430.69 15.06 1.38 0.0093  
Error 2582 28114.81 10.89   
Corrected Total 2677.00 29545.50   
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
REP 1 51.08 51.08 4.69 0.0304 * 
DISCO 2 161.66 80.83 7.42 0.0006 **
REP*DISCO 2 7.43 3.71 0.34 0.7110  
ICON 1 12.81 12.81 1.18 0.2782  
REP*ICON 1 13.79 13.79 1.27 0.2606  
DIS 1 9.68 9.68 0.89 0.3458  
REP*DIS 1 3.53 3.53 0.32 0.5692  
CLAUSE 1 11.60 11.60 1.06 0.3022  
REP*CLAUSE 1 4.34 4.34 0.40 0.5279  
SEMREL 1 179.32 179.32 16.47 <.0001 **
REP*SEMREL 1 0.73 0.73 0.07 0.7962  
DISCO*ICON 2 2.42 1.21 0.11 0.8950  
REP*DISCO*ICON 2 16.52 8.26 0.76 0.4684  
DISCO*DIS 2 25.83 12.91 1.19 0.3056  
REP*DISCO*DIS 2 37.56 18.78 1.72 0.1784  
ICON*DIS 1 4.08 4.08 0.38 0.5403  
REP*ICON*DIS 1 4.14 4.14 0.38 0.5376  
DISCO*CLAUSE 2 37.59 18.80 1.73 0.1782  
REP*DISCO*CLAUSE 2 5.41 2.70 0.25 0.7802  
ICON*CLAUSE 1 133.78 133.78 12.29 0.0005 **
REP*ICON*CLAUSE 1 0.97 0.97 0.09 0.7648  
DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.53 0.53 0.05 0.8250  
REP*DIS*CLAUSE 1 20.79 20.79 1.91 0.1672  
DISCO*SEMREL 2 31.49 15.74 1.45 0.2358  
REP*DISCO*SEMREL 2 41.41 20.70 1.90 0.1496  
ICON*SEMREL 1 2.85 2.85 0.26 0.6091  
REP*ICON*SEMREL 1 7.46 7.46 0.68 0.4080  
DIS*SEMREL 1 49.27 49.27 4.52 0.0335 * 
REP*DIS*SEMREL 1 3.09 3.09 0.28 0.5945  
CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 1.12 1.12 0.10 0.7482  
REP*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 26.88 26.88 2.47 0.1163  
DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 21.30 10.65 0.98 0.3762  
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 7.59 3.80 0.35 0.7057  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE 2 19.56 9.78 0.90 0.4075  
REP*DISC*ICON*CLAUS 2 1.35 0.67 0.06 0.9399  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 18.01 9.01 0.83 0.4374  
REP*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 19.76 9.88 0.91 0.4037  
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 1.87 1.87 0.17 0.6788  
REP*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 9.53 9.53 0.87 0.3497  
180 
 
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL 2 114.99 57.49 5.28 0.0051 **
REP*DISC*ICON*SEMRE 2 10.04 5.02 0.46 0.6308  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 10.79 5.39 0.50 0.6095  
REP*DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 1.53 0.76 0.07 0.9322  
ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 2.72 2.72 0.25 0.6171  
REP*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.9663  
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 57.45 28.73 2.64 0.0717  
REP*DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 6.72 3.36 0.31 0.7344  
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 7.76 7.76 0.71 0.3988  
REP*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 11.61 11.61 1.07 0.3019  
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 1.24 1.24 0.11 0.7360  
REP*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 1.09 1.09 0.10 0.7515  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUS 2 0.42 0.21 0.02 0.9810  
REP*DIS*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 2 6.47 3.23 0.30 0.7430  
DISC*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 2 26.82 13.41 1.23 0.2921  
REP*DIS*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 2 33.62 16.81 1.54 0.2138  
DISC*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 15.27 7.64 0.70 0.4960  
REP*DIS*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 12.77 6.39 0.59 0.5563  
DISC*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 21.39 10.69 0.98 0.3746  
REP*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.9989  
DIS*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 3 17.73 5.91 0.54 0.6530  
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 3 29.91 9.97 0.92 0.4325  
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APPENDIX N 
 
Omnibus ANOVA Covariate Residuals (Card Rotation Test. Tested Against an 
Aggregated Error Term. Missing Scores not Replaced). 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
Model 95 1449.24 15.26 1.40 0.0071 
Error 2582 28120.15 10.89  
Corrected Total 2677.00 29569.39  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
REP 1 70.02 70.02 6.43 0.0113*
DISCO 2 160.16 80.08 7.35 0.0007**
REP*DISCO 2 6.98 3.49 0.32 0.7258 
ICON 1 13.25 13.25 1.22 0.2700 
REP*ICON 1 14.36 14.36 1.32 0.2510 
DIS 1 9.37 9.37 0.86 0.3537 
REP*DIS 1 3.66 3.66 0.34 0.5621 
CLAUSE 1 10.99 10.99 1.01 0.3152 
REP*CLAUSE 1 4.32 4.32 0.40 0.5287 
SEMREL 1 181.22 181.22 16.64 <.0001**
REP*SEMREL 1 0.80 0.80 0.07 0.7863 
DISCO*ICON 2 2.49 1.25 0.11 0.8919 
REP*DISCO*ICON 2 16.15 8.07 0.74 0.4765 
DISCO*DIS 2 24.99 12.49 1.15 0.3177 
REP*DISCO*DIS 2 37.57 18.79 1.72 0.1784 
ICON*DIS 1 4.17 4.17 0.38 0.5360 
REP*ICON*DIS 1 4.16 4.16 0.38 0.5365 
DISCO*CLAUSE 2 38.00 19.00 1.74 0.1749 
REP*DISCO*CLAUSE 2 5.27 2.63 0.24 0.7852 
ICON*CLAUSE 1 133.48 133.48 12.26 0.0005**
REP*ICON*CLAUSE 1 0.74 0.74 0.07 0.7937 
DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.56 0.56 0.05 0.8203 
REP*DIS*CLAUSE 1 21.12 21.12 1.94 0.1638 
DISCO*SEMREL 2 30.68 15.34 1.41 0.2447 
REP*DISCO*SEMREL 2 40.43 20.22 1.86 0.1565 
ICON*SEMREL 1 2.95 2.95 0.27 0.6029 
REP*ICON*SEMREL 1 7.83 7.83 0.72 0.3966 
DIS*SEMREL 1 49.01 49.01 4.50 0.0340*
REP*DIS*SEMREL 1 3.25 3.25 0.30 0.5849 
CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 1.46 1.46 0.13 0.7142 
REP*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 27.44 27.44 2.52 0.1126 
DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 20.79 10.40 0.95 0.3851 
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 7.39 3.69 0.34 0.7124 
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE 2 19.08 9.54 0.88 0.4165 
REP*DISC*ICON*CLAUS 2 1.39 0.70 0.06 0.9380 
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 18.08 9.04 0.83 0.4360 
REP*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 19.34 9.67 0.89 0.4116 
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 2.16 2.16 0.20 0.6561 
REP*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 9.63 9.63 0.88 0.3472 
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DISCO*ICON*SEMREL 2 116.15 58.07 5.33 0.0049**
REP*DISC*ICON*SEMRE 2 10.22 5.11 0.47 0.6255 
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 11.33 5.66 0.52 0.5946 
REP*DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 1.33 0.66 0.06 0.9409 
ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 2.80 2.80 0.26 0.6124 
REP*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.9565 
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 57.86 28.93 2.66 0.0704 
REP*DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 6.95 3.48 0.32 0.7268 
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 7.62 7.62 0.70 0.4031 
REP*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 11.00 11.00 1.01 0.3150 
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 1.20 1.20 0.11 0.7403 
REP*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 1.05 1.05 0.10 0.7559 
DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUS 2 0.35 0.17 0.02 0.9842 
REP*DIS*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 2 6.23 3.12 0.29 0.7512 
DISC*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 2 26.61 13.31 1.22 0.2949 
REP*DIS*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 2 33.36 16.68 1.53 0.2164 
DISC*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 15.78 7.89 0.72 0.4847 
REP*DIS*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 12.77 6.39 0.59 0.5564 
DISC*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 21.21 10.60 0.97 0.3778 
REP*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.9988 
DIS*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 3 18.52 6.17 0.57 0.6369 
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 3 29.61 9.87 0.91 0.4372 
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APPENDIX O 
 
Omnibus ANOVA Covariate Residuals (Sentence Span Test. Tested Against an 
Aggregated Error Term. Missing Scores not Replaced). 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
Model 95 1472.03 15.50 1.43 0.0047 
Error 2582 28010.02 10.85  
Corrected Total 2677.00 29482.06  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
REP 1 91.83 91.83 8.46 0.0037**
DISCO 2 162.09 81.04 7.47 0.0006**
REP*DISCO 2 6.78 3.39 0.31 0.7317 
ICON 1 14.25 14.25 1.31 0.2519 
REP*ICON 1 14.36 14.36 1.32 0.2501 
DIS 1 8.86 8.86 0.82 0.3662 
REP*DIS 1 3.77 3.77 0.35 0.5556 
CLAUSE 1 10.67 10.67 0.98 0.3215 
REP*CLAUSE 1 4.94 4.94 0.45 0.5000 
SEMREL 1 180.16 180.16 16.61 <.0001**
REP*SEMREL 1 0.85 0.85 0.08 0.7789 
DISCO*ICON 2 2.76 1.38 0.13 0.8805 
REP*DISCO*ICON 2 16.33 8.17 0.75 0.4712 
DISCO*DIS 2 24.64 12.32 1.14 0.3214 
REP*DISCO*DIS 2 38.01 19.00 1.75 0.1737 
ICON*DIS 1 4.15 4.15 0.38 0.5361 
REP*ICON*DIS 1 3.96 3.96 0.37 0.5456 
DISCO*CLAUSE 2 39.26 19.63 1.81 0.1639 
REP*DISCO*CLAUSE 2 5.73 2.87 0.26 0.7678 
ICON*CLAUSE 1 134.65 134.65 12.41 0.0004**
REP*ICON*CLAUSE 1 0.48 0.48 0.04 0.8330 
DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.56 0.56 0.05 0.8196 
REP*DIS*CLAUSE 1 21.70 21.70 2.00 0.1574 
DISCO*SEMREL 2 30.53 15.27 1.41 0.2450 
REP*DISCO*SEMREL 2 39.72 19.86 1.83 0.1605 
ICON*SEMREL 1 2.91 2.91 0.27 0.6046 
REP*ICON*SEMREL 1 8.43 8.43 0.78 0.3780 
DIS*SEMREL 1 50.28 50.28 4.63 0.0314*
REP*DIS*SEMREL 1 3.19 3.19 0.29 0.5877 
CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 1.56 1.56 0.14 0.7043 
REP*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 26.98 26.98 2.49 0.1149 
DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 20.11 10.05 0.93 0.3959 
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 7.03 3.51 0.32 0.7233 
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE 2 19.41 9.71 0.89 0.4088 
REP*DISC*ICON*CLAUS 2 1.85 0.92 0.09 0.9183 
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 18.11 9.05 0.83 0.4342 
REP*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 19.04 9.52 0.88 0.4160 
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 2.48 2.48 0.23 0.6324 
REP*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 8.80 8.80 0.81 0.3679 
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DISCO*ICON*SEMREL 2 116.28 58.14 5.36 0.0048**
REP*DISC*ICON*SEMRE 2 9.71 4.86 0.45 0.6391 
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 10.94 5.47 0.50 0.6041 
REP*DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 1.21 0.60 0.06 0.9459 
ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 2.98 2.98 0.27 0.6004 
REP*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.9214 
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 56.56 28.28 2.61 0.0740 
REP*DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 7.45 3.72 0.34 0.7095 
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 7.91 7.91 0.73 0.3931 
REP*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 9.58 9.58 0.88 0.3473 
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 1.28 1.28 0.12 0.7309 
REP*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 1.00 1.00 0.09 0.7620 
DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUS 2 0.28 0.14 0.01 0.9872 
REP*DIS*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 2 6.40 3.20 0.29 0.7446 
DISC*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 2 25.50 12.75 1.18 0.3089 
REP*DIS*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 2 33.27 16.64 1.53 0.2160 
DISC*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 16.44 8.22 0.76 0.4687 
REP*DIS*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 12.75 6.37 0.59 0.5558 
DISC*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 20.12 10.06 0.93 0.3957 
REP*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.9995 
DIS*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 3 19.14 6.38 0.59 0.6227 
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 3 29.82 9.94 0.92 0.4321 
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APPENDIX P 
 
Omnibus ANOVA Log Scores (Missing Scores not Replaced). 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
REP 1 71.94 71.93 0.96 0.3732  
SUBJ(REP) 62 4741.24 76.51 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO 2 3.19 1.59 5.48 0.0053 **
REP*DISCO 2 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.9641  
SUBJ*DISCO(REP) 124 36.08 0.29 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON 1 0.34 0.34 1.68 0.1996  
REP*ICON 1 0.66 0.66 3.28 0.0750  
SUBJ*ICON(REP) 62 12.56 0.20 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DIS 1 0.39 0.39 1.54 0.2191  
REP*DIS 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.9711  
SUBJ*DIS(REP) 62 15.83 0.26 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
CLAUSE 1 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.8653  
REP*CLAUSE 1 0.15 0.15 0.69 0.4110  
SUBJ*CLAUSE(REP) 62 13.84 0.22 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
SEMREL 1 3.65 3.65 15.64 0.0002 **
REP*SEMREL 1 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.8123  
SUBJ*SEMREL(REP) 62 14.46 0.23 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON 2 0.16 0.08 0.30 0.7407  
REP*DISCO*ICON 2 0.21 0.10 0.38 0.6823  
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON(REP) 124 33.95 0.27 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*DIS 2 0.85 0.43 1.60 0.2065  
REP*DISCO*DIS 2 0.56 0.28 1.05 0.3545  
SUBJ*DISCO*DIS(REP) 124 33.13 0.27 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*DIS 1 0.17 0.17 0.64 0.4269  
REP*ICON*DIS 1 0.11 0.11 0.43 0.5130  
SUBJ*ICON*DIS(REP) 62 16.09 0.26 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*CLAUSE 2 1.76 0.88 3.40 0.0364 * 
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REP*DISCO*CLAUSE 2 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.9243  
SUBJ*DISCO*CLAUSE(REP) 124 31.97 0.26 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*CLAUSE 1 2.57 2.57 10.68 0.0018 **
REP*ICON*CLAUSE 1 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.7669  
SUBJ*ICON*CLAUSE(REP) 62 14.93 0.24 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.54 0.54 2.57 0.1140  
REP*DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.24 0.24 1.16 0.2855  
SUBJ*DIS*CLAUSE(REP) 62 12.94 0.21 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*SEMREL 2 0.40 0.20 0.93 0.3959  
REP*DISCO*SEMREL 2 0.95 0.48 2.21 0.1138  
SUBJ*DISCO*SEMREL(REP) 124 26.72 0.22 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*SEMREL 1 0.04 0.04 0.20 0.6591  
REP*ICON*SEMREL 1 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.8065  
SUBJ*ICON*SEMREL(REP) 62 12.77 0.21 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DIS*SEMREL 1 1.00 1.00 4.95 0.0298 * 
REP*DIS*SEMREL 1 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.8917  
SUBJ*DIS*SEMREL(REP) 62 12.49 0.20 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.05 0.05 0.24 0.6239  
REP*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.27 0.27 1.28 0.2625  
SUBJ*CLAUSE*SEMREL(REP) 62 13.00 0.21 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 0.78 0.39 1.75 0.1775  
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 0.49 0.25 1.11 0.3342  
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON*DIS(REP) 122 27.20 0.22 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE 2 0.59 0.30 1.55 0.2159  
REP*DISC*ORDCO*CLAUS 2 0.70 0.35 1.84 0.1638  
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE(REP) 124 23.59 0.19 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 0.55 0.27 1.06 0.3482  
REP*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 0.27 0.13 0.52 0.5945  
SUBJ*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE(REP) 122 31.44 0.26 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.22 0.22 0.79 0.3784  
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REP*ORDCO*DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.9353  
SUBJ*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE(REP) 62 17.26 0.28 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL 2 4.45 2.22 10.98 <.0001 **
REP*DISC*ORDCO*SEMRE 2 0.10 0.05 0.25 0.7796  
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON*SEMREL(REP) 106 21.47 0.20 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 0.29 0.15 0.68 0.5091  
REP*DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 0.40 0.20 0.93 0.3981  
SUBJ*DISCO*DIS*SEMREL(REP) 120 25.87 0.22 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 0.10 0.10 0.43 0.5138  
REP*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 0.38 0.38 1.59 0.2128  
SUBJ*ICON*DIS*SEMREL(REP) 54 13.07 0.24 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 0.43 0.21 1.08 0.3438  
REP*DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.8800  
SUBJ*DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL(REP) 115 22.73 0.20 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.9797  
REP*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.50 0.50 2.03 0.1602  
SUBJ*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL(REP) 50 12.29 0.25 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.5868  
REP*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.53 0.53 1.61 0.2103  
SUBJ*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL(REP) 52 17.21 0.33 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 2 0.10 0.05 0.21 0.8120  
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 2 1.63 0.82 3.29 0.0444 * 
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE(REP) 58 14.40 0.25 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 2 2.93 1.46 3.95 0.0270 * 
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 2 2.68 1.34 3.62 0.0355 * 
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON*DIS*SEMREL(REP) 41 15.18 0.37 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 0.81 0.40 0.85 0.4360  
REP*DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 0.34 0.17 0.36 0.7020  
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL(REP) 32 15.21 0.48 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.9928  
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REP*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 1.14 0.57 1.53 0.2296  
SUBJ*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL(REP) 41 15.33 0.37 . .  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 1.23 0.61 2.12 0.1490  
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 0.63 0.31 1.08 0.3601  
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL(REP) 18 5.22 0.29 . .  
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APPENDIX Q 
 
Omnibus ANOVA Raw Scores (Six-way subtracted. ! Denotes the five-way interactions 
that were not subtracted due to significance or borderline significance. Missing scores not 
replaced). 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
REP 1 70.11 70.11 0.91 0.3443  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO 2 106.98 53.49 5.00 0.0081 ** 
REP*DISCO 2 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.9954  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON 1 21.85 21.85 3.11 0.0829  
REP*ICON 1 14.90 14.90 2.12 0.1506  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DIS 1 7.70 7.70 0.79 0.3783  
REP*DIS 1 5.76 5.76 0.59 0.4459  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
CLAUSE 1 7.22 7.22 0.95 0.3334  
REP*CLAUSE 1 20.32 20.32 2.68 0.1069  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
SEMREL 1 173.56 173.56 18.04 <.0001 ** 
REP*SEMREL 1 0.21 0.21 0.02 0.8843  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON 2 0.22 0.11 0.01 0.9901  
REP*DISCO*ICON 2 8.28 4.14 0.37 0.6888  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*DIS 2 32.76 16.38 1.59 0.2073  
REP*DISCO*DIS 2 17.93 8.96 0.87 0.4206  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*DIS 1 3.57 3.57 0.35 0.5556  
REP*ICON*DIS 1 4.89 4.89 0.48 0.4906  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*CLAUSE 2 39.23 19.62 1.96 0.1454  
REP*DISCO*CLAUSE 2 5.80 2.90 0.29 0.7491  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*CLAUSE 1 67.10 67.10 6.86 0.0110 * 
REP*ICON*CLAUSE 1 1.38 1.38 0.14 0.7081  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
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DIS*CLAUSE 1 20.34 20.34 2.49 0.1198  
REP*DIS*CLAUSE 1 19.22 19.22 2.35 0.1303  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*SEMREL 2 17.58 8.79 1.33 0.2672  
REP*DISCO*SEMREL 2 23.84 11.92 1.81 0.1682  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*SEMREL 1 0.90 0.90 0.12 0.7276  
REP*ICON*SEMREL 1 4.32 4.32 0.59 0.4449  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DIS*SEMREL 1 51.26 51.26 7.41 0.0084 ** 
REP*DIS*SEMREL 1 3.30 3.30 0.48 0.4923  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.39 0.39 0.05 0.8170  
REP*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 4.17 4.17 0.58 0.4502  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 48.24 24.12 2.65 0.0750  
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 3.73 1.87 0.20 0.8152  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE 2 34.98 17.49 2.45 0.0904  
REP*DISC*ICON*CLAUS 2 10.24 5.12 0.72 0.4900  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 31.00 15.50 1.88 0.1571  
REP*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 6.78 3.39 0.41 0.6638  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 7.39 7.39 0.71 0.4019  
REP*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 13.75 13.75 1.32 0.2541  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL 2 124.00 62.00 10.52 <.0001 ** 
REP*DISC*ICON*SEMRE 2 1.74 0.87 0.15 0.8627  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 2.96 1.48 0.20 0.8199  
REP*DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 5.42 2.71 0.36 0.6952  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 9.61 9.61 1.46 0.2326  
REP*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 7.62 7.62 1.15 0.2873  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 3.81 1.91 0.23 0.7923  
REP*DISC*CLAUS*SEMRE 2 3.36 1.68 0.21 0.8146  
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Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.9763  
REP*ICON*CLAUS*SEMRE 1 19.25 19.25 1.79 0.1865  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 8.13 8.13 0.67 0.4168  
REP*DIS*CLAUS*SEMREL 1 11.22 11.22 0.92 0.3406  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISC*ICON*DIS*CLAUS 2 7.34 3.67 0.40 0.6724  
REP*DIS*ICO*DIS*CLAU 2 31.78 15.89 1.73 0.1861 ! 
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISC*ICON*DIS*SEMRE 2 65.14 32.57 3.64 0.0347 * 
REP*DIS*ICO*DIS*SEMR 2 117.00 58.50 6.55 0.0034 ** ! 
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISC*ICON*CLAU*SEMRE 2 24.64 12.32 0.86 0.4317  
REP*DIS*ICO*CLA*SEMR 2 9.58 4.79 0.33 0.7178  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISC*DIS*CLAUS*SEMRE 2 2.58 1.29 0.15 0.8646  
REP*DIS*DIS*CLA*SEMR 2 2.24 1.12 0.13 0.8811  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DIS*ICO*DIS*CLA*SEMR 2 49.47 24.73 1.25 0.3077  
 
192 
 
APPENDIX R 
 
Omnibus ANOVA Raw Scores (Five-ways subtracted. ! Denotes the four-way 
interactions that were not subtracted due to significance or borderline significance. 
Missing scores not replaced). 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
REP 1 59.08 59.08 0.94 0.3356  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO 2 77.56 38.78 3.44 0.0351 * 
REP*DISCO 2 0.84 0.42 0.04 0.9635  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON 1 10.62 10.62 1.27 0.2632  
REP*ICON 1 21.70 21.70 2.61 0.1116  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DIS 1 12.56 12.56 1.24 0.2700  
REP*DIS 1 6.63 6.63 0.65 0.4218  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
CLAUSE 1 6.84 6.84 0.84 0.3622  
REP*CLAUSE 1 22.03 22.03 2.71 0.1046  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
SEMREL 1 155.13 155.13 15.28 0.0002 ** 
REP*SEMREL 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.9937  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON 2 0.51 0.25 0.02 0.9772  
REP*DISCO*ICON 2 9.68 4.84 0.44 0.6445  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*DIS 2 26.01 13.01 1.27 0.2836  
REP*DISCO*DIS 2 22.44 11.22 1.10 0.3367  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*DIS 1 6.40 6.40 0.60 0.4402  
REP*ICON*DIS 1 1.08 1.08 0.10 0.7507  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*CLAUSE 2 26.84 13.42 1.33 0.2677  
REP*DISCO*CLAUSE 2 2.67 1.33 0.13 0.8761  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*CLAUSE 1 57.41 57.41 6.76 0.0117 * 
REP*ICON*CLAUSE 1 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.8959  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
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DIS*CLAUSE 1 22.92 22.92 2.68 0.1068  
REP*DIS*CLAUSE 1 20.65 20.65 2.41 0.1253  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*SEMREL 2 12.14 6.07 0.95 0.3907  
REP*DISCO*SEMREL 2 23.22 11.61 1.81 0.1678  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*SEMREL 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.9967  
REP*ICON*SEMREL 1 4.31 4.31 0.54 0.4670  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DIS*SEMREL 1 29.48 29.48 4.16 0.0455 * 
REP*DIS*SEMREL 1 2.32 2.32 0.33 0.5690  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.9319  
REP*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 4.21 4.21 0.56 0.4575  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 56.70 28.35 3.45 0.0350 * 
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 4.80 2.40 0.29 0.7473  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE 2 35.56 17.78 2.52 0.0842  
REP*DISC*ICON*CLAUS 2 1.31 0.65 0.09 0.9113  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 28.87 14.44 1.94 0.1485  
REP*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 11.24 5.62 0.75 0.4725  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 0.53 0.53 0.05 0.8267  
REP*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 7.45 7.45 0.68 0.4129  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL 2 123.77 61.89 10.08 <.0001 ** 
REP*DISC*ICON*SEMRE 2 1.77 0.89 0.14 0.8657  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 0.87 0.44 0.06 0.9412  
REP*DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 6.44 3.22 0.45 0.6400  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 20.78 20.78 3.38 0.0715  
REP*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 7.58 7.58 1.23 0.2720  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 12.61 6.31 0.76 0.4718  
REP*DISC*CLAUS*SEMRE 2 3.31 1.66 0.20 0.8203  
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Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.21 0.21 0.02 0.8870  
REP*ICON*CLAUS*SEMRE 1 20.68 20.68 2.00 0.1635 ! 
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 8.81 8.81 0.74 0.3934  
REP*DIS*CLAUS*SEMREL 1 7.99 7.99 0.67 0.4162  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISC*ICON*DIS*CLAUS 2 25.14 12.57 1.29 0.2835  
REP*DIS*ICO*DIS*CLAU 2 34.37 17.19 1.76 0.1808  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISC*ICON*DIS*SEMRE 2 76.62 38.31 3.92 0.0273 * ! 
REP*DIS*ICO*DIS*SEMR 2 77.23 38.61 3.95 0.0266 * 
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISC*ICON*CLAU*SEMRE 2 34.60 17.30 1.30 0.2847  
       
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISC*DIS*CLAUS*SEMRE 2 0.67 0.34 0.04 0.9591  
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APPENDIX S 
 
Omnibus ANOVA Raw Scores (Four-Ways Subtracted. Missing Scores not Replaced). 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
REP 1 55.62 55.62 1.01 0.3184  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DISCO 2 35.23 17.62 1.66 0.1945  
REP*DISCO 2 9.31 4.66 0.44 0.6460  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
ICON 1 10.27 10.27 1.16 0.2856  
REP*ICON 1 12.48 12.48 1.41 0.2395  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DIS 1 2.05 2.05 0.27 0.6021  
REP*DIS 1 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.9402  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
CLAUSE 1 16.84 16.84 1.99 0.1637  
REP*CLAUSE 1 9.76 9.76 1.15 0.2874  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
SEMREL 1 83.82 83.82 9.73 0.0027 ** 
REP*SEMREL 1 0.72 0.72 0.08 0.7740  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DISCO*ICON 2 2.40 1.20 0.17 0.8476  
REP*DISCO*ICON 2 20.67 10.34 1.43 0.2439  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DISCO*DIS 2 24.34 12.17 1.21 0.3021  
REP*DISCO*DIS 2 12.97 6.48 0.64 0.5270  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
ICON*DIS 1 6.88 6.88 0.68 0.4129  
REP*ICON*DIS 1 0.79 0.79 0.08 0.7804  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DISCO*CLAUSE 2 37.19 18.59 2.23 0.1121  
REP*DISCO*CLAUSE 2 2.61 1.30 0.16 0.8556  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
ICON*CLAUSE 1 62.24 62.24 6.32 0.0145 * 
REP*ICON*CLAUSE 1 5.00 5.00 0.51 0.4786  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DIS*CLAUSE 1 12.84 12.84 1.49 0.2272  
REP*DIS*CLAUSE 1 4.05 4.05 0.47 0.4960  
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Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DISCO*SEMREL 2 22.00 11.00 1.55 0.2154  
REP*DISCO*SEMREL 2 32.42 16.21 2.29 0.1054  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
ICON*SEMREL 1 12.65 12.65 1.58 0.2132  
REP*ICON*SEMREL 1 0.21 0.21 0.03 0.8714  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DIS*SEMREL 1 40.60 40.60 5.78 0.0192 * 
REP*DIS*SEMREL 1 1.39 1.39 0.20 0.6583  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 3.42 3.42 0.42 0.5213  
REP*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 1.57 1.57 0.19 0.6633  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 25.12 12.56 1.29 0.2802  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE 2 33.67 16.83 2.26 0.1088  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 6.21 3.10 0.32 0.7290  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 1.81 1.81 0.21 0.6485  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL 2 132.57 66.29 9.74 0.0001 ** 
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 12.66 6.33 0.85 0.4301  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 3.29 3.29 0.73 0.3953  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 9.34 4.67 0.60 0.5505  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 1.60 1.60 0.22 0.6432  
REP*ICON*CLAUS*SEMRE 1 17.95 17.95 2.43 0.1250  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 2.79 2.79 0.34 0.5641  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
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REP*DIS*ICO*DIS*CLAU 4 18.97 4.74 0.44 0.7766  
       
Source DF Type III SS Mean  
DISC*ICON*DIS*SEMRE 2 61.70 30.85 2.92 0.0589  
REP*DIS*ICO*DIS*SEMR 2 14.66 7.33 0.69 0.5021  
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APPENDIX T 
 
Omnibus ANOVA Raw Scores. (Missing Scores not Replaced). 
 
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
REP 1 71.67 71.67 0.94 0.3366  
SUBJ(REP) 62 4737.27 76.41 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO 2 104.56 52.28 4.91 0.0089 ** 
REP*DISCO 2 0.18 0.09 0.01 0.9918  
SUBJ*DISCO(REP) 124 1320.45 10.65 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON 1 23.79 23.79 3.38 0.0707  
REP*ICON 1 14.00 14.00 1.99 0.1633  
SUBJ*ICON(REP) 62 436.13 7.03 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DIS 1 7.02 7.02 0.72 0.3998  
REP*DIS 1 5.31 5.31 0.54 0.4636  
SUBJ*DIS(REP) 62 605.80 9.77 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
CLAUSE 1 7.12 7.12 0.95 0.3345  
REP*CLAUSE 1 25.64 25.64 3.41 0.0696  
SUBJ*CLAUSE(REP) 62 466.36 7.52 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
SEMREL 1 170.72 170.72 17.44 <.0001 ** 
REP*SEMREL 1 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.9004  
SUBJ*SEMREL(REP) 62 606.82 9.79 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON 2 0.16 0.08 0.01 0.9929  
REP*DISCO*ICON 2 8.46 4.23 0.38 0.6859  
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON(REP) 124 1386.53 11.18 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*DIS 2 33.32 16.66 1.60 0.2056  
REP*DISCO*DIS 2 19.30 9.65 0.93 0.3980  
SUBJ*DISCO*DIS(REP) 124 1289.40 10.40 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*DIS 1 4.89 4.89 0.48 0.4906  
REP*ICON*DIS 1 5.22 5.22 0.51 0.4764  
SUBJ*ICON*DIS(REP) 62 630.87 10.18 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*CLAUSE 2 39.28 19.64 1.95 0.1460  
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REP*DISCO*CLAUSE 2 10.43 5.22 0.52 0.5963  
SUBJ*DISCO*CLAUSE(REP) 124 1246.12 10.05 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*CLAUSE 1 69.84 69.84 7.30 0.0089 **1
REP*ICON*CLAUSE 1 2.78 2.78 0.29 0.5915  
SUBJ*ICON*CLAUSE(REP) 62 593.01 9.56 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DIS*CLAUSE 1 21.49 21.49 2.61 0.1112  
REP*DIS*CLAUSE 1 17.67 17.67 2.15 0.1478  
SUBJ*DIS*CLAUSE(REP) 62 510.12 8.23 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*SEMREL 2 17.76 8.88 1.35 0.2618  
REP*DISCO*SEMREL 2 22.19 11.09 1.69 0.1882  
SUBJ*DISCO*SEMREL(REP) 124 812.74 6.55 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*SEMREL 1 1.37 1.37 0.19 0.6626  
REP*ICON*SEMREL 1 3.67 3.67 0.52 0.4755  
SUBJ*ICON*SEMREL(REP) 62 441.15 7.12 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DIS*SEMREL 1 52.55 52.55 7.56 0.0078 **2
REP*DIS*SEMREL 1 4.25 4.25 0.61 0.4376  
SUBJ*DIS*SEMREL(REP) 62 431.23 6.96 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.39 0.39 0.05 0.8211  
REP*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 3.14 3.14 0.42 0.5190  
SUBJ*CLAUSE*SEMREL(REP) 62 463.31 7.47 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 53.43 26.72 2.98 0.0546  
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS 2 3.94 1.97 0.22 0.8032  
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON*DIS(REP) 122 1094.68 8.97 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE 2 28.94 14.47 2.07 0.1307  
REP*DISC*ICON*CLAUS 2 21.86 10.93 1.56 0.2138  
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE(REP) 124 867.41 7.00 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 30.11 15.06 1.84 0.1633  
REP*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE 2 7.02 3.51 0.43 0.6523  
SUBJ*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE(REP) 122 998.62 8.19 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 7.18 7.18 0.66 0.4182  
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REP*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 1 6.69 6.69 0.62 0.4345  
SUBJ*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE(REP) 62 670.67 10.82 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*SEMREL 2 123.38 61.69 10.71 <.0001 **3
REP*DISC*ICON*SEMRE 2 4.42 2.21 0.38 0.6826  
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON*SEMREL(REP) 106 610.75 5.76 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 2.39 1.20 0.16 0.8530  
REP*DISCO*DIS*SEMREL 2 2.32 1.16 0.15 0.8570  
SUBJ*DISCO*DIS*SEMREL(REP) 120 900.95 7.51 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 10.99 10.99 1.62 0.2092  
REP*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 1 9.58 9.58 1.41 0.2407  
SUBJ*ICON*DIS*SEMREL(REP) 54 367.44 6.80 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 4.10 2.05 0.25 0.7801  
REP*DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 3.20 1.60 0.19 0.8234  
SUBJ*DISCO*CLAUSE*SEMREL(REP) 115 946.47 8.23 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.9719  
REP*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 23.85 23.85 2.20 0.1440  
SUBJ*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL(REP) 50 541.24 10.82 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 8.83 8.83 0.70 0.4082  
REP*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 1 11.81 11.81 0.93 0.3395  
SUBJ*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL(REP) 52 660.68 12.71 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 2 8.08 4.04 0.43 0.6553  
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE 2 60.06 30.03 3.16 0.0496  
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE(REP) 58 550.40 9.49 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 2 72.60 36.30 3.76 0.0316  
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS*SEMREL 2 114.90 57.45 5.96 0.0054 ** 
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON*DIS*SEMREL(REP) 41 395.39 9.64 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 26.30 13.15 0.90 0.4154  
REP*DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 11.81 5.90 0.41 0.6700  
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON*CLAUSE*SEMREL(REP) 32 466.00 14.56 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 1.21 0.60 0.07 0.9331  
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REP*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 2.46 1.23 0.14 0.8685  
SUBJ*DISCO*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL(REP) 41 357.06 8.71 . .  
      
Source DF SS MS F Pr > F  
DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 46.38 23.19 1.15 0.3395  
REP*DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL 2 31.72 15.86 0.78 0.4712  
SUBJ*DISCO*ICON*DIS*CLAUSE*SEMREL(REP) 18 363.70 20.21 . .  
      
1 Fmax=4, ~1339=1.02, P>.05,       
2 Fmax=4, ~1337=1.26, P>.05      
3 Fmax=12, ~454=1.05, P>.05      
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APPENDIX U 
 
Least Squared Means. 
 
 
Discourse Order by Iconicity by Semantic Relationship 
     
  Physical Social Physical Social 
  Chrono Chrono Nchrono Nchrono
GivenGiven 5.128 6.073 5.225 5.740
GivenNew 6.345 5.964 5.598 6.529
NewGiven 5.613 6.595 5.608 6.091
     
     
Iconicity by Clause    
  
Main 
Clause 
First 
Main 
Clause 
Last   
Chronological 5.657 6.249   
Non-Chronological 5.945 5.652   
     
     
Semantic Relationship by Psychological Distance 
     
  Physical Social   
Near 5.545 6.357   
Far 5.627 5.974   
     
     
Discourse Order     
     
GG 5.542    
GN 6.109    
NG 5.977    
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APPENDIX V 
 
Paired Comparisons. 
 
DISCOURSE ORDER BY ICONICITY BY SEMANTIC RELATIONSHIP  
        
ICON at GivenGiven, Physical      
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F   
ICON 1 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.8158   
SUBJ*ICON(REP) 60 269.10 4.48 . .   
        
ICON at GivenGiven, Social      
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F   
ICON 1 26.20 26.20 2.48 0.1205   
SUBJ*ICON(REP) 63 666.18 10.57 . .   
        
ICON at GivenNew, Physical      
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F TK F Value* Pr > F 
ICON 1 25.38 25.38 4.11 0.0469 4.28 >.05 
SUBJ*ICON(REP) 62 382.91 6.18 . .   
        
ICON at GivenNew, Social       
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F TK F Value Pr > F 
ICON 1 28.03 28.03 5.53 0.0218 3.91 >.05 
SUBJ*ICON(REP) 63 319.28 5.07 . .   
        
ICON at NewGiven, Physical      
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F   
ICON 1 6.13 6.13 0.96 0.3312   
SUBJ*ICON(REP) 63 402.65 6.39 . .   
        
ICON at NewGiven, Social       
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F TK F Value Pr > F 
ICON 1 45.68 45.68 5.20 0.0259 2.74 >.05 
SUBJ*ICON(REP) 63 553.02 8.78 . .   
        
* Tukey-Kramer F-value       
        
        
SEMREL at GivenGiven, Chrono      
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F TK F Value Pr > F 
SEMREL 1 57.16 57.16 8.58 0.0048 5.4 <.05 
SUBJ*SEMREL(REP) 62 413.08 6.66 . .   
        
SEMREL at GivenGiven, Nchrono      
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F   
SEMREL 1 35.06 35.06 3.63 0.0612   
SUBJ*SEMREL(REP) 63 607.84 9.65 . .   
        
SEMREL at GivenNew, Chrono      
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Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F   
SEMREL 1 13.12 13.12 2.83 0.0976   
SUBJ*SEMREL(REP) 63 292.36 4.64 . .   
        
SEMREL at GivenNew, Nchrono      
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F TK F Value Pr > F 
SEMREL 1 103.34 103.34 14.32 0.0003 2.83 >.05 
SUBJ*SEMREL(REP) 63 454.68 7.22 . .   
        
SEMREL at NewGiven, Chrono      
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F TK F Value Pr > F 
SEMREL 1 147.77 147.77 19.90 <.0001 5.42 <.05 
SUBJ*SEMREL(REP) 63 467.83 7.43 . .   
        
SEMREL at NewGiven, Nchrono      
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F   
SEMREL 1 12.06 12.06 1.50 0.2254   
SUBJ*SEMREL(REP) 63 507.05 8.05 . .   
        
        
ICONICITY BY CLAUSE       
CLAUSE at Chrono        
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F TK F Value Pr > F 
CLAUSE 1 99.12 99.12 9.96 0.0025 6.38 <.05 
SUBJ*CLAUSE(REP) 63 627.09 9.95 . .   
        
CLAUSE at Nchrono        
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F   
CLAUSE 1 26.27 26.27 3.49 0.0662   
SUBJ*CLAUSE(REP) 63 473.65 7.52 . .   
        
ICON at Mcfirst        
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F   
ICON 1 12.51 12.51 2.16 0.1466   
SUBJ*ICON(REP) 63 370.81 5.89 . .   
        
ICON at Mclast        
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F TK F Value Pr > F 
ICON 1 134.51 134.51 12.61 0.0007 6.44 <.05 
SUBJ*ICON(REP) 63 671.89 10.66 . .   
        
        
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE BY SEMANTIC RELATIONSHIP  
        
DIS at Physical        
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F   
DIS 1 0.40 0.40 0.05 0.8160   
SUBJ*DIS(REP) 63 460.20 7.30 . .   
        
DIS at Social        
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Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F   
DIS 1 37.23 37.23 3.42 0.0690   
SUBJ*DIS(REP) 63 685.59 10.88 . .   
        
SEMREL at Near        
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F TK F Value Pr > F 
SEMREL 1 226.05 226.05 32.46 <.0001 7.99 >.05 
SUBJ*SEMREL(REP) 63 438.80 6.97 . .   
        
SEMREL at Far        
Source DF SS MS F Value Pr > F   
SEMREL 1 19.25 19.25 2.39 0.1269   
SUBJ*SEMREL(REP) 63 506.73 8.04 . .   
 
 
